State v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 04 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 20090829.,20090829. |
| Citation | 707 Utah Adv. Rep. 5,2012 UT 27,279 P.3d 371 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. James Norman ALEXANDER, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Marian Decker, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Linda M. Jones, Michael R. Sikora, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 In this case, we consider the showing required for a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea under the current version of section 77–13–6 of the Utah Code (Plea Withdrawal Statute or Statute) 2 and rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
¶ 2 In 2007, James Alexander pled guilty to burglary with intent to commit sexual battery. Prior to his sentencing, Mr. Alexander filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that motion, he argued that when the district court accepted his guilty plea, it failed to apprise him of the elements of sexual battery, as required by rule 11. In addition, he alleged that he was never otherwise informed of the elements of sexual battery, and his plea was therefore not knowingly and voluntarily made. The district court denied Mr. Alexander's motion and sentenced him to a prison term of one to fifteen years.
¶ 3 On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, concluding that the district court did not comply with rule 11(e)(4)(A) at the plea hearing because it did not inform Mr. Alexander of the elements of sexual battery, which was the specific intent crime underlying the burglary charge. The court of appeals assumed that the violation of rule 11 automatically rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary. Thus, it held that Mr. Alexander was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 4 We granted certiorari to resolve three issues: (1) “whether the court of appeals erred in its evaluation of the case in relation to the record and the standard for a knowing and voluntary plea,” (2) whether the court of appeals erred in declining to require a showing of prejudice before holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea,3 and (3) whether the court of appeals' decision in this case conflicts with our prior holding in Hurst v. Cook.4
¶ 5 A majority of the court agrees on the following. First, three members of this court hold that, although the court of appeals erred in limiting its review to whether the district court had complied with rule 11 during the plea hearing, the record nonetheless demonstrates that Mr. Alexander's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Second, three members of this court hold that the court of appeals did not err in declining to require a showing of prejudice because such a showing is not required by rule 11( l ). Finally, the court unanimously holds that, because this case involves a different issue than the one addressed in our holding in Hurst, the two cases do not conflict. Based on these conclusions, we affirm the court of appeals' decision to allow Mr. Alexander to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 6 In 2007, Mr. Alexander was charged with rape, a first degree felony, and forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony. At the preliminary hearing on these charges, the alleged victim testified that on January 29, 2006, Mr. Alexander phoned her and said he wanted to come to her house and have sex with her. She stated that she had told Mr. Alexander he could come to her home, but she would not have sex with him. When Mr. Alexander arrived, he began “talking about sexual acts” and she again stated that she did not want to have sex with him. Mr. Alexander nonetheless began to hug and kiss her. He grabbed her arms and breasts and touched her vagina. She testified that she “pulled away” from Mr. Alexander and told him to “back off” and “get the hell off [her].” She stated that Mr. Alexander then pushed her down on the bed, climbed on top of her and forced her to have sexual intercourse without her consent. Although he did not testify at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Alexander denied the allegations and pled not guilty to the charges.
¶ 7 Sometime after the preliminary hearing, Mr. Alexander and the State entered into plea negotiations. Mr. Alexander subsequently agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of burglary 5 with the intent to commit sexual battery,6 a second degree felony. The amended charging documents described the burglary charge as follows:
[O]n or about January 29, 2006, in violation of Title 76 Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, ... the defendant, James N. Alexander, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of [the alleged victim] with the intent to commit a sexual battery.
¶ 8 At the same time that the State filed the amended charging documents, Mr. Alexander and his counsel signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea (Plea Affidavit). In the Plea Affidavit, the elements of the burglary charge were identified as follows: “The defendant (1) remained unlawfully (2) in a dwelling (3) with the intent to commit a felony, theft, assault, lewdness, or sexual battery.” Neither the amended charging documents nor the Plea Affidavit described or listed the elements of sexual battery. As to the factual basis for the burglary charge, the Plea Affidavit stated, “On 1/29/06 at [omitted address] in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant was in the apartment of [the alleged victim] and committed the offense of sexual battery on [her].”
