State v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex.
| Decision Date | 14 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-40116,18-40116 |
| Citation | 918 F.3d 440 |
| Parties | State of TEXAS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE OF TEXAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Eric A. White, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General for the State of Texas, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Danny Scot Ashby, Esq., Justin Roel Chapa, David I. Monteiro, Esq., Megan Whisler, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Patricia Lane Briones, Frederick Richard Petti, Esq., Petti & Briones, P.L.L.C., Scottsdale, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.
Christopher D. Kratovil, Esq., Dykema Cox Smith, Dallas, TX, for Amicus Curiae Tyler Area Chamber of Commerce.
Before SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
For almost thirty years, the State of Texas and one of its Indian tribes, the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe (the "Tribe"), have disputed the impact of two federal statutes on the Tribe's ability to conduct gaming on the Tribe's reservation. The first statute, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act1 (the "Restoration Act"), restored the Tribe's status as a federally-recognized tribe and limited its gaming operations according to state law. The second, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 – 2721, broadly "establish[ed] ... Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands." Id. § 2702(3).
Soon after IGRA was enacted, this court determined that the Restoration Act and IGRA conflict and that the Restoration Act governs the Tribe's gaming activities. See Ysleta del sur Pueblo v. Texas ("Ysleta I "), 36 F.3d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1994). Several years later, when the Tribe was conducting gaming operations in violation of Texas law, the district court permanently enjoined that activity as a violation of the Restoration Act.
The Supreme Court then decided National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services , 545 U.S. 967, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005), and City of Arlington v. FCC , 569 U.S. 290, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 (2013). And the National Indian Gaming Commission ("NIGC"), which administers IGRA, held, contrary to Ysleta I , that IGRA governs the Tribe's gaming activity. Citing those changes in the law, the Tribe asked the district court to dissolve the permanent injunction. The district court refused, the Tribe appeals, and we affirm.
In 1987, Congress passed the Restoration Act to restore "the Federal recognition of" both the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo," an Indian tribe in far west Texas) and the Tribe. Pub. L. No. 100-89, §§ 103(a), 203(a), 101 Stat. at 667, 670.2 The Restoration Act's final section regulates gaming on the Tribe's reservation and lands. It provides that "[a]ll gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on the lands of the tribe." Id . § 207(a), 101 Stat. at 672.3 It bars Texas from asserting regulatory control over otherwise legal gaming on the Tribe's reservation and lands. Id. § 207(b), 101 Stat. at 672. It also gives "the courts of the United States ... exclusive jurisdiction over any offense in violation" of its gaming restriction and limits Texas to "bringing an action in the courts of the United States to enjoin violations of the provisions of this section." Id. § 207(c), 101 Stat. at 672.
Congress enacted IGRA the following year. Finding that "existing Federal law d[id] not provide clear standards or regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands," 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3), Congress established "Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and ... a National Indian Gaming Commission ... to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue." Id. § 2702(3). Though its stated purpose is broad, IGRA does not specifically preempt the field of Indian gaming law.
IGRA defines three classes of gaming that federally recognized tribes may offer and regulates each differently. Tribes have "exclusive jurisdiction" over "class I gaming," which consists of "social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming" associated with "tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1). "Class II gaming" includes "the game of chance commonly known as bingo," id. § 2703(7)(A)(i), and certain "card games" either "explicitly authorized" or "not explicitly prohibited" by state law. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I)–(II). Tribes have the authority to regulate class II gaming, provided that a tribe issues a self-regulatory ordinance meeting statutory criteria and the NIGC approves that ordinance. Id. § 2710(b)(1)–(2). "Class III gaming" includes all forms of gaming that are not in class I or II. Class III gaming is lawful on Indian lands only if tribes secure federal administrative and state approval. Id. § 2703(8); see id. § 2710(d). IGRA created the NIGC to administer its provisions, instructing the NIGC to "promulgate such regulations and guidelines as it deems appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 2706(b)(10).
Notwithstanding the Restoration Act, Texas, the Tribe, and the Pueblo have long disputed whether IGRA applies to the Tribe and the Pueblo. Texas avers that IGRA's permissive gaming structure is inconsistent with Sections 107(a) and 207(a) of the Restoration Act, which prohibit gaming that violates Texas law on the Pueblo's and Tribe's lands, respectively. The Tribe maintains that IGRA permits it to conduct gaming operations according to IGRA's three-class structure.
This court first considered the relationship between the Restoration Act and IGRA in Ysleta I . Under IGRA, the Pueblo had tried to negotiate a compact with Texas to permit class III gaming. Texas refused, citing the Restoration Act and insisting that state law prohibited the proposed games. The Pueblo sued to compel Texas to negotiate, and the district court granted summary judgment for the Pueblo.
