State v. Aguilar, 020221 NMCA, A-1-CA-36967
| Opinion Judge | JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge |
| Party Name | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE LUIS AGUILAR, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Attorney | Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant |
| Judge Panel | WE CONCUR: MEGAN P. DUFFY JUDGE SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, JUDGE |
| Case Date | February 02, 2021 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY JACQUELINE D. FLORES, DISTRICT JUDGE
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
OPINION
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge
{¶1} Defendant Jose Luis Aguilar appeals from convictions of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(E) (2011, amended 2019), and concealing identity, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-3 (1963). Defendant first appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, claiming that the evidence was obtained as the consequence of unlawful detention and questioning by police. Substantial evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. Because this is the only basis on which Defendant appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance, we affirm that conviction.
{¶2} Defendant seeks reversal of his concealing identity conviction on three additional grounds: (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that the police officer was acting in a "legal performance of his duty," as required by Section 30-22-3; (2) the district court erred in refusing to give Defendant's requested concealing identity jury instruction; and (3) the district court erred in refusing to clarify the instruction that the police officer must act in the "legal performance of his duty" in response to the jury's questions during deliberations. We agree with Defendant that reasonable suspicion to detain and question a suspect is an essential element of the charge of concealing identity, pursuant to Section 30-22-3. We agree as well that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. Because we reverse on this ground, we do not consider Defendant's remaining claims of error.
BACKGROUND
{¶3} The Albuquerque Police Department was dispatched to a local restaurant following a call by the restaurant's manager. The manager reported that she was concerned about a group of four or five people, including Defendant, who were in the restaurant and were acting suspiciously. The manager reported that each person in the group was in the restroom for ten minutes, one after another. When the last person in the group, a woman, had been in the restroom for twenty minutes and failed to respond to the manager's knock on the restroom door, the manager called the police. The manager testified that the group's use of the restroom made her suspect drug activity.
{¶4} Two officers arrived approximately ten minutes after the manager called the police. By that time, most of the group had left. The only members of the group left at the restaurant were the woman, who remained inside the restroom, and Defendant. Defendant had left the table where the group had shared a pizza and was standing outside under the restaurant's awning.
{¶5} The officers spoke with the manager for less than one minute and then knocked on the restroom door. When a woman came out of the restroom, the officers began to question her. One of the officers asked the woman who she was with, and she pointed out Defendant. Officer Willsey went outside to talk to Defendant.
{¶6} Officer Willsey first asked Defendant whether he had a weapon. When Defendant answered that he had a pocket knife, Officer Willsey patted Defendant down and found two pocket knives.
{¶7} Officer Willsey then asked Defendant for his name. Defendant gave the officer a false name. Officer Willsey told Defendant to sit on a nearby curb while the officer ran a computer check. The State admitted that Officer Willsey had detained Defendant and that Defendant was not free to leave. Officer Willsey testified both at the suppression hearing and at trial that he detained Defendant on suspicion of criminal trespass. See NMSA 1978, § 30-14-1 (1995) (defining criminal trespass); see also UJI 14-1402 NMRA (providing a criminal trespass uniform jury instruction).
{¶8} When, after several minutes, Officer Willsey could not confirm Defendant's identity, Officer Willsey confronted Defendant and demanded his correct name and social security number. Defendant again gave Officer Willsey a false name and social security number. Officer Willsey went back to his computer and discovered that the social security number Defendant had given him belonged to a woman.
{¶9} As Officer Willsey was completing his second identity check, he noticed that Defendant was staring at the transit center across the street. Officer Willsey suspected Defendant was planning to run. Shortly after, Defendant ran across the street toward the transit center. Officer Willsey apprehended and arrested him. In a search incident to Defendant's arrest, five bindles of methamphetamine were found in Defendant's jacket pocket. Defendant was charged with concealing identity, in violation of Section 30-22-3, and possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Section 30-31-23(E).
{¶10} Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress all statements made and all evidence seized after his detention by Officer Willsey, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Officer Willsey had reasonable suspicion to detain and question him. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was tried before a jury on both charges.
{¶11} At the conclusion of the State's evidence at trial, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the charge of concealing identity. He argued that the State was required to prove as an element of concealing identity that the officer had "reasonable suspicion" to detain and question Defendant, pursuant to Section 30-22-3, and had failed to do so. The district court denied the motion for directed verdict and allowed both charges to go to the jury.
{¶12} Defendant then requested that the district court instruct the jury that they needed to find the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant to convict Defendant of concealing identity. The court denied Defendant's request. Defendant was convicted by the jury of both offenses.
{¶13} This appeal followed. Because the evidence offered by the State to establish that Officer Willsey had reasonable suspicion to detain and question Defendant differed significantly at trial from that offered at the suppression hearing, the evidence relevant to our decision will be reviewed during the discussion of each issue below.
DISCUSSION
I. The District Court Properly Denied Defendant's Pretrial Motion to Suppress
{¶14} Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that Officer Willsey lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime when he was detained. We conclude that substantial evidence at the suppression hearing supports the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress because the evidence establishes that Officer Willsey had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that Defendant had committed criminal trespass when he detained Defendant.
{¶15} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. We review factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal determinations de novo." State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 10, 357 P.3d 958 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "First, we look for substantial evidence to support the district court's factual findings, with deference to the district court's review of the testimony and other evidence presented." State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8, 410 P.3d 186 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We then review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion because "the decision of whether police conduct was objectively reasonable extends beyond fact-finding." State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 19, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our review of a suppression hearing relies on the entire record, not just the record of the suppression hearing. State v. Monafo, 2016-NMCA-092, ¶ 10, 384 P.3d 134.
{¶16} Reasonable suspicion is viewed from the perspective of what the officer knew at the time the officer detained a suspect. See State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8, 146 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579. "Reasonable suspicion must exist at the inception of the stop and cannot be based on facts that arise as a result of the encounter." State v. Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-006, ¶ 13, 387 P.3d 323 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Reasonable suspicion exists where an officer can point to specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts that, when judged objectively would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unsupported intuition or inarticulate hunches are not enough. Id.
{¶17} At the suppression hearing, Officer Willsey testified that he and his partner were dispatched to the local restaurant through a computer-aided dispatch system (CADS) after the restaurant's manager made a suspicious person call to the police. The CADS gave Officer Willsey a narrative of why he was being dispatched. When Officer Willsey arrived at the restaurant, he spoke to the manager. Officer Willsey testified that the manager pointed out Defendant, identifying him as one of the...
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