State v. Agnello
| Decision Date | 10 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3406-CR,96-3406-CR |
| Citation | 218 Wis.2d 829,581 N.W.2d 593 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lucian AGNELLO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: DIANE S. SYKES, Judge. Affirmed.
Before FINE, SCHUDSON and CURLEY, JJ.
Lucian Agnello appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pleaded guilty to first-degree intentional homicide, party to a crime, contrary to §§ 939.05 and 940.01(1), STATS. Before pleading guilty, Agnello made a motion to suppress his confession and was granted a hearing. Agnello claims that the trial court committed constitutional error by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him at the suppression hearing regarding the truthfulness of his confession, and erred by finding his confession to be voluntary. Agnello also claims that the trial judge erred by declining to recuse herself at his sentencing hearing. We conclude that although the prosecutor's cross-examination of Agnello regarding the truthfulness of his confession is problematic, Agnello failed to raise a sufficiently specific objection to the cross-examination. Therefore, because Agnello failed to reasonably advise the trial court of the basis for his objection, we decline to address this issue on appeal. We also conclude that the trial court properly found Agnello's confession to be voluntary and, hence, admissible. Finally, we conclude that the trial judge properly declined to recuse herself. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
On the night of February 19, 1996, Agnello was arrested in connection with the murder of his foster father, Theodore Agnello. Agnello was taken to a police station and placed in an interrogation room sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. The next day, beginning at approximately 6:00 a.m., Agnello was questioned by police detectives, with breaks taken at various periods during the day. At approximately 3:20 p.m., Agnello signed a confession.
Agnello was charged with first-degree intentional homicide, party to a crime. He filed a motion to suppress his confession based on allegations of involuntariness and the denial of his request for counsel during police questioning. On April 19, 1996, the trial court held a suppression hearing at which Agnello testified. On cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly questioned Agnello concerning the truthfulness of his confession. Over Agnello's defense counsel's general relevancy objection, the trial court allowed the questioning and required Agnello to answer. The trial court then found that Agnello's testimony concerning the events surrounding the confession was incredible, and found that his confession was voluntary.
On May 14, 1996, Agnello pleaded guilty to first-degree intentional homicide, party to a crime. At the sentencing hearing, Agnello requested that the trial judge recuse herself. Agnello based his motion on the fact that the trial judge had learned that Agnello's codefendant, Douglas Stream, was employed by a window company that had worked on her home, and that she had called the window company and requested that her file be secured to prevent access to her home address. The trial judge found that her actions did not prevent her from acting impartially, and she declined to recuse herself. The trial court then sentenced Agnello to life in prison with a parole eligibility date in fifty-five years. Agnello now appeals.
Agnello claims that the trial court committed constitutional error, under Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), when it allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding the truthfulness of his confession during the Miranda-Goodchild hearing, 1 and relied on his testimony in determining the confession's admissibility. We conclude that Agnello has waived his right to make this argument on appeal.
At the Miranda-Goodchild hearing, Agnello testified that the police had not read him his Miranda rights, that the police had refused his request for a lawyer, and that his confession was coerced by the tactics the police used during the interrogation. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Agnello numerous questions concerning the truthfulness of his confession which the trial court required Agnello to answer. Early in the cross-examination, in response to the prosecutor's question, "But you and Mr. Stream planned this killing; is that correct?" Agnello's counsel objected by stating, It is unclear whether the word "relative" is an error attributable to the court reporter or to Agnello's counsel. In any event, the trial court apparently interpreted the objection as pertaining to relevancy, and overruled it, stating, 2
The general relevancy objection which Agnello made at trial is very different than the argument Agnello now makes on appeal. During the hearing, Agnello merely stated that the evidence was irrelevant, and he now cites to authority for that proposition, specifically arguing that, according to Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961), and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the prosecution's cross-examination was irrelevant and constitutionally impermissible. Agnello bases his claim on the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Rogers and Jackson that a trial court's determination of whether a confession was voluntarily given should not be affected by considerations regarding the truthfulness of the confession. See Rogers, 365 U.S. at 543-44 (), see also Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77 ( ). Although we find Agnello's claim raises some concern, it is clear that he failed to present the trial court with any information concerning either Rogers or Jackson, and, at the suppression hearing, he failed to develop the argument he now makes on appeal beyond a general claim that the evidence was irrelevant.
The specific ground for objection must be stated at trial in order for the objection to be preserved on appeal. See § 901.03(1)(a), STATS; see also Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis.2d 1, 10, 456 N.W.2d 797, 801 (1990) (). An objection is sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal if it apprises the court of the specific grounds upon which it is based. See Holmes v. State, 76 Wis.2d 259, 271, 251 N.W.2d 56, 62 (1977). "To be sufficiently specific, an objection must reasonably advise the court of the basis for the objection." State v. Peters, 166 Wis.2d 168, 174, 479 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Ct.App.1991). The rule requiring a specific, contemporaneous objection advances a number of important objectives, including: (1) enabling the record to be made when witnesses recollections are freshest; (2) enabling the judge, who has observed the witnesses' demeanors, to make factual determinations; (3) giving the trial court the opportunity to exclude evidence, which might lead to the defendant's acquittal; and (4) encouraging the parties to view the trial as an event of significance that should be kept as error-free as possible. See State v. Davis, 199 Wis.2d 513, 517-19, 545 N.W.2d 244, 245-46 (Ct.App.1996).
Agnello's objection did not "apprise the court of the specific grounds upon which it [wa]s based," nor did it "reasonably advise the court of [its] basis." See Holmes, 76 Wis.2d at 271, 251 N.W.2d at 62; Peters, 166 Wis.2d at 174, 479 N.W.2d at 200. Without reference to the statements made by the Supreme Court in Rogers and Jackson, and without any other explanation or argument by the defendant's counsel, evidence concerning the truthfulness of a defendant's confession might reasonably seem relevant to a trial court attempting to appraise the credibility of a testifying witness. Thus, Agnello now presents an argument he did not ask the trial court to address. If we were to address Agnello's argument, we would undermine the objectives of the rule requiring a specific and contemporaneous objection. Thus, in order to preserve the objectives of the rule requiring a contemporaneous and specific objection to every perceived trial court error, we must decline to address this argument. See Davis, 199 Wis.2d at 517-19, 545 N.W.2d at 245-46. Therefore, we conclude that Agnello has waived his right to make this argument on appeal, and we decline to address it. 3
Agnello also claims on appeal that the trial court erred by finding his confession to be voluntary. We disagree.
We first note that the parties disagree regarding the State's burden of persuasion. The State...
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