State v. Ala. Coushatta Tribe of Tex.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:01–CV–299 |
| Parties | State of TEXAS, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA COUSHATTA TRIBE OF TEXAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Anne Marie Mackin, Benjamin Storey Lyles, Michael Raphael Abrams, William Terrell Deane, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.
Danny Scot Ashby, David Ingram Monteiro, Justin Roel Chapa, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Dallas, TX, Chris Allen Rule, General Counsel Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas, Livingston, TX, David R. Lundgren, Crowell Law Offices, Bandon, OR, Frederick Richard Petti, Petti and Briones PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, Scott David Crowell, Crowell Law Offices, Sedona, AZ, for Defendant.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Local Rules for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, and order of the District Court, this proceeding is before the undersigned United States Magistrate for all matters, including trial and entry of judgment. Pending before the Court for purposes of this order are:
-the State of Texas' First Amended Motion for Contempt for Violation of the June 25, 2002, Injunction, and Alternatively for Equitable Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (doc. #74) and Motion for Summary Judgment of Contempt and to Enforce the Court's June 25, 2002, Permanent Injunction (doc. #96); and
-the Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas' Motion for Relief from Judgment (doc. #76) and Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #99).
On November 21, 2001, the Alabama–Coushatta Tribe of Texas ("The Tribe") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (doc. #1) against the State of Texas ("The State") and a handful of its officials seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under the provisions of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama–Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("The Restoration Act"), the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 ("IGRA"), and case law. Specifically, the Tribe sought injunctive relief allowing the Tribe to govern gaming activities on its Indian lands, free from interference. In the original complaint, the Tribe cited the imminent threat presented by Texas potentially interfering in the Tribe's exercise of its sovereign and statutory rights to offer certain gaming activities on Tribal lands. The Tribe also cited background information about its circumstances at the time, including a 46% unemployment rate, poor health conditions, and a median household income for the Tribe of $10,809. See Complaint (doc. #1), at p. 6. The Tribe stated that it is responsible for stewardship of its 4,593 acre Reservation, the external boundaries of which fall within Polk County, Texas. The land lies in the Big Thicket area and is generally unsuitable for raising crops or cattle. The Tribe claims that it was wrongfully dispossessed of over two million acres of its original Reservation, but acknowledges that it was seeking a declaration of its rights only regarding the current acreage held by the United States in trust for the benefit of the Tribe. The complaint goes on to explain the background regarding the Restoration Act of 1987 and the resulting sovereign authority of federally recognized tribes to govern gaming activities.
By means of the Restoration Act of 1987, Indian tribes were restored to federally recognized status. Through the Restoration Act, all rights or privileges lost to the tribes under the Termination Act of 1954, codified in Title 25, United States Code, were restored to the tribes, including the tribes' authority to manage their own affairs, govern themselves, regulate internal matters and substantive law, and have territorial boundaries. See Complaint (doc. #1), at ¶ 17. In this case, the Tribe avers that certain members of Congress threatened to block passage of the Restoration Act unless the Tribe agreed to language which would forever prevent it from engaging in gaming activities on its lands. Id. at ¶ 18. The Tribe claims that under duress, it was coerced into passing a tribal resolution supporting such language, which if passed into law, would have precluded gaming. Id. Congress passed the governing Restoration Act in 1987, and the Tribe's Resolution was incorporated into the Act. See 25 U.S.C.S. § 737(a)1 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2017).
