State v. Allen
Court | Supreme Court of Oregon |
Writing for the Court | JONES |
Citation | 725 P.2d 331,301 Or. 569 |
Decision Date | 26 August 1986 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on review, v. Edward Eugene ALLEN, Petitioner on review. CC CR 84 2 32; CA A36265; SC S32762. |
Page 331
v.
Edward Eugene ALLEN, Petitioner on review.
In Banc.
Decided Aug. 26, 1986.
Robert J. McCrea of McCrea, P.C., Eugene, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.
Richard D. Wasserman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen. and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.
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[301 Or. 571] JONES, Justice.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree arson. He appealed, contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he previously had committed arson. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction without opinion, 78 Or.App. 193, 714 P.2d 1119, and defendant petitions this court for review. We granted review to decide whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's admission into evidence of a prior arson of a building committed by the defendant. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
Defendant was charged with hiring an acquaintance, Michael Dotson, to set fire to a house in Brookings on December 1, 1982. At trial, the state offered evidence that Dotson met defendant through Dotson's janitorial service, which cleaned a restaurant owned by defendant, and that Dotson and defendant met several times in Medford taverns at which time defendant told Dotson that he wanted to have a house in Brookings burned. Defendant said that the house belonged to a friend who was getting a divorce, and the friend wanted to burn the house before the property settlement. Dotson eventually agreed to set the fire in return for several thousand dollars.
After detailed coaching by defendant, Dotson drove from Medford to Brookings during the early morning of December 1. Arriving in Brookings at 8 a.m., he purchased a gasoline can at a hardware store and filled it with unleaded gasoline. Following defendant's prescribed methodology, Dotson placed paper cups filled with unleaded gasoline in the oven and turned on the oven; he also poured gasoline in several rooms in the house. After the house caught fire, Dotson remained nearby and watched firefighters put out the blaze. He then telephoned defendant to report that he successfully had set fire to the house. Defendant denied any participation in setting the fire. To show defendant's motive, the state offered evidence that defendant hired the dwelling torched to obtain insurance money in excess of the market value of the premises and to resolve a friend's marital dispute.
Although defendant did not own the house, the state argued that he would gain from the fire. To understand the [301 Or. 572] state's theory of defendant's motive, we give the somewhat complex history of the house's legal ownership. Defendant's mother originally owned the house, using it occasionally on weekends and vacations. In 1981, she and defendant borrowed $50,000 from a credit union using the house as security; defendant spent about $40,000 of the loan on investments. Defendant defaulted on the loan and the credit union took title to the house in July 1982. While defendant and the credit union attempted to negotiate an agreement so that defendant could repurchase the house after foreclosure, the insurance policy for the house remained in his mother's name, and was in her name at the time of the fire.
In addition to evidence offered to prove that the 1982 fire was an act of arson, the state offered evidence of a 1975 arson to which defendant confessed. Defendant's confession to the arson was one of a number of other confessions to other crimes and he pled guilty to two burglaries and one perjury charge. It is the admission of this evidence of defendant's uncharged prior misconduct that concerns us in this case.
To prove defendant's prior arson, the state offered testimony from two state police officers. The officers testified that in 1977 defendant confessed that he hired a friend to set fire to his house in Talent, Oregon, on January 27, 1975. Defendant admitted that because he needed money he filed a falsified insurance claim for items not actually lost in the fire and that he committed the arson to resolve a marital dispute.
At trial, the state contended that the evidence of the 1975 arson showed a method similar to the 1982 arson: defendant paid a friend to set the fire, gasoline was used to start the fire, and he falsely claimed insurance proceeds. The state also argued that defendant had learned from
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the 1975 arson to refine his criminal technique. The force of the gasoline explosion in the 1975 fire knocked defendant's accomplice off the front porch of the house. "[T]he contrast between the crude method of setting the 1975 fire, in which defendant's friend was injured, and the somewhat more sophisticated and safe method of starting this fire, in which the ignition would be delayed until the oven element reached a high temperature, showed defendant's preparation and plan to commit the crime."Defendant objected to the admission of evidence [301 Or. 573] concerning the 1975 arson, contending that it was not relevant to the 1982 arson with which he was charged and, if relevant, defense counsel claimed that the prior arson evidence was "unfairly prejudicial and highly inflammatory." (No pun intended.) The trial judge admitted the evidence, stating that it
" * * * tends to identify Mr. Allen. It tends to show the motive. It tends to show the intent. It tends to show preparation. It tends to show plan. It tends to show knowledge, absence of mistake or accident. And it is evidence that the jury can consider [in the case-in-chief]."
As mentioned, we allowed review, together with State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535, 725 P.2d 312 (1986), and State v. Gailey, 301 Or. 563, 725 P.2d 328 (1986), to determine whether the similar crime evidence in this case is admissible under OEC 404(3). Defendant denied having anything to do with the fire and claims that the fire's origin was unknown.
The prior crime evidence of the 1975 arson was admissible. As we stated in Johns and Gailey, we approach prior crime cases by first determining...
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State v. Deloretto, 05C45532; A130694.
...Id. at 552-53, 725 P.2d 312 (quoting Edward Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 8, § 5:05 (1984)); see also State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 577, 725 P.2d 331 (1986) (deciding, in a companion case to Johns, that evidence of an earlier arson to which the defendant had confessed was admis......
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State v. Moen, C-21131
...is relevant if it "even slightly increases or decreases the probability of existence of any material fact in issue." State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 573, 725 P.2d 331 (1986) (emphasis Long before Johns, this court recognized the relevancy of a defendant's prior hostile acts toward a homicide v......
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State v. Walton
...relevant if it "even slightly increases or decreases the probability of existence of any material fact in issue[.]" State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 573, 725 P.2d 331 [311 Or. 233] The trial court found that evidence of the Minit Mart robbery was relevant for the reasons asserted by the state. ......
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State v. Beavers, No. 17778.
...premises was caused by arson was relevant to rebut "defense evidence that the [charged] fire was electrical in origin"); State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 577, 725 P.2d 331 (1986) ("evidence of the prior arson was relevant to [the] defendant's knowledge of how to start an arson fire and was also......
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State v. Deloretto, 05C45532; A130694.
...Id. at 552-53, 725 P.2d 312 (quoting Edward Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence 8, § 5:05 (1984)); see also State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 577, 725 P.2d 331 (1986) (deciding, in a companion case to Johns, that evidence of an earlier arson to which the defendant had confessed was admis......
-
State v. Moen, C-21131
...is relevant if it "even slightly increases or decreases the probability of existence of any material fact in issue." State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 573, 725 P.2d 331 (1986) (emphasis Long before Johns, this court recognized the relevancy of a defendant's prior hostile acts toward a homicide v......
-
State v. Walton
...relevant if it "even slightly increases or decreases the probability of existence of any material fact in issue[.]" State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 573, 725 P.2d 331 [311 Or. 233] The trial court found that evidence of the Minit Mart robbery was relevant for the reasons asserted by the state. ......
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State v. Beavers, No. 17778.
...premises was caused by arson was relevant to rebut "defense evidence that the [charged] fire was electrical in origin"); State v. Allen, 301 Or. 569, 577, 725 P.2d 331 (1986) ("evidence of the prior arson was relevant to [the] defendant's knowledge of how to start an arson fire and was also......