State v. Allen

• Decision Date: 15 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 41,548-KA.,41,548-KA.
• Citation: 942 So.2d 1244
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Travis Orlando ALLEN, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

942 So.2d 1244

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Travis Orlando ALLEN, Appellant.

No. 41,548-KA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

November 15, 2006.

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W. Jarred Franklin, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.

Jerry L. Jones, District Attorney, Cynthia P. Lavespere, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, CARAWAY and MOORE, JJ.

CARAWAY, J.

Travis Orlando Allen was convicted of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Allen appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.

Facts

Claude Brown was concerned after his daughter, Antinissin Kirston Brown ("Brown"), unexpectedly missed a weekly family meeting. When family members called Brown's cell phone, it was answered by Grace Robinson, who told them she found it near a school. When the family retrieved the phone from Ms. Robinson, it looked bloody. Mr. Brown went to his daughter's home. His knocks at the front door went unanswered, so he checked the back door and found it unlocked. Hearing loud music playing inside, Mr. Brown decided to call the police.

The officers found the small house in disarray. Going through the home, they found blood droplets in a hall leading towards the front/living room area. Once in the hall, officers opened the bathroom door and found a bloody scene. Across the hall, officers saw Brown's nude body lying on the bedroom floor. Her head was covered by a blanket. Brown had been "hogtied" with seven types of ligatures including an iron cord, a cable cord, an extension cord and a purse strap. Her head had been covered by cloth which was bound at her neck by one of the ligatures. After removing the head covering, officers discovered a sock stuffed in Brown's throat. Brown's head lacerations resulted from blows using a claw hammer found at the crime scene. The coroner determined the cause of Brown's death as suffocation and brain hemorrhage.

Brown's cell phone call activity showed she had talked to someone named Travis. Brown's banking records showed activity occurring after her death on April 17, 2005. Police obtained surveillance photographs of an individual using Brown's bank card to withdraw cash from her account. As police were seeking more information on "Travis," they received an anonymous tip that someone named Travis worked at a restaurant in the mall and had been acting suspicious. After confirming that Travis Allen was employed at the restaurant, Detective Mark Nappier interviewed him and identified Allen as the same individual who used Brown's bank card. Allen was taken into custody.

Allen eventually confessed to killing Brown with whom he had a relationship for two months. He also admitted spending $2,700 shopping with her savings after her death. At trial, Allen claimed the murder was caused by a fight that just got out of hand. The jury convicted Allen of second degree murder. This appeal ensued.

Discussion

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Allen argues that the killing was in fact manslaughter because the victim was the initial aggressor, and the fight "got out of hand." He also contends that the state failed to prove that the offense was committed during the perpetration of an armed robbery.

When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accord with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992).

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App.2d Cir.8/30/02), 827 So.2d 508, writ denied, 02-3090 (La.11/14/03), 858 So.2d 422.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Owens, 30,903 (La. App.2d Cir.9/25/98), 719 So.2d 610, writ denied, 98-2723 (La.2/5/99), 737 So.2d 747.

Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382. Specific intent need not be proved as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126 (La.1982); State v. Taylor, 621 So.2d 141 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 93-2054 (La.2/11/94), 634 So.2d 371. Specific intent may be established by circumstantial evidence alone if every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. State v. Cousan, supra. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Brown, 618 So.2d 629 (La. App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 624 So.2d 1222 (La.1993).

A defendant's confession is direct evidence, for it is an acknowledgment of guilt for which no inference need be drawn. La. R.S. 15:449; State v. McNeal, 34,593 (La.App.2d Cir.4/4/01), 785 So.2d 957; State v. Jones, 451 So.2d 35 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied, 456 So.2d 171 (La.1984). It is well settled that a person cannot be convicted on his confession alone. State v. Hopkins, 35,146 (La. App.2d Cir.11/02/01), 799 So.2d 1234. However, once proof independent of the confession confirms the fact of death by violent means, the confession alone can supply the proof linking the accused to the crime. Additionally, the confession can prove the elements essential to determining the degree of the crime, such as intent, or the underlying felony in a felony-murder prosecution. State v. Bryant, 29,344 (La.App.2d Cir.5/7/97), 694 So.2d 556; State v. Cutwright, 626 So.2d 780 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 632 So.2d 761 (La.1994). This corroboration rule requires only that there be some evidence other than the confession that a criminal act was committed. State v. Cutwright, supra.

La. R.S. 14:30.1 provides, in pertinent part, that second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or

(2)(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ... armed robbery, ... or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

La. R.S. 14:64 provides in part that armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.

La. R.S. 14:31 defines manslaughter in pertinent part as:

A.(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed.

Manslaughter is a homicide which would either be first or second degree murder but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his cool reflection and self-control. La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). The elements of "sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense, and when the defendant establishes such factors by a preponderance of the evidence, a verdict for murder is inappropriate. State v. Leger, 05-0011 (La.7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108; State v. Deal, 00-0434 (La.11/28/01), 802 So.2d 1254, 1260, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 828, 123 S.Ct. 124, 154 L.Ed.2d 42 (2002). In addition, provocation and time for cooling are questions for the jury to be...