The complaint also discussed the United States Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians , 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), which the Tribe contends should be applied to Texas public policy to allow for the Tribe to have sovereign and inherent authority over its gaming activities. See Complaint , at ¶ 19–21. In 1999, the General Council for the Tribe voted for the Tribe to offer gaming activities as a source to generate badly-needed tribal government revenues. Id. at ¶ 23. The Tribe constructed and opened an Entertainment Facility for members of the Tribe's private gaming club. Id. at ¶ 24. The Entertainment Facility maintained a number of gaming devices, including random number generators, electronic ticket dispensers, electronic pull tabs, spinning reel slots, and video lottery devices. Id. The Tribe cited a number of other gaming activities that are protected in Texas, including the State Lottery, a horse racing industry, an extensive "slot parlor" market, charitable carnival or casino nights, high-stakes bingo, raffles, casino cruises. Id. at ¶ 26. The Tribe also claimed that the State had embraced a policy of "willful blindness" when it came to non-enforcement as thousands of "eight-liner" games were being used in hundreds of establishments throughout Texas, despite the State's official policy against allowing such private, non-governmental "lottery" games. Id. at ¶ 27. The complaint notes that the Texas State Lottery and Texas State Horse Racing Commission have the regulatory/discretionary authority over gambling/gaming devices. Id. at ¶ 28. In conclusion, the Tribe filed their initial complaint seeking a declaration and injunctive relief from the court permitting it to possess authority to regulate gaming activities on its own Indian lands and to authorize and regulate forms of gaming on its own lands. See id. at ¶¶ 35–41.
After the Tribe filed the original complaint, the following course of events ensued. The State filed an answer with a competing motion for injunctive relief. The presiding judge at the time, The Honorable John Hannah, Jr., stayed the case pending a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a related case2 , Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo.3 After the Fifth Circuit handed down its January 17, 2002, order affirming the district court in the Ysleta case, the Court lifted the stay in this case. Judge Hannah then conducted a four (4) day hearing on the requested relief, and issued his findings of fact and memorandum opinion after receiving the parties' post-hearing proposed findings of fact and briefs.
Judge Hannah issued his ruling on June 25, 2002, in a 22–page memorandum opinion and order in which he granted relief to the State of Texas in the form of a permanent injunction (doc. #36), Alabama–Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Texas , 208 F.Supp.2d 670, 674 (E.D. Tex. 2002). In sum, he held that "the Tribe should be permanently enjoined from operating its casino because (1) under the plain language of the Restoration Act, as codified in Title 25 of the United States Code, Section 737(a), and Texas law the Tribe is prohibited from conducting casino gaming and (2) the Tribe's resolution not to engage in gaming in exchange for restoration of its federal trust status was "incorporated into the Restoration Act." Id. at 672. Judge Hannah carefully analyzed governing precedent, including the Restoration Act and its history, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. State of Tex. , 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1016, 115 S.Ct. 1358, 131 L.Ed.2d 215 (1995) ( Ysleta I ), and the Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon . See id. at 672–678. He concluded that the Tribe's activities in operating the Entertainment Center (to include gaming activities) violated provisions of the Texas Penal Code which prohibit certain manners of gambling and that the Entertainment Center was a public nuisance under law. See id. at 678–79 )4 (governing common and public nuisances as defined by Texas Penal Code) ). Based on this conclusion, and after weighing the appropriate factors to consider before issuing injunctive relief, Judge Hannah ordered the Tribe to cease and desist in operating its gaming and gambling activities on the Tribe's reservation which violate state law. Id. at 682.
On July 17, 2002, Judge Hannah entered final judgment and denied the Tribe's request to stay his ruling pending appeal (doc. #47, doc. #48). On September 11, 2002, while the appeal was pending, he also granted the State's request for an award of attorney's fees and awarded $62,828.50 in attorneys' fees and $3,816.00 in non-taxable litigation expenses to the State as the prevailing party pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Order (doc. #52).
On April 16, 2003, the Fifth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion in which a three-judge panel upheld Judge Hannah's decision. See Fifth Circuit Order (doc. #53), 66 Fed.Appx. 525 (5th Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit concluded that it was bound by Ysleta I and further noted that "[h]owever sympathetic we may be to the Tribe's argument, we may not reconsider Ysleta , even if we believed that the case was wrongly decided." Id. at p. 4. The Court went on to conclude that "[j]ust as the district court concluded, we are bound by the determination that the Restoration Act precludes the Yselta del Sur Pueblo and the Alabama...
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Texas v. Pueblo
...to modify or replace the Restoration Act if they would like to conduct gaming on the reservation. See Texas v. Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Texas, 298 F. Supp. 3d 909, 925 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (stating that "[t]he plain language of the Restoration Act stands, as does the Fifth Circuit's undisturb......