State v. Albert

Decision Date22 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. 26828.,26828.
Citation138 Idaho 284,62 P.3d 208
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael D. ALBERT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Paul S. Sonenberg argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued. LANSING, Judge.

Michael Albert appeals from his conviction for statutory rape following a jury trial. He argues that the district court erred by excluding all of his alibi witnesses as a sanction for discovery violations and by denying Albert's motion to compel the State to produce the name and telephone number of another adult with whom the alleged victim previously had sexual relations. Because we hold that the district court committed reversible error in excluding Albert's alibi witnesses, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

Albert was indicted for rape, Idaho Code § 18-6101, on October 12, 1999. The State alleged that on the night of July 3, 1999, he had sexual intercourse with fifteen-year-old J.H. in a warehouse in Meridian, Idaho. Albert's trial was initially scheduled for February 27, 2000. On January 12, the State filed a discovery request pursuant to I.C. § 19-5191 asking for notice of any planned alibi defense, including notice of the place where Albert claimed to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of alibi witnesses. On February 2, Albert responded with a notice that he intended to present an alibi defense through two witnesses, Scott and Brenda Farnworth. The notice misspelled the Farnworths' name as "Farworth" but correctly stated their then-current address in McCall, Idaho. The notice described the place where Albert claimed to have been at the time of the alleged offense as the "Farworths'" home in Nampa, Idaho but did not give the street address of the Nampa home. On February 9, the State filed a motion to require that the Farnworths appear for deposition or, alternatively, to exclude their testimony from trial because the Farnworths had declined to speak with state investigators and because Albert's discovery response was vague about the alibi location. After hearing this motion, the court continued the trial date to May 16, 2000 and ordered Albert to provide a complete disclosure of the alibi information as required by I.C. § 19-519.

Albert did not serve an amended disclosure of alibi information until May 4. That same day, he also gave the name and correct address of an additional witness, Allison Vieira, but did not identify her as an alibi witness. The amended notice stated the address of the Farnworths' former home, where Albert claimed to have been on the night of the alleged offense, as a lot in a mobile home park at "2119 Caldwell Boulevard," in Nampa, Idaho. This was an incorrect address, however, for the Farnworths' former residence was actually at 2819 Caldwell Boulevard. Upon the receipt of this amended notice, the prosecutor and an investigator who sought to interview witnesses at or near the alibi location found that "2119 Caldwell Boulevard" referred to an empty parcel.

The State did not notify defense counsel of this apparent error in the address or request clarification. At the outset of the second day of trial, Albert's counsel informed the district court and the State that he had a fourth alibi witness, Crystal Ward, who had not been previously disclosed. Later that day, during discussion of the order in which witnesses would testify, Albert's counsel referred to the address of Albert's alibi location as 2819 Caldwell Boulevard. The State then informed the court that the address Albert had previously disclosed was 2119 Caldwell Boulevard. The State claimed prejudice due to the incorrect disclosure and requested the exclusion of Albert's alibi witnesses as a sanction. The district court took the matter under advisement and required Albert to make his witnesses available for interview by the State. The State interviewed Albert's four alibi witnesses that evening. The next morning, the State again moved to exclude the witnesses. The district court granted the State's motion, excluding all of Albert's alibi witnesses as a sanction for his erroneous discovery response. The defense then rested without presenting any evidence, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.

Albert appeals. The primary issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in precluding Albert from presenting his alibi defense.

ANALYSIS

A. Exclusion of Alibi Witnesses

On appeal from an order imposing discovery sanctions, we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 846, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1999). In examining a trial court's discretionary decision, this Court inquires: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. In the present appeal, we focus upon whether the district court, in excluding Albert's alibi witnesses, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards.

The right of an accused to call witnesses in his defense is guaranteed by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 654, 98 L.Ed.2d 798, 811 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has said that "[f]ew rights are more fundamental" than this one. Id. at 408, 108 S.Ct. at 652, 98 L.Ed.2d at 809. The State also has a weighty interest, however, in the ability to obtain timely and complete discovery responses from a defendant. The United States Supreme Court noted in Taylor, "Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412 n. 17, 108 S.Ct. at 654 n. 17, 98 L.Ed.2d at 812 n. 17 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446, 449 (1970)). Therefore, the Sixth Amendment "does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system." Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412-13, 108 S.Ct. at 654-55, 98 L.Ed.2d at 812-13.