¶ 9 Before accepting the guilty plea, the district court held a hearing where it reviewed with Mr. Alexander the amended charging documents and the Plea Affidavit. Although the district court did not discuss the elements of sexual battery, the court did ask Mr. Alexander's counsel if he had explained “what a second degree felony means” and if he felt that Mr. Alexander was entering a knowing and voluntary plea. Mr. Alexander's counsel stated that he had “reviewed the amended [charging documents] with [Mr. Alexander] as well as th [e] [Plea Affidavit] outlining all of those issues.” He also articulated the factual basis for the plea as follows:
[O]n January 29th [of] 2006 ..., Mr. Alexander was in the [home] of [the alleged victim], a friend of his.... [H]e was allowed into the [home], but while [there], he committed the offense of sexual battery on [her].
The prosecutor then clarified that while Mr. Alexander was in the alleged victim's home, “she start[ed] to do some actions that clearly t[old] [him] that he need[ed] to be out of the apartment and instead of leaving, he remain[ed] with the intent as we've outlined.” When the court asked Mr. Alexander if that factual basis was accurate, he responded, “Yes, sir.” The court then informed Mr. Alexander of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and the court accepted his guilty plea.
¶ 10 Prior to sentencing, Mr. Alexander filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In support of his motion, he alleged that the district court had failed to apprise him of the nature and elements of sexual battery, as it was required to do by rule 11(e)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 He also asserted that, because he was never informed of the nature and elements of sexual battery, which was the specific intent crime underlying the burglary charge, his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The court denied Mr. Alexander's motion and later sentenced him to a prison term of one to fifteen years.8
¶ 11 Mr. Alexander appealed the district court's denial of his motion to the Utah Court of Appeals. At the court of appeals, he argued that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because he did not understand the nature and elements of sexual battery.9 The court of appeals reviewed the Plea Affidavit and the plea hearing, and it determined that they “contain[ed] no discussion of the elements of sexual battery.” 10 The court stated that because intent to commit sexual battery “was the crux of the burglary charge against [Mr. Alexander], the trial court was required [by rule 11(e)(4)(A) ] to ensure that [he] understood the elements of sexual battery—and that he was pleading guilty to all of those elements—before accepting his guilty plea.” 11 The court of appeals assumed that because the district court had failed to comply with rule 11 when accepting Mr. Alexander's guilty plea, the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.12 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision and held that Mr. Alexander could withdraw his guilty plea. 13
¶ 12 After the court of appeals issued its opinion, the State filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. The State contends that the court of appeals erred in three respects. First, the State argues that the court of appeals erred in limiting its analysis to whether the district court complied with rule 11 and in assuming that a violation of rule 11 automatically renders a plea unknowing and involuntary. The State asserts that, under a proper analysis, the court would conclude that Mr. Alexander's plea was in fact knowing and voluntary because the record demonstrates that he was adequately informed of the “intent to commit sexual battery” element of the burglary charge. Second, the State contends that the court of appeals erred in declining to require Mr. Alexander to demonstrate that, “but for” any deficiency in the plea, he would not have pled guilty. According to the State, such a showing is mandated by rule 11( l ). Finally, the State argues that the court of appeals' decision conflicts with our prior holding in Hurst v. Cook,14 and that this conflict requires reversal.
¶ 13 In contrast, Mr. Alexander first argues that even if the court of appeals did err in its analysis, the record does not demonstrate that he was adequately informed of the elements of sexual battery, and thus, his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Second,...
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State v. Collins
...to withdraw a plea on the basis that it was not knowing and voluntary need not show prejudice.72 The court of appeals concluded that Alexander applied here because the “holding rests in part on the difficulty of evaluating whether an uninformed defendant would, had he or she been informed, ......
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State v. Trotter
...Due Process Clause; its derivative “knowing and voluntary” standard is further codified in Utah's Plea Withdrawal Statute. See State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 19, 279 P.3d 371 (“Although rule 11 provides guidance for the entry of guilty pleas, any attempt to withdraw that plea is governed......
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State v. Collins
...to withdraw a plea on the basis that it was not knowing and voluntary need not show prejudice.72 The court of appeals concluded that Alexander applied here because the “holding rests in part on the difficulty of evaluating whether an uninformed defendant would, had he or she been informed, ......
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Rhinehart v. State
...plea of guilty ... may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly or voluntarily made.”); State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16, 279 P.3d 371 (“A plea is not knowing and voluntary when the record demonstrates that the accused does not understand the nat......