State v. Alegrand

• Decision Date: 09 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 31200.,31200.
• Citation: State v. Alegrand, 130 Conn.App. 652, 23 A.3d 1250 (Conn. App. 2011)
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticutv.Claude ALEGRAND.

130 Conn.App. 652

23 A.3d 1250

STATE of Connecticut

v.Claude ALEGRAND.

No. 31200.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 13, 2010.Decided Aug. 9, 2011.

Diane Polan, New Haven, with whom were Michael J. Wishnie and Ana Munoz, law student intern, and, on the brief, Daniel Habib, law student intern, for the appellant (defendant).Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEAR and FLYNN, Js.FLYNN, J.

The defendant, Claude Alegrand, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion for relief from judgment and sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear his motion for relief from judgment and sentence, a motion presented as an independent action in equity, or, in the alternative, as a petition for a writ of audita querela. As a third alternative, the defendant contends that even if we find that the court's jurisdictional holding was correct, we should nonetheless, despite that lack of jurisdiction, exercise our supervisory powers, pursuant to Practice Book § 60–2, to consider the merits of the defendant's constitutional claims. We conclude that the court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's case and, therefore, dismissed his motion. We also deem it inappropriate to exercise our supervisory powers and, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant's appeal. On August 14, 2003, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–136.¹ After the court, Clifford, J., accepted the plea, the defendant was found guilty, and the court sentenced him to serve five years imprisonment, execution suspended after two years, followed by a conditional discharge for two years. More than five years later, on November 25, 2008, after learning that he might be deported to Haiti as a result of this felony conviction, the defendant filed “a motion for relief from judgment and sentence.” The motion sought to have the court, Handy, J., grant his motion for relief from judgment and sentence, vacate his plea of nolo contendere and render judgment of acquittal, and dismiss with prejudice the criminal charges against him, or, alternatively, vacate the plea of nolo contendere and grant him an opportunity for a new trial. The defendant did not explain how the court would have authority or jurisdiction to dismiss the charges against him or render a judgment of acquittal. In support of his motion, the defendant asserted the following factual claims: (1) actual innocence by virtue of being at the wrong place at the wrong time when a drug dealer was robbed; (2) ineffectiveness of trial counsel who (a) advised him to enter a plea of nolo contendere when she knew witnesses for the state could not be located, (b) refused to try his case unless he paid her more money, (c) failed to advise him that he could move to withdraw his plea; (3) impairment of his faculties from prior drug use during his plea canvass; and (4) failure of the court, Clifford, J., to establish that his plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary after getting no response to a question during the plea canvass as to whether the defendant was then under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Before the trial court, Handy, J., the defendant premised jurisdiction on two common-law vehicles: an independent action in equity and a writ of audita querela. On April 13, 2009, the court heard argument on the defendant's motion, and relying on our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 153, 913 A.2d 428 (2007), then determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion.

After deciding it had no jurisdiction as to the claim for general independent equitable relief, the court then, nonetheless, recognized that the Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction and a court of equity but declined to exercise its equitable powers under the totality of the circumstances. The court did not find “[the defendant's] position to be different than other defendants that have appeared before [the] court who are not citizens of the United States of America” and, therefore, the circumstances did not rise to the level of its exercise as a court of equity.

As to the specific claim for relief under the writ of audita querela, the court reasoned that there is no criminal case, or constitutional or statutory provision in Connecticut, that establishes that the writ of audita querela is a procedure that could be utilized for the court to exercise its jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of conviction, open the judgment of conviction or vacate the defendant's nolo contendere plea. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit a criminal conviction via these procedural mechanisms, and it dismissed the motion. This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review. Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction purely are legal in nature and are subject to plenary review. State v. Das, 291 Conn. 356, 361, 968 A.2d 367 (2009). Every presumption favoring subject matter jurisdiction should be indulged. Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

I

The defendant first claims that the court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an independent action in equity. The defendant argues that Connecticut courts have long heard independent actions brought as a means of obtaining relief from unfair judgments. In response, the state argues that the court properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to vacate the defendant's conviction because there is no legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction that would allow it. We agree with the state.

In this case, the court rendered an oral decision. In addressing the defendant's counsel, the court stated: “I'm not here to take evidence, counsel. I'm here to hear argument on whether or not this court feels that it has jurisdiction, and if I find it has jurisdiction, we may proceed to some other matters, but we need to get through the threshold issue.”

The court went on to say that “the threshold issue with which this court is faced is one of jurisdiction, and it is this court's opinion, that without getting by the jurisdictional issue, we cannot get to the substantive issues that have been cited in the brief in [the defendant's] behalf.” Quoting State v. Lawrence, supra, 281 Conn. at 153, 913 A.2d 428, the court further stated: “It is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed. This is so because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction and begins serving the sentence.” ² (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

The defendant argues that the court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an independent action in equity. On appeal, the defendant acknowledges that no Connecticut case addresses the propriety of collaterally challenging a criminal conviction via an independent action in equity. In support of his claim, the defendant relies only on holdings in Connecticut civil cases addressed to civil judgments and federal cases.

Citing federal cases, Justice Joseph Story and several cases from our Supreme Court,³ the defendant claims that our laws should permit such independent equitable actions “[i]n all cases, where by accident, mistake, fraud or otherwise, a party has an unfair advantage in proceedings in a court of law, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, and it is, therefore, against conscience that he should use that advantage, a court of equity will interfere, and restrain him from using the advantage....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Folwell v. Howell, 117 Conn. 565, 568–69, 169 A. 199 (1933); see 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (10th Ed. 1870) § 885.

Essentially, the defendant's claim is that his conviction is “unconscionable” and, therefore, an independent equitable action should lie to vacate his plea and set aside his conviction. The state disagrees on several grounds. First, it argues that there is no authority in Connecticut for an independent equitable action. Second, it cites State v. Lawrence, supra, 281 Conn. at 154, 913 A.2d 428, for the proposition that “[w]ithout a legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction ... the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify its judgment.” Third, it argues, citing State v. Mollo, 63 Conn.App. 487, 492, 776 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 257 Conn. 904, 777 A.2d 194 (2001), that the state has an interest in finality of judgments. We agree with the state.

In Lawrence, our Supreme Court summarized well established principles of law concerning jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it and its source is the constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created.... Article fifth, § 1 of the Connecticut constitution proclaims that [t]he powers and jurisdiction of the courts shall be defined by law, and General Statutes § 51–164s provides that [t]he superior court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute.... The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction.... In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.... It is well established that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has been executed.... This is so because ...