This court reversed, holding that "(1) the Restoration Act and IGRA establish different regulatory regimes with regard to gaming" and that "(2) the Restoration Act prevails over IGRA when gaming activities proposed by the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo are at issue." Ysleta I , 36 F.3d at 1332. With respect to the first ruling, this court found it "significant" that "the Restoration Act establishes a procedure for enforcement of § 107(a) which is fundamentally at odds with the concepts of IGRA." Id . at 1334. Based on that finding, we had to determine "which statute [to] appl[y]." Id. The Pueblo urged "that, to the extent that a conflict between the two exists, IGRA impliedly repeals the Restoration Act." Id. at 1334–35. We rejected that theory, noting that implied repeals are disfavored and that generally "a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one." Id . at 1335 (cleaned up). And "[w]ith regard to gaming," we continued, "the Restoration Act clearly is a specific statute, whereas IGRA is a general one." Id.4
This court thus concluded "that [the Restoration Act]—and not IGRA—would govern the determination of whether gaming activities proposed by the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo are allowed under Texas law, which functions as surrogate federal law." Id ."If the [Pueblo] wishe[d] to vitiate [the restrictive gaming provisions] of the Restoration Act," we declared, "it will have to petition Congress to amend or repeal the Restoration Act rather than merely comply with the procedures of IGRA." Id .5
The Tribe was not a party in Ysleta I , but, "particularly with regard to the sections concerning gaming," its Restoration Act is almost identical to the Pueblo's. Id. at 1329 n.3. We thus suggested in Ysleta I that the Restoration Act—and not IGRA—would govern the legality of any gaming operations of the Tribe. Despite the Restoration Act's restrictions, the Tribe maintained a casino on its reservation after Ysleta I . And in 2001, the Tribe sued Texas, seeking declaratory relief that its gaming was lawful under IGRA. See Alabama-Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Texas , 208 F.Supp.2d 670, 672 (E.D. Tex. 2002). Texas counterclaimed, asking the district court permanently to enjoin the Tribe's gaming activities based on Section 207 of the Restoration Act. Id.
Relying on Ysleta I , the district court held that the Restoration Act governed the legality of the Tribe's gaming activities. Id. at 677–78. And because those activities violated Texas law, the court permanently enjoined them in 2002. Id. at 681. This court affirmed, explaining that it was "bound by the determination [in Ysleta I ] that the Restoration Act precludes [the Tribe] from conducting all gaming activities prohibited by Texas law on tribal lands." Alabama Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. Texas , No. 02-41030, 66 Fed.Appx. 525, 2003 WL 21017542, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished).6
The Tribe ceased all gaming for twelve years. But in 2015, it started the process outlined by IGRA to secure NIGC's approval to offer class II gaming. As IGRA requires, see 25 U.S.C. § 2710, the Tribe adopted an ordinance authorizing class II bingo gaming—which Texas law permits in several forms7 —and submitted it to NIGC's Chairman for approval.8 The Tribe concedes that by seeking that approval, the Tribe was requesting NIGC's formal administrative determination of whether, contrary to Ysleta I , the tribe fell within IGRA's ambit.
The Chairman approved the ordinance via letter, explaining that "[n]othing in the IGRA's language or its legislative history indicates that the Tribe is outside the scope of NIGC's jurisdiction."9 He then determined that the Tribe's reservation—established through the Restoration Act—counts as "Indian lands" under IGRA. Those findings, the Chairman continued, demonstrate that the Tribe's "lands are eligible for gaming under IGRA." The Chairman thus concluded that the Tribe's ordinance was "consistent with the requirements of IGRA and NIGC regulations" and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bastardo-Vale v. Attorney Gen. U.S.
...of Alaka's focus on the statute's language and structure, conveys that it viewed the statute as clear. See Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, 918 F.3d 440, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that a "prior judicial decision need not say in so many magic words that its holding is the only p......
-
Ali v. Barr
...out of order. Plus, " Chevron ’s premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps." Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas , 918 F.3d 440, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). So it would not make sense for a court to opine on the meaning of a statute while repe......
-
In re U.S. Bureau of Prisons, DEPT. OF JUSTICE
... ... , Hernandez was arrested by local law enforcement and charged in state court with being a felon in possession of a firearm, theft of a firearm, ... ...
-
State v. Astorga
...omitted from the current version of the United States Code, but it appears to still be in effect. See Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas , 918 F.3d 440, 442 n.1 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 855, 205 L.Ed.2d 459 (2020).6 In certain instances, in addition to t......