State v. Alger
Decision Date | 06 December 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 12903,12903 |
Citation | 603 P.2d 1009,100 Idaho 675 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James William ALGER, aka James William McClure and Rick Lee Quanstrom, Defendants-Respondents. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Eugene A. Ritti, Deputy Attys. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard D. Petersen of Neilson & Bedke, Burley, for defendants-respondents.
This is an appeal by the State from orders of the district court suppressing certain statements-confessions made by respondents McClure and Quanstrom shortly after their arrest on charges of first degree burglary. We reverse in part and remand in part for further proceedings.
Thefts for which defendants-respondents were later charged occurred in early October, 1977. Thereafter, two informants notified law enforcement agents that they (the informants) had been in an apartment occupied by several persons including McClure, and that there they (the informants) had observed specific items that had been stolen in the recent thefts. James Batterton, another of the occupants of the apartment, had told the informants that the goods had been stolen by persons, including himself and defendant McClure.
On the basis of that information, officers obtained a warrant to search the apartment. Pursuant to that warrant, the officers entered the apartment, notified the occupants of the search warrant, and after a cursory search of the apartment, discovered items of food and jewelry that matched the description of some of the stolen merchandise. The officers then arrested McClure. Thereafter, a two and one-half hour additional search of the apartment revealed additional items that were linked to the burglaries.
Following McClure's arrest, he was given his Miranda rights and confronted with a co-defendant's statement implicating him in the burglaries. He was told that he faced a possible fifty-six years in the penitentiary. Although it is unclear at what point in time, I. e., before or after McClure began to make his confession, he was also told that if he cooperated the judge would be informed of that cooperation.
Two days after the McClure arrest, respondent Quanstrom was arrested. The record does not explicitly indicate whether the arresting officers had an arrest warrant. While in custody, Quanstrom was given his Miranda rights, confronted with the statements of co-defendants and told that he faced a possible sixty years in the penitentiary. The record indicates that prior to his confession an interrogating officer and Quanstrom had a discussion. Quanstrom stated that on the basis of this discussion he (Quanstrom) Believed that he would be charged as an accessory. The trial court found that these "implied" promises induced Quanstrom's confession.
Four days after Quanstrom's initial confession, he appeared before a magistrate court for arraignment. At that time he was informed that he had been charged as a principal to the burglary, rather than an accessory. Nevertheless, following that magistrate's hearing, Quanstrom not only reiterated his prior admissions to the three burglaries, but also admitted his involvement in yet a fourth burglary which was then under investigation.
Following a preliminary hearing, McClure and Quanstrom were bound over to stand trial in the district court, and, as aforesaid, moved to have their statements-confessions suppressed, which motion the court granted, and the State has appealed.
A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant "(w)hen a felony has in fact been committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it." I.C. § 19-603. Reasonable or probable cause has been defined as information that "would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that such person is guilty." State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 23, 435 P.2d 797, 800 (1967); See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) ( ); State v. Polson, 81 Idaho 147, 339 P.2d 510 (1959); State v. Autheman, 47 Idaho 328, 274 P. 805 (1929).
The adequacy of probable cause is not measured against the high standards required for conviction. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-75, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); See State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 23, 435 P.2d 797 (1967). As the Brinegar Court noted, 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310.
The trial judge here concluded there was insufficient probable cause for the arrest of McClure. The court noted that McClure's "mere presence" in the apartment and the lack of concrete evidence at the time of the arrest linking the jewelry and food items with the burglaries did not constitute probable cause for the arrest. In so doing the court evidently failed to consider the information furnished by the law enforcement agents, which information formed the basis for the search warrant. That information combined with other factors could reasonably cause a prudent person to believe McClure had committed the burglaries. Therefore, the trial court erred in not considering that information in its ruling on the probable cause issue.
Admittedly, mere presence is not sufficient probable cause for arrest. The case of United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), is, however, instructive here. There, Di Re and Buttitta were seated in a car with a third man who had just purchased counterfeit gas coupons. Since nothing else linked Di Re to the crime, the only factor justifying his arrest was his presence in the car and the Court there held that his mere presence without further probable cause was insufficient. However, as to Buttitta, police officers had been told by a reliable informant that Buttitta intended to sell the counterfeit coupons and were told at the time of the arrest that Buttitta was indeed the seller. Buttitta then, unlike Di Re, was connected to the crime by more than his mere presence and there was sufficient probable cause for Buttitta's arrest. In the instant case, the situation of McClure is more analogous to that of Buttitta in United States v. Di Re, supra. In both cases officers relied on other information linking the men with the respective crimes and relied on more than "mere presence." See also State ex rel. Glantz v. District Court, 154 Mont. 132, 461 P.2d 193 (1969).
Here, the district court also noted the absence of concrete evidence linking the burglaries with the jewelry and food items found in the apartment prior to McClure's arrest. Probable cause does not require an officer to compile an ironclad case against a suspect. Rather, it deals with the probable consequences of all facts considered as a whole. As with McClure's "mere presence" the information received by the officers cast a different light on what might be otherwise innocent facts and enabled the officers to conclude that the items were indeed food stolen from the Farmer's Corner store. "(D) irect observations, insufficient unto themselves to establish probable cause, may nevertheless be added to trustworthy hearsay, which . . . is also insufficient unto itself, so that the combination of incriminatory elements may establish the probable cause which neither alone quite demonstrates." Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar And Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741, 778-79 (1974). Here, the presence of items with the same brand name as the stolen goods would not necessarily constitute sufficient probable cause. When such information is coupled with the officers' prior information, the requirements for probable cause are met. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) ( ).
We turn now to the assertion of the respondents that the Aguilar two-prong test must be satisfied before the informants' assertions can be a basis for probable cause for arrest. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967). Aguilar holds that hearsay information is a permissible foundation for probable cause if (1) the basis for declarant's knowledge is demonstrated, and (2) the declarant's reliability or credibility is established. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976). Here, there is no assertion of informant unreliability. However, respondents assert that the Aguilar standard is not met because the officers relied upon multiple hearsay. Batterton, one of the alleged burglars, told the informants of the theft, the location of the goods, and the identity of his co-conspirators, one of whom was McClure. Those informants observed the stolen goods in the apartment. All of that information was given to a law enforcement officer, who in turn signed the affidavit in support of the search warrant.
Multiple hearsay is permissible in establishing probable cause as long as the Aguilar two-prong test is satisfied at each link. United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016, 96...
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