State v. Allen
| Citation | 856 S.E.2d 494,377 N.C. 169 |
| Decision Date | 16 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 8A20,8A20 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Harley Aaron ALLEN |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Nicholas S. Brod, Assistant Solicitor General, and Ryan Y. Park, Deputy Solicitor General, for the State-appellant.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Katherine Jane Allen, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.
¶ 1 The issue before us in this case addresses whether defendant Harley Aaron Allen was subjected to a deprivation of his right to liberty without due process of law on the grounds that he was tried for and convicted of committing a criminal offense at a time when he "lack[ed] the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense." Drope v. Missouri , 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had erred by failing to hold a second hearing for the purpose of inquiring into defendant's competence immediately prior to trial even though defendant had been found to be competent at a hearing held six months earlier. After careful consideration of the State's challenge to the Court of Appeals’ decision, we hold that the trial court did not err by failing to hold a second competency hearing immediately prior to the beginning of defendant's trial on its own motion. As a result, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining challenge to the validity of the trial court's judgments.
¶ 2 On 22 July 2015, defendant sold a pill containing a derivative of opium known as buprenorphine
to a confidential informant. On 22 October 2015, a warrant for arrest charging defendant with selling Subutex, delivering Subutex, and maintain a vehicle for the purpose of keeping or selling Subutex was issued. On 22 February 2016, the Mitchell County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging defendant with possession of Subutex with the intent to sell or deliver and having attained habitual felon status.
¶ 3 On 2 September 2016, defendant's trial counsel filed a motion seeking to have a forensic evaluator appointed for the purpose of assessing defendant's capacity to proceed. On the same day, Judge R. Gregory Horne entered an order allowing defendant's motion. However, defendant was involuntarily committed to Mission Hospital before the required forensic evaluation could be completed, with this being one of the two instances during 2016 in which defendant's parents petitioned to have defendant involuntarily committed after he "appeared to lose behavioral control, threatening suicide and becoming confrontational" while under the influence of methamphetamine. At the time of defendant's November 2016 hospitalization, the attending medical professionals developed the opinion that substance abuse underlay many of defendant's psychiatric, medical, and social stressors.
¶ 4 During defendant's November 2016 involuntary commitment, forensic psychologist Paul Freedman evaluated defendant in accordance with Judge Horne's order. Based upon information obtained during his evaluation, Mr. Freedman described defendant as "hav[ing] substantial deficits regarding his overall fund of knowledge."1 More specifically, Mr. Freedman noted that defendant had a very low IQ of approximately 60, had been awarded disability payments as the result of an intellectual disability, and was unable to manage his overall finances, including his disability payments, without assistance. As a result, Mr. Freedman found that defendant suffered from an intellectual disability, memory impairment
, and overall neurological dysfunction.
¶ 5 In addition, Mr. Freedman reported that defendant had "acknowledged that he had previously signed plea agreements without having an understanding of what they contained," with it being unclear to Mr. Freedman "whether [defendant] knew he was facing multiple felony charges in two counties." Furthermore, Mr. Freedman stated that defendant exhibited a serious lack of understanding of the judicial system, having described a judge as "the man you gotta stand in front of" and being unable to say whether the defense attorney was "on his side."
¶ 6 In the course of a phone conversation that Mr. Freedman had with defendant's adoptive mother, defendant's adoptive mother stated that she and her husband had adopted defendant as an infant after he had experienced almost two years of extreme abuse and neglect. In Mr. Freedman's view, the "abuse, detailed to this examiner, that the defendant suffered as an infant necessarily leaves a permanent, tragic, and irrevocable mark," with defendant's cognitive deficits
, which had "been with him since early childhood," being conditions that he would "likely struggle with [ ] for the remainder of his life." In light of "the nature of his impairments," Mr. Freedman felt "that [defendant's] prospects of restorability are limited." At the conclusion of his evaluation, Mr. Freedman opined that defendant was not capable of proceeding to trial.
¶ 7 After defendant had been released from Mission Hospital, the State moved on 17 January 2017 that defendant be committed to Butner Central Regional Hospital for a second evaluation of his capacity to proceed. On the same date, Judge Gary M. Gavenus entered an order granting the State's motion. On 20 February 2017, Dr. Bruce Berger, a forensic psychiatrist, completed a second evaluation of defendant's capacity to proceed.
¶ 8 After the completion of his evaluation, Dr. Berger concluded that defendant had a "profound lack of knowledge" of the court system and that defendant's adaptive functioning was significantly impaired. In Dr. Berger's view, defendant's limited adaptive functioning, when taken "in combination with [defendant's] attention deficits, learning deficits[,] difficult[ies] in moderating his behavior, mood disorder, and possible decrease of day-to-day structure since his marriage, all contribute to him being more impaired than IQ scores alone ... would suggest." Dr. Berger noted that, when asked what a prosecutor did, defendant had replied that "[h]e and the judge work together," and that, when asked what a "plea bargain" was, defendant had said that it meant that you "[s]ign something." As a result, Dr. Berger determined that defendant was not capable of proceeding to trial.
¶ 9 On 19 April 2017, following the completion of Dr. Berger's competency evaluation, Judge Gavenus entered an order committing defendant to Broughton Hospital for temporary custody and mental health treatment. On 18 May 2017, Monisha Berkowskie, Ph.D., a Senior Psychologist at Broughton Hospital, wrote a letter stating that, in the opinion of defendant's treatment team, defendant had developed a "strong foundation of rational and factual knowledge of the legal system" following a course of treatment that included medication, educational sessions focused upon the development of an understanding of courtroom procedures, and attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings that were intended to assist defendant in combating his substance abuse problems. In light of these developments, Dr. Berkowskie requested that another capacity evaluation be performed.
¶ 10 On 1 June 2017, Dr. Berger conducted another capacity evaluation of defendant at Broughton Hospital. Dr. Berger noted that, since beginning treatment at Broughton Hospital, defendant had become able to "follow unit routine, advocate for his needs, interact with peers and staff appropriately, and successfully complete activities of daily living independently." In addition, Dr. Berger reported that defendant was able to identify the specific charges that had been lodged against him and understood that he would be sent to prison if found guilty. Similarly, Dr. Berger stated that defendant comprehended the nature of the plea negotiation process and had the ability to explain the roles that defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, juries, and witnesses played in the judicial system. At the conclusion of his evaluation, Dr. Berger opined that defendant had an improved and nuanced understanding of the court system and was capable of proceeding to trial.
¶ 11 On 23 August 2017, a pre-trial competency hearing was held before Judge Gavenus. In the course of the competency hearing, Judge Gavenus asked defendant's trial counsel whether he agreed with Dr. Berger's conclusion that defendant was now competent to stand trial. In response, defendant's trial counsel stated that:
In addition, Judge Gavenus had the following colloquy with defendant:
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Gavenus...
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