To accommodate these competing interests, when faced with a request by the State to exclude defense evidence due to late disclosure or nondisclosure, the trial court must weigh the prejudice to the State against the defendant's right to a fair trial. Harris, 132 Idaho at 847, 979 P.2d at 1205. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 800, 802, 992 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct.App.1999). In a serious felony case, it is ordinarily the trial court's obligation "to fashion a sanction which will impress counsel with the importance of responding to discovery requests, and yet will not prejudice the defense of the case." State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 211, 899 P.2d 416, 424 (1995). This obligation gives way, however, when the defendant's discovery violation was willful and designed to facilitate the presentation of fabricated testimony or to impede the State's ability to conduct effective cross-examination or to present rebuttal evidence. In that event, the untimely-disclosed defense evidence may be excluded notwithstanding the availability of other sanctions that would prevent prejudice to the State. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413-14, 108 S.Ct. at 655, 98 L.Ed.2d at 813; Harris, 132 Idaho at 846, 979 P.2d at 1204; State v. Martinez, 137 Idaho 804, 807, 53 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Ct.App.2002). In order to determine whether the tardiness or nondisclosure was intentional, a trial judge may insist upon an explanation for a party's noncompliance with discovery requirements. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415, 108 S.Ct. at 656, 98 L.Ed.2d at 814.

In the present case, the record does not demonstrate that the address error in Albert's amended alibi notice was willful. Although the pattern of untimely responses, spelling errors and the address error show a disturbing level of negligence by Albert or his attorney or both, any inference of willful deception is negated by the fact that Albert accurately disclosed the then-current addresses of the witnesses.2 As of February 2, 2000, the State knew that Albert was asserting as an alibi that he was with the Farnworths at their residence in Nampa at the time the offense was alleged to have occurred. Twelve days before trial, the State had been given Vieira's name and correct address. Utilizing the current addresses, the prosecutor apparently had no difficulty making contact with the named witnesses.3 In the absence of evidence of willfulness, it was the obligation of the trial court, and is this Court's task on review, to examine whether prejudice suffered by the State due to the alibi address error outweighs the prejudice to Albert from the exclusion of all four witnesses who were reportedly ready to testify that he was with them at a residence in Nampa on the night when he was alleged to have committed a rape in Meridian.

The State argued to the trial court, and asserts again on appeal, that it was prejudiced because, being ignorant of the correct address of the Nampa residence, investigators were unable to interview neighbors or other potential witnesses who might have refuted the alibi. We are unpersuaded by this argument because the State's prejudice was readily avoidable. The prosecutor could have acquired the correct address by the simple expedient of informing defense counsel that the disclosed address was a vacant parcel and requesting the correct information. Instead, the prosecutor...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • State v. Diaz
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 6, 2022
    ...not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system.’ " State v. Albert , 138 Idaho 284, 287, 62 P.3d 208, 211 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois , 484 U.S. 400, 412–13, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ). Nor is a defendant free......
  • State v. Burris, Docket No. 33593 (Idaho App. 9/11/2008)
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • September 11, 2008
    ...v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 206, 899 P.2d 416, 419 (1995); Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho at 884, 119 P.3d at 659; State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 287-89, 62 P.3d 208, 211-13 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 302-03, 923 P.2d 1005, 1009-10 (Ct. App. 1996). Whether to impose a sanction......
  • State v. Ogden
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • November 2, 2022
    ...the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system.’ " Id . (citing State v. Albert , 138 Idaho 284, 287, 62 P.3d 208, 211 (Ct. App. 2002) ). A defendant has no right to present irrelevant evidence; even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded in c......
  • State v. Vondenkamp
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • August 2, 2005
    ...Idaho 630, 633-34, 945 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1997); State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 206, 899 P.2d 416, 419 (1995); State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 287-89, 62 P.3d 208, 211-13 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 302-03, 923 P.2d 1005, 1009-10 (Ct.App.1996). Here, however, while defense c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT