State v. Alexander

Decision Date12 February 2016
Docket NumberNo. 14–347.,14–347.
Citation139 A.3d 574,2016 VT 19
PartiesSTATE of Vermont v. Shamel L. ALEXANDER.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Robert F. Plunkett, Bennington County Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender General, and Bridget Denzer, Law Clerk (on the Brief), Montpelier, for DefendantAppellant.

Robert Appel, Burlington, for Amicus Curiae Vermonters for Criminal Justice Reform.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, SKOGLUND, ROBINSON and EATON, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

¶ 1. Defendant Shamel L. Alexander appeals from his conviction for trafficking heroin in violation of 18 V.S.A. § 4233(c). He argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We agree and reverse.

¶ 2. The trial court made the following findings in connection with defendant's motion to suppress. On July 11, 2013, Detective Urbanowicz of the Bennington Police Department (BPD) was driving an unmarked police vehicle in Bennington when a taxicab pulled up next to him on his right side and the driver motioned for him to roll down his window. When he did so, the cab driver asked Detective Urbanowicz for the location of the “China Buffet.” There is no Chinese restaurant in Bennington called China Buffet. Detective Urbanowicz noted that according to the information displayed on the cab, it haled from Albany, New York. On the basis of his work with the Southern Vermont Drug Task Force, the detective was aware of information that heroin and crack cocaine dealers from out of state were using cabs and buses to travel to Bennington to distribute drugs. Specifically, he was aware that the Yankee Trails bus stop, located next to a Chinese restaurant on Main Street in Bennington that had always been called the Lucky Dragon, was a place where both controlled and street drug transactions had occurred.

¶ 3. Detective Urbanowicz was aware that the task force had developed information that a large African American male, with the nickname “Sizzle,” traveled to Bennington in the company of a woman named Danielle and a man named Tracy, both known to Detective Urbanowicz to deal drugs.1 Detective Urbanowicz noticed a large African American male sitting in the front passenger seat of the cab and thought he might be “Sizzle,” though he was not certain.

¶ 4. Coincidentally, Corporal Hunt, also of the BPD, drove by in uniform and in a marked police cruiser. Detective Urbanowicz mentioned to Corporal Hunt through the window that the cab “would be a good stop if you could find him doing something wrong.” Corporal Hunt was aware of the same information as Detective Urbanowicz relating to drug investigations in Bennington and was aware of “Sizzle's” general description.

¶ 5. Corporal Hunt saw that the cab had a GPS device attached to the interior of the front windshield and stopped the cab for violating 23 V.S.A. § 1125, which prohibits driving with an obstructed windshield. The cab driver identified himself as the owner and operator of the cab, and provided his license, registration, and proof of insurance. The passenger identified himself as Shamel L. Alexander, gave his date of birth, and indicated that he was from Brooklyn, New York. He said he was going to the Chinese restaurant.

¶ 6. Corporal Hunt ran records checks on both the driver and passenger and saw that there were no warrants for either. The record check also revealed Alexander had a prior misdemeanor arrest from Dover, Vermont in 2010, had an alias: “Snacks,” and had a listed address in New York.

¶ 7. At that point, Corporal Hunt asked the driver to step out of the cab so he could discuss the situation with the driver. Corporal Hunt proceeded to ask the driver questions about defendant and the circumstances of his ride to Bennington. The driver revealed that Alexander had been driven to Bennington several times by different cab drivers in the past, is generally picked up at the bus station in Albany, and did not have a specific address for his destination but wanted to be taken to the “Chinese Buffet” on Main Street. After this discussion, Corporal Hunt asked the driver for permission to search the cab.

¶ 8. Corporal Hunt then approached Alexander, who told Hunt that he had family in Bennington and listed several people with the last name of Alexander. Corporal Hunt, who has lived in the community for a number of years, did not recognize the names. Defendant told Corporal Hunt that he was going to meet his grandmother on School Street. Corporal Hunt is familiar with many of the families on School Street and knew of no older woman with the last name of Alexander who lived on School Street. Corporal Hunt opined that it was odd that defendant would go to a restaurant a short distance from his grandmother's house before going to her home. Defendant responded that he actually lived in Bennington, further arousing Corporal Hunt's suspicions.

¶ 9. Corporal Hunt asked defendant “if he minded” if Corporal Hunt searched his bags. Defendant initially responded that he did mind. Corporal Hunt then radioed for a canine unit to be brought to the scene to perform a search. Once he heard that, defendant clarified that he did not mind if Corporal Hunt searched his bags. Upon searching defendant's bags, Corporal Hunt discovered over ten grams of heroin in 401 bags, wrapped in forty separate bundles.

¶ 10. In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that Corporal Hunt's initial stop of the cab was valid because the GPS unit adhered to the windshield violated 23 V.S.A. § 1125(a). In addition, when Corporal Hunt expanded the scope of the stop by asking the driver to exit the cab and answer questions relating to Detective Urbanowicz's suspicions of drug-related crimes, he had reasonable suspicion of drug activity based on reliable information that drug traffickers came from other states to Bennington using taxi cabs; that they used the Lucky Dragon on Main Street as a drop off point; that the passenger of the cab was looking for a Chinese restaurant but did not know its name or location; and that a large African American male, called Sizzle, was possibly involved in such drug-trafficking. Although this description is vague, the trial court concluded that it matched defendant's appearance. In addition, the court noted that defendant was only detained for about fifteen minutes, approximately the time it would take an officer to process a traffic ticket. Finally, because the trial court concluded that none of the seizures preceding defendant's consent to search his bag were unlawful, the voluntariness of his search was not tainted by prior unlawful seizures.

¶ 11. A jury subsequently convicted defendant, and the court sentenced him to ten years to ten years and one day to serve.

¶ 12. On appeal, defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of the initial stop when Corporal Hunt pulled over the cab. However, he argues that when Corporal Hunt asked the cab driver to get out of the taxicab, Corporal Hunt expanded the stop in scope and duration. This expanded seizure for the purpose of investigating suspicions of drug-related crimes was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and defendant's subsequent consent to search was involuntary and tainted by the unlawful seizure.2

¶ 13. In reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a de novo standard to the trial court's legal conclusions and a clear-error standard to its factual findings.” State v. Pitts, 2009 VT 51, ¶ 6, 186 Vt. 71, 978 A.2d 14.

I. Expansion of the Traffic Stop

¶ 14. The first question we must answer is: at what point, if any, did the concededly lawful traffic stop on account of Corporal Hunt's suspicion of a traffic violation expand in scope or duration such that additional reasonable suspicion was required?

¶ 15. Generally, a police officer may stop an individual where the officer has “reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect that an individual is engaged in criminal activity.” Pitts, 2009 VT 51, ¶ 7, 186 Vt. 71, 978 A.2d 14 ; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Where the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer “may briefly detain the individual to investigate the circumstances that gave rise to the suspicion.” Pitts, 2009 VT 51, ¶ 7, 186 Vt. 71, 978 A.2d 14. However, [t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified’ by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted)); see also State v. Ford, 2007 VT 107, ¶ 4, 182 Vt. 421, 940 A.2d 687 (“Under both the Vermont and the United States Constitutions, we have recognized that a brief detention, its scope reasonably related to the justification for the stop and inquiry, is permitted in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.” (internal alteration and quotation omitted)).

¶ 16. In the context of seizures relating to traffic violations, the law is well settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place. See Rodriguez v. United States, –––U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (“A relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop’ ... than to a formal arrest.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 34, 757 A.2d 1017, 1027 (2000). As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez, ––– U.S. at ––––, 135...

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