State v. Aikins

• Decision Date: 24 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 74582,74582
• Citation: 932 P.2d 408,261 Kan. 346
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Robert AIKINS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 408

932 P.2d 408

261 Kan. 346

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v.Robert AIKINS, Appellant.

No. 74582.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 24, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1.When reviewing a trial court's suppression of evidence, the appellate courts normally give great deference to the factual findings of the trial court.The ultimate determination of the trial court's suppression of evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate determination.

2.If a warrantless arrest is challenged by a defendant, the burden is on the State to justify the arrest was not only authorized by the statute, but that it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.The constitutional validity of a warrantless arrest depends upon whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed a felony.

3.Probable cause for arrest without a warrant depends upon the probabilities arising from known facts and circumstances.Probable cause exists when the practical considerations of everyday life would lead a reasonable and prudent officer to believe a felony has been or is being committed.

4.Statements of citizen informers are not viewed with such rigid scrutiny as the testimony of a police informer.

5.Two factors which come into play when evaluating the conduct of the police in making a warrantless arrest are: the seriousness of the alleged offense and the exigency of the situation, as where immediate arrest seems desirable because of the likelihood that the suspect will flee the jurisdiction.

6.In determining whether probable cause to arrest exists, all the information in the officer's possession, fair inferences therefrom, and facts may be taken into consideration that might not be admissible on the issue of guilt.

7.Two or more defendants, charged in separate complaints or informations which allege that the defendants have participated in the same act or acts, may be later joined for trial if the defendants could have been charged in the same complaint, information, or indictment.The determination of whether two defendants could have been charged together in the same complaint and thus tried together, even though the defendants were actually charged in separate complaints, is in the trial court's discretion.

8.In order for a trial court to conduct separate trials for defendants who could be joined together in one complaint and trial, actual prejudice stemming from a joint trial must be shown.

9.The usual grounds to show prejudice so that severance or nonjoinder will be granted are as follows: (1) that the defendants have antagonistic defenses; (2) that important evidence in favor of one of the defendants which would be admissible in a separate trial would not be allowed in a joint trial; (3) that evidence incompetent as to one defendant and introducible against another would work prejudicially to the former with the jury; (4) that a confession by one defendant, if introduced and proved, would be calculated to prejudice the jury against other defendants; and (5) that one of the defendants who could give evidence for the whole or some of the other defendants would become a competent and compellable witness on the separate trials of such other defendants.

10.A mere allegation of an antagonistic defense is not enough.Antagonistic defenses occur when each defendant is attempting to convict the other or the defenses conflict to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.A mere inconsistency in trial strategy does not constitute an antagonistic defense.

11.A defendant is not entitled to severance simply because separate trials would provide him or her with a better chance of acquittal.Before a trial court may grant severance on this ground, it must be shown that the prejudice which would flow from a joint trial would be beyond the curative power of a cautionary instruction, thereby denying the defendant a fair trial.

12.The purpose of the voir dire examination is to enable the parties to select competent jurors without bias, prejudice, or partiality.The nature and scope of the voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

13.Allegations of judicial misconduct during trial must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding such alleged misconduct.In order to warrant or require the granting of a new trial, it must affirmatively appear that the conduct was of such a nature that it prejudiced the substantial rights of the complaining party.A mere possibility of prejudice from a remark of the judge is not sufficient to overturn a verdict or judgment.If a proper and reasonable construction will render the remark unobjectionable, the remark is not prejudicial.

14.Terminating a trial and declaring a mistrial on one of the statutory grounds listed in K.S.A. 22-3423 is largely within the discretion of the trial court.A clear showing of abuse of discretion must be made before the decision of the trial court will be set aside on appeal.

15.Judicial discretion must be considered as exercisable only within the bounds of reason and justice in the broader sense and be considered abused only when it plainly overpasses those bounds.

16.A two-part test evaluates alleged violations of an order in limine.First, there must be a determination whether there was a violation of the order in limine.Second, if the order in limine is violated, there must be a determination whether the testimony elicited in violation of the order substantially prejudiced the defendant.The burden is on the defendant to show he or she was substantially prejudiced.

17.A defendant has a constitutionally protected privilege to request and obtain from the prosecution evidence that is material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.Suppression of such evidence is a violation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.Prosecutors are under a positive duty, independent of court order, to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant.This duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense exists even where no request has been made.

18.There are three classifications regarding a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence: (1) where there is a deliberate bad faith suppression for the purpose of obstructing the defense or intentional failure to disclose evidence which has high probative value and which could not have escaped the prosecutor's attention; (2) where there is a deliberate refusal to honor a request for evidence where evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith in refusing the request; and (3) where suppression was not deliberate and no request for evidence was made, but where hindsight discloses that the defense could have put the evidence to significant use.

19.The test to review all exculpatory evidence questions is the same.To grant a mistrial based on evidence withheld by the prosecution, the evidence must be clearly exculpatory and must be material so that its suppression was clearly prejudicial to the defendant.

20.Evidence is exculpatory if it tends to disprove a fact in issue which is material to guilt or punishment.Evidence is also exculpatory if it bears upon the credibility of a key witness on an important issue in the case.

21.Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

22.When the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant prior to trial, if the evidence becomes available to the defendant during trial and the defendant is not prejudiced in defending against it, the prosecution's failure to disclose the evidence earlier will not constitute a due process violation or reversible error.

23.The declaration of a mistrial is a matter entrusted to the trial court's discretion.The test of whether the trial court abused its discretion is whether no reasonable person would agree with the trial court.In criminal trials, the prosecution is given wide latitude in language and in manner or presentation of closing argument as long as it is consistent with the evidence.Improper remarks made by the prosecutor on closing argument are grounds for reversal only when they are so gross and flagrant so as to prejudice the jury against the defendant and to deny the defendant a fair trial.

24.No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he or she objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he or she objects and the grounds for the objection, unless the instruction is clearly erroneous.An instruction is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court reaches a firm conviction that if the trial error had not occurred, there is a real possibility the jury would have returned a different verdict.

25.When reviewing challenges to jury instructions, the instructions are to be considered together and read as a whole without isolating any one instruction.If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts in the case, and if the jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, then the instructions do not constitute reversible error although they may be in some small way erroneous.

26.When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Joseph L. Dioszeghy, Overland Park, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, Assistant District Attorney, argued the...