State v. Alirez
| Decision Date | 31 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37387,A-1-CA-37387 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALEXANDER ALIREZ, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Maha Khoury, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellant
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
Steven J. Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
{1} The State appeals from the district court's decision to dismiss Defendant Alexander Alirez's charge of extreme cruelty to animals in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-18-1(E)-(F) (2007), and four charges of cruelty to animals in violation of Section 30-18-1(B), (D), on double jeopardy grounds. The State argues that double jeopardy does not preclude criminal prosecution for cruelty to animals where an animal owner's animals are seized and subsequently relinquished to the State pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-18-1.2 (2009), because of a defendant's failure to post security. We reverse the district court and remand for additional proceedings.
{2} On September 2, 2015, pursuant to a search warrant, five dogs were seized from 302-A Union Street in Las Vegas, New Mexico—an address associated with Defendant—based on a finding of probable cause that the dogs were suffering from extreme malnourishment caused by "cruel treatment." NMSA 1978, § 30-18-1.1(A), (B) (1999). One of the dogs, "Hubble," was admitted to the Petroglyph Animal Hospital on September 3, 2015, and was ultimately euthanized. The other four dogs were housed with the Animal Welfare Coalition Pet Center (AWC). On November 11, 2015, an additional dog, "Vanderbilt," was seized at 415 Blanchard Street, Las Vegas, New Mexico—another address associated with Defendant—and housed with AWC.
{3} Around the time that Hubble was euthanized, the State filed a criminal complaint that included one count of extreme cruelty to animals in violation of Section 30-18-1(E) and four counts of cruelty to animals in violation of Section 30-18-1(B). The State did not file any criminal charges related to Vanderbilt at that time or thereafter. The charges were dismissed without prejudice due to a mistrial on October 3, 2016, and refiled by the State on October 31.
{4} On March 14, 2016, AWC filed a civil action in magistrate court for indemnification of the costs associated with caring for and housing five dogs (Hubble was not included) or for surrender of the dogs. The total cost of feeding, caring for, and housing the animals from the date each of the dogs arrived at AWC until the hearing on March 28, 2016, was $14,660. Defendant was not present at the hearing before the magistrate court, and the court issued a default judgment on April 1, 2016. The magistrate court ordered Defendant to pay a $10,000 security for the costs associated with feeding, caring for, and housing the dogs.1 Defendant did not pay the security within fifteen days, as required by the statute, and the animals were deemed relinquished to the State. See § 30-18-1.2(E).
{5} Based on the security, involuntary relinquishment of his dogs, and the default judgment from the magistrate court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case on double jeopardy grounds. The district court granted Defendant's motion. The State filed a timely motion to reconsider, which included exhibits indicating that the amount of the security was associated with the cost of housing the animals. The district court held a hearing and ultimately denied the motion to reconsider. The State timely appealed.
{6} The issue on appeal is whether the requirement in Section 30-18-1.2(E) that a person charged with cruelty to animals either post a security to indemnify the animal shelter for the care of the animals, or lose the animals by involuntary relinquishment, is a punitive forfeiture under double jeopardy principles.
{7} We review double jeopardy claims de novo. State v. Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 747. The Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 1995-NMSC-069, ¶ 14, 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, we are concerned with multiple punishments for the same offense. "The Double Jeopardy Clause not only protects against the imposition of two punishments for the same offense, but also protects criminal defendants against being twice placed in jeopardy for such punishment." Id.
{8} In New Mexico, we use a three-factor test, articulated in Schwartz, to determine whether a forfeiture places a defendant in double jeopardy: "(1) whether the [s]tate subjected the defendant to separate proceedings; (2) whether the conduct precipitating the separate proceedings consisted of one offense or two offenses; and (3) whether the penalties in each of the proceedings may be considered 'punishment' for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. ¶ 15.
{9} The parties do not contest the first two factors, focusing instead on the third factor in their briefing. It is clear that Defendant was subjected to two separate proceedings. See id. ¶ 16 . We assume without deciding that "the same conduct precipitated the separate proceedings and forms the basis" for both the relinquishment of the dogs and the criminal charges against Defendant. State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, ¶ 21, 133 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772. Thus, we move on to the third factor: whether the relinquishment of Defendant's dogs was remedial or punitive in nature. See Schwartz, 1995-NMSC-069, ¶ 22 ().
{10} The Legislature "may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause." Schwartz, 1995-NMSC-069, ¶ 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the sanction "may be fairly characterized only as a deterrent or as retribution, then the revocation is punishment; if the penalty may fairly be characterized as remedial, then it is not punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis." Id. ¶ 28.
To determine whether a sanction is remedial or punitive, a reviewing court begins by evaluating the government's purpose in enacting the legislation, rather than evaluating the effect of the sanction on the defendant. Then the court must determine whether the sanction . . . was sufficiently punitive in its effect that, on balance, the punitive effects outweigh the remedial effect. Although a civil penalty may cause a degree of punishment for the defendant, such a subjective effect cannot override the legislation's primarily remedial purpose.
City of Albuquerque v. One 1984 (1) White Chevy Ut., 2002-NMSC-014, ¶ 11, 132 N.M. 187, 46 P.3d 94 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{11} The purpose of the security and relinquishment provisions is plainly remedial.2 Before a defendant may be ordered to post security for an animal under the cruelty to animals statutes, a court must find that there is "probable cause that the animal is being cruelly treated" and issue a warrant for the seizure of the animal. Section 30-18-1.1(B). Between the time of seizure and the resolution of criminal charges brought against the animal's owner, a seized animal remains under the care of an animal care organization in a kind of "protective custody" in which the animal receives necessary "rehabilitation and maintenance" while protected from any potential further abuse. Fiscal Impact Report, S.B. 127, Custody & Care of Mistreated Animals, 49th Leg., 1st. Sess. (N.M. 2009), at 3, available at https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/firs/SB0127.pdf; see § 30-18-1.2(C) (). The security provisions are intended to ensure that the animal care organization has recourse to avoid shouldering the full financial burden of providing housing, sustenance, and medical care—which, as this case demonstrates, "can reach into the tens of thousands of dollars," Fiscal Impact Report, supra, at 3—to the animal during this period, subject to the qualification that a court must take the defendant's ability to pay these costs into consideration in setting the security amount. Cf. State ex rel. Foy v. Austin Capital Mgmt., Ltd., 2015-NMSC-025, ¶ 46, 355 P.3d 1 . And, because a defendant becomes liable for the full cost of this care upon conviction for cruelty to animals, NMSA 1978, § 30-18-1.3(A) (2009), the security provides the animalcare organization some assurance that a portion of this cost will be...
To continue reading
Request your trial