State v. Ahmed

Decision Date04 August 2021
Docket NumberDocket No. 47521
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
Parties STATE of Idaho, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Moawia Omer AHMED, Defendant-Appellant.

169 Idaho 151
492 P.3d 1110

STATE of Idaho, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Moawia Omer AHMED, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 47521

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2021 Term.

Filed: August 4, 2021


Anthony R. Geddes, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Appellant. Sarah E. Tompkins argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. John C. McKinney argued.

BEVAN, Chief Justice.

While this is a case about a conviction for violating a protection order, the principal focus is on the statutes and guidelines governing domestic violence courts in Idaho. Moawia Omer Ahmed was charged with violating a protection order under Idaho Code section 39-6312. At his arraignment, Ahmed's case was transferred to the Ada County Domestic Violence Court ("DVC"). In his pretrial motions, Ahmed moved the magistrate court to dismiss the charge on constitutional grounds. The magistrate court denied Ahmed's motion, the case proceeded to trial, and, ultimately, a jury found Ahmed guilty.

Ahmed appealed his conviction to the district court. Ahmed maintained the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Ahmed also argued the magistrate court erred by: 1) admitting hearsay evidence; 2) failing to properly instruct the jury; and 3) requiring Ahmed to undergo a domestic violence

492 P.3d 1115

assessment. The district court, in its intermediate appellate capacity, affirmed. Ahmed appeals the district court's decision. We likewise affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2017, based on a petition filed under Idaho Code section 39-63041 by Nabila Hamid, Ahmed's wife, a magistrate court issued a protection order against Ahmed. The protection order remained effective for one year, as authorized by Idaho Code section 39-6306.2 The protection order listed Nabila as the protected party, as well as Ahmed and Nabila's two minor sons, S.O. and A.A. The protection order prohibited Ahmed from knowingly remaining within three-hundred feet of S.O.’s elementary school, among other locations not pertinent to this appeal.

On December 12, 2017, officers with the Boise Police Department responded to the elementary school after the school secretary called and informed police Ahmed had been there and attempted to visit S.O. Based on this call, Ahmed was ultimately arrested and cited for violating the protection order, a misdemeanor in violation of Idaho Code section 39-6312(1).

At Ahmed's arraignment, the prosecutor assigned Ahmed's case to DVC.3 In his pretrial motions, Ahmed moved the magistrate court to dismiss the charge pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)(2), alleging "constitutional defects." Ahmed argued:

First, the [protection order] entered in October 2018 violated the separation of powers doctrine when the judiciary subsumed the role of the legislature by issuing an order defining criminal conduct. Second, the [DVC] lacks the statutory authority to adjudicate the case because no written criteria for the eligibility, protocol and processes for discharge of participants exists, as required by Idaho Code and the Idaho Supreme Court Guidelines. ...

As to his second argument, Ahmed also claimed that the "lack of set rules and procedures in DVC violates [Ahmed's] right to procedural due process." The magistrate court denied Ahmed's motion to dismiss.

Ahmed sought a permissive appeal of the denial of his motion to dismiss from the district court. The district court denied Ahmed's permissive appeal and remanded the case to the "[m]agistrate [d]ivision for continued hearings as currently set[.]" The case proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, the State called the school secretary to testify. The secretary testified that Ahmed went to the main office at the elementary school and asked to see his son, S.O. The secretary also testified that Ahmed left after she informed him that S.O. was not on campus because school had ended early that day. The secretary explained that after

492 P.3d 1116

Ahmed left she confirmed in S.O.’s file that Ahmed was subject to the protection order and she called the police to inform them of Ahmed's visit to the school. The State later moved to admit an audio recording of the phone call between the school secretary and the police dispatcher through the dispatcher's testimony. Ahmed objected on foundation and hearsay grounds. The State, in response, argued the evidence was admissible under the present sense impression to the rule against hearsay. The magistrate court agreed and admitted the recording.

At the completion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the magistrate court, along with the parties, addressed the proposed post-proof jury instructions. Ahmed advocated for the magistrate court to include an intent element to the instruction that listed the elements required for a violation of a protection order. The magistrate court declined to include an intent element in the instruction.

The jury found Ahmed guilty of violating the protection order. The magistrate court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Ahmed to 365 days in jail, with credit for two days served and 363 suspended for two years of probation, with the first year supervised. The court also suspended a $1,000 fine and ordered that Ahmed pay court costs. Additionally, the magistrate court ordered Ahmed to "complete a domestic violence evaluation."

Ahmed appealed to the district court. Ahmed argued the magistrate court erred by: 1) denying Ahmed's motion to dismiss; 2) admitting the audio recording under the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay; 3) failing to include an intent element in the jury instructions; and 4) ordering Ahmed to undergo a domestic violence evaluation as part of his sentence. The district court affirmed the magistrate court. Ahmed timely appealed the district court's decision.

II. QUESTIONS ON APPEAL

1. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate court's denial of Ahmed's motion to dismiss?

2. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate court's admission of the audio recording of the school secretary's phone call under the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay?

3. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate court giving a jury instruction that did not include an intent element for violation of a protection order?

4. Did the district court err in affirming Ahmed's sentence?

5. Is reversal of Ahmed's conviction necessary under the cumulative error doctrine?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"On review of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision." State v. Lantis , 165 Idaho 427, 428, 447 P.3d 875, 876 (2019). The standard is as follows:

Th[is] Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.

Ellis v. Ellis , 167 Idaho 1, 6–7, 467 P.3d 365, 370–71 (2020) (quoting Pelayo v. Pelayo , 154 Idaho 855, 858–59, 303 P.3d 214, 217–18 (2013) ). "[T]his Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court. Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court." Id . at 7, 467 P.3d at 371 (quoting Pelayo , 154 Idaho at 859, 303 P.3d at 218 (internal citations and quotations omitted)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Ahmed asserts the same errors here that he did before the district court. First, Ahmed argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss because both the DVC process and Idaho Code section 39-6312 are unconstitutional. Second, Ahmed argues the district

492 P.3d 1117

court erred in affirming the magistrate court's admission of hearsay evidence because the trial court's error was not harmless. Third, Ahmed argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's jury instructions because the magistrate court failed to provide an instruction on the requisite intent of violating a protection order. Fourth, Ahmed argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's sentence that ordered Ahmed undergo a domestic violence evaluation because the sentence was based on charges of which Ahmed had been acquitted. Last, Ahmed argues, if the errors individually do not warrant reversal, reversal of his conviction is necessary under the cumulative error doctrine. For the reasons below, we affirm the district court's decision.

A. The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court's denial of Ahmed's motion to dismiss.

When confronted with Ahmed's motion to dismiss the charge against him based on constitutional defects with the DVC process, the magistrate court denied the motion, explaining:

I think that a defendant does not ... opt into this court, if he's assigned to this court, the defendant is in this court, but he's entitled to all the due process considerations. The defendant does not have to plead guilty to anything ... he or she would be entitled to have a trial, would be entitled to have an attorney appointed or have an attorney of their own choice represent them and they would be entitled to have a pretrial conference, a jury trial. Also[,] there are [a] number of post-adjudication reviews.

If the defendant is found not guilty ... then the case is simply not in this court.

So, overall, I think this is a due process court. ... [O]n those grounds and on the constitutional grounds that are related, I don't think there is any particular liberty interests that a defendant can assert ... that a defendant would be entitled to have the case handled by a judge not involved with domestic violence court.

The district court affirmed. First, the...

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