State v. Alfred

• Decision Date: 13 October 1913
• Citation: 87 Vt. 157,88 A. 534
• Parties: STATE v. ALFRED.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

88 A. 534

87 Vt. 157

STATE

v. ALFRED.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Chittenden.

Oct. 13, 1913.

Exceptions from Chittenden County Court Louis Alfred was convicted of receiving and concealing stolen goods, and he excepts. Conviction affirmed.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and MUNSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and POWERS, JJ.

Theodore E. Hopkins, State's Atty., and Henry B. Shaw, both of Burlington, for the State.

V. A. Bullard and M. G. Leary, both of Burlington, for respondent.

WATSON, J. The state Constitution (chapter 2, § 4) provides that courts of justice shall be maintained in every county in this state, and shall be open for the trial of all causes proper for their cognizance; and justice shall be therein impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary delay. It contains no provision more particularly regulating or fixing the terms of court, or the times of holding the same. This being so, it was within legislative power to determine the number of, and times for, stated or regular terms in each county; and. in the exercise of this power, it was also within the province of the Legislature to make such provisions for special terms, the ordering of the same, and the nature of the business to be transacted thereat, as in its judgment the public welfare may require. State v. Williams, 2 McCord (S. C.) 301; State v. Gallman, 79 S. C. 229, 60 S. E. 682; State v. Davis, 88 S. C. 204, 70 S. E. 417; Banks v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 800, 141 S. W. 380. See Thorwarth v. Blanchard, 87 Vt.——, 87 Atl. 52.

The statute provides that "the presiding judge of the county court may, in his discretion, at any time, order a special session of such court for the trial of criminal cases." P. S. 1359. Substantially the law of this section has existed by statute for more than a century, and there is no case to prove that an attack upon its validity has ever before been made—affording strong argument that such an attack cannot successfully be made.

It was within legitimate legislative action to confer the power to call such special sessions upon the presiding judge of the county court. Barber v. State, 13 Fla. 675; Bass v. State, 17 Fla. 685; Merchant v. North, 10 Ohio St. 251; Hardin v. State, 38 Tex. 598; Grinad v. State, 34 Ga. 270; Spann v. State, 47 Ga. 553; Banks v. Commonwealth, cited above.

It is said that since, by section 1359 of the statute, the action of the court in such special session is limited to criminal matters, a tribunal different from the one contemplated by the chapter of which that section is a part is created. But this position is untenable. As before observed, provisions for such special sessions are made in the interest of the public welfare; and limiting the causes to be there heard and determined, to those of a criminal nature, may be considered in keeping with the constitutional right of persons charged with criminal offenses, to a speedy public trial. Yet whether the powers of the court are general, as at the regular terms, or limited, as by the statute in question, the session is a term, though not a regular term, of the county court, and within the statutory limitation the court has the same jurisdiction and authority as at a regular term. State v. Williams, cited above; Penman v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 660, 133 S. W. 540; Bales v. State, 63 Ala. 30; Wilson v. State, 52 Ala. 299.

Not only may pending criminal cases be there heard, but causes of this character may be there commenced and determined. Penman v. Commonwealth; State v. Register, 133 N. C. 746, 46 S. E. 21.

It is further said: (1) That the statute makes no provision for a hearing, public or otherwise, upon the question of whether there should be a special session; (2) that the ordering of such a session is a matter in which the public, and those having business therein, are interested, and should have an opportunity to be heard; and (3) that there is no provision by which notice is to be given to the public, or to those interested as having business at such session, of the time when the session will open and business therein begin—by reason of all which a court convened pursuant to section 1359 is not a court of justice under the Constitution, and a trial by such court would not be in accordance with the law of the land (relying upon chapter 1, art. 10, and chapter 2, § 4, of the state Constitution and upon the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution).

In this instance, the order for the special session was made at the request of the state's attorney of the county, representing the interests of the state; hence the question of necessity of notice to the public, giving an opportunity to be heard on the question of making the order,...