State v. Aho, 65656-8

Citation137 Wn.2d 736,975 P.2d 512
Decision Date22 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. 65656-8,65656-8
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Fonua AHO, Petitioner.
Douglas Stratemeyer, Seattle, for Petitioner

Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Tod Bergstrom, Deputy, Seattle, for Respondent.

MADSEN, J.

Petitioner was convicted of three counts of first degree child molestation and one count of rape of a child. He claims his convictions for child molestation violate ex post facto prohibitions because the statute under which he was charged and under which the jury was instructed did not take effect until approximately a year and a half after the beginning of the charging period. We agree that those convictions must be reversed and this matter remanded on the ground that the convictions violate due process.

FACTS

The charges against Fonua Aho were based upon conduct alleged to have occurred during a period of time beginning in January 1987 and ending December 31, 1992, where Aho's daughter L. was the victim, and ending August 1995, where his other daughter M. was the victim. In accord with RCW 9A.44.083, the jury was instructed that to convict Aho on any of the child molestation counts, the State had to prove that he had sexual contact with the victim during a stated time period beginning January 1, 1987, that the victim was under age 12, and that Aho was at least 36 months older than the victim. Jury instructions 4, 5, 11, 13; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 87, 88, 94, 96. RCW 9A.44.083 was not effective until July 1, 1988. Laws of 1988, ch. 145, § 5.

The jury convicted Aho of two counts of first degree child molestation involving L., one count of first degree child molestation involving M., and one count of first degree rape of a child involving M. The jury was not asked to identify when the acts giving rise to the child molestation convictions occurred. Thus, it is possible that Aho was convicted for an act occurring before the effective date of the statute.

Aho appealed, arguing, among other things, that his convictions for child molestation violate ex post facto prohibitions of the state and federal constitutions because the jury may have convicted him for acts occurring before the effective date of RCW 9A.44.083. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the child molestation statute is simply a recodification of the former indecent liberties statute which did not include any revisions which affected the outcome in this case, and, therefore, the convictions did not violate ex post facto laws because as applied the statute criminalized the same conduct as the indecent liberties statute. State v. Aho, 89 Wash.App. 842, 852-54, 954 P.2d 911, review granted, 136 Wash.2d 1007, 966 P.2d 903 (1998). The Court of Appeals also concluded, however, that the State properly conceded that new sentencing guidelines for child molestation could not be applied to acts which may have occurred before their effective date without violating ex post facto prohibitions. The court therefore remanded for resentencing under the sentencing guidelines applicable to indecent liberties. Id. at 855, 954 P.2d 911.

Aho then sought discretionary review, challenging only his convictions for child molestation. This court granted review. Because the defense proposed "to convict" instructions on two of the child molestation counts which included a period beginning in January 1987, the court asked for additional briefing on the issue of whether error, if any, was invited error.

ANALYSIS

Although the focus of the parties' argument and the Court of Appeals' decision is whether an ex post facto violation occurred, after consideration we conclude this case involves a due process rather than an ex post facto question. While ordinarily we will decide a case only on the basis of issues raised in the petition for review and the answer, RAP 13.7(b), this court has the authority to determine whether a matter is properly before the court, to perform those acts which are proper to secure fair and orderly review, and to waive the rules of appellate procedure when necessary to "serve the ends of justice." RAP 1.2(c), 7.3; see Kruse v. Hemp, 121 Wash.2d 715, 721, 853 P.2d 1373 (1993); City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994) (court with inherent discretionary authority to reach an issue not briefed by parties if the issue is necessary for decision). This court may raise an issue sua sponte and rest its decision on that issue. RAP 12.1(b); Greengo v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 135 Wash.2d 799, 813, 959 P.2d 657 (1998). One factor that we have considered in determining whether to exercise this authority is to decide whether the issue is a purely legal one. McCready, 123 Wash.2d at 269, 868 P.2d 134. Generally, we request additional briefing. See RAP 12.1(b); Greengo, 135 Wash.2d at 812-13, 959 P.2d 657. However, if briefing is not necessary to full and fair resolution of the issue, we will, in the rare case, decide the issue without additional briefing. See Falk v. Keene Corp., 113 Wash.2d 645, 659, 782 P.2d 974 (1989); Alverado v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 111 Wash.2d 424, 430, 759 P.2d 427 (1988).

Here, the issue is a legal one, and the due process violation is so apparent that additional briefing is unnecessary. Further, as explained below, the underlying principles of the due process violation here are similar to those underlying ex post facto prohibitions.

The jury convicted Aho of three counts of first degree child molestation, RCW 9A.44.083, but did not specify whether the acts that it found constituted the offenses occurred before or after July 1, 1988. As indicated, Aho maintains these convictions violate ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. However, the statute cannot be regarded as a retrospective law and therefore no ex post facto issue arises.

The enactment of ex post facto laws is prohibited by the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("[n]o state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law"); Const. art. I, § 23 ("[n]o ... ex post facto law ... shall ever be passed....") The ex post facto clauses prohibit the Legislature from enacting laws that alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase the punishment for a crime. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997); 1 in RE personaL restraint oF stanphill, 134 wash.2d 165, 169, 949 P.2d 365 (1998). "To fall within the ex post facto prohibition, a law must be retrospective--that is 'it must apply to events occurring before its enactment'...." Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, 117 S.Ct. 891 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)).

The Legislature did not intend that RCW 9A.44.083 apply retrospectively. In 1988, the Legislature enacted a number of statutes defining first, second, and third degree rape of a child and first, second, and third degree child molestation. RCW 9A.44.073 through .089. The bill creating the new statutes expressly stated that they apply only to offenses committed after July 1, 1988. Laws of 1988, ch. 145, § 25 ("This act ... shall apply only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1988."). The Legislature clearly did not enact a law applying to events occurring before its enactment.

Rather than an ex post facto issue, this case raises a due process question. However, underlying principles are similar. In addressing the argument that judicial decisions are subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the United States Supreme Court explained that the ex post facto prohibition applies to the legislative branch, and thus judicial decisions which are applied retroactively may raise due process concerns, but do not fall within the ex post facto clause itself. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) ("[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature ... and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government"). In such a case, the due process issue is akin to an ex post facto issue, though, because "the principle on which the [ex post facto] Clause is based [is] the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties" and this is "fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty." Id. at 191, 97 S.Ct. 990.

Application of the statute under the facts here cannot be attributed to legislative action; the Legislature plainly and clearly provided that the statute does not apply to acts occurring before July 1988. Instead, in direct violation of this clear legislative mandate both the state and defense counsel permitted this matter to go forward despite the fact that the charging period, set forth in the jury instructions, included a substantial period of time before July 1988.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals reasoning, the first degree child molestation statute does not simply recodify the same offense defined as indecent liberties under former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b). 2 Aside from the issue whether the two statutes have the same mental element, disputed by the parties, the child molestation statute has different age and age differential elements. Whereas indecent liberties under former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b) involved sexual contact with a child under 14 years of age, first degree child molestation involves sexual contact with a child under 12 years of age. In addition, the first degree child molestation statute requires that the perpetrator be at least thirty-six months older than the victim is. In contrast, indecent liberties under former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b) did not have this element. Compare former RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b) with RCW 9A.44.083. Because the elements are not the same, the first degree child molestation statute does not state the same offense as the former indecent liberties statute, RCW 9A.44.100(1)(b). Moreover, while indecent liberties under former RCW...

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