State v. Allen
Decision Date | 10 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 104,104 |
Citation | 875 A.2d 724,387 Md. 389 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Jeffrey Edward ALLEN. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Devy Patterson Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for petitioner.
Stacy W. McCormack, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, on brief), for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
Jeffrey Edward Allen was convicted of first degree felony-murder in the Circuit Court for Charles County. The Court of Special Appeals reversed his conviction on the grounds that a defendant cannot be found to have committed felony-murder on the basis of a determination that he formed the intent to rob the victim only after he inflicted the fatal injuries. Allen v. State, 158 Md.App. 194, 857 A.2d 101 (2004). We granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to decide the following question:
"Can a defendant be found guilty of felony-murder, even if he did not form the intent to steal until after the application of force that resulted in the victim's death, so long as the taking of personal property was `part and parcel' of the same episode, and if so, did the Court of Special Appeals err in reversing Allen's conviction of felony-murder because the court so instructed the jury?"
State v. Allen, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 997 (2004). We agree with the Court of Special Appeals and shall affirm the judgment of that court.
In the late evening of October 23, 2001, a car pulled up next to respondent Jeffrey Edward Allen near the corner of 5th and H Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. Allen was aware that this neighborhood ("The Stroll") was a frequent meeting place for men, and he had "a pretty good idea" of why a car would stop next to him. One or more of the vehicle's three occupants asked Allen if he wished to go with them to La Plata, Charles County, Maryland. Allen agreed and got into the car.
After stopping to pick up another individual, the vehicle proceeded to a residence in La Plata, where it discharged three of the passengers. The driver, John Butler, agreed to meet one of the departing passengers at 9:00 the following morning to attend a funeral. Butler and Allen then continued on to Butler's residence in Port Tobacco, Charles County. Butler and Allen engaged in consensual sex and fell asleep on Butler's bed.
Allen described the next morning's events three times: in an oral statement to police, in a written statement to police, and in his testimony at trial. These accounts were relatively consistent with one another. According to Allen, he awoke around 9:00 a.m. and asked Butler if he still planned to attend the funeral. Butler replied that he did not, which upset Allen because he wanted to leave the house. Butler told Allen to "chill out" in the kitchen and have a beer. Allen went to the kitchen and opened the refrigerator, in which he discovered a live rat. This discovery increased Allen's desire to leave, and he asked Butler to get up and drive him back to Washington, D.C. Butler remained in bed.
In his written statement Allen told police:
Consistent with this statement, Allen testified at trial that he had not intended to take Butler's car when he jingled the keys or during the ensuing struggle.
While looking for a place to call the police, Allen lost control of Butler's car and ran it into a ditch. He flagged down a passing motorist, who drove him to a fire station. Finding no one there, the motorist took Allen to a store in Ironsides, Charles County, where Allen proceeded to call 911. In his 911 call, Allen reported a slightly different version of events vis-à-vis his movements with the car keys:
Butler died of his injuries, and Allen was indicted by the Grand Jury for Charles County. He was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Charles County for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony-murder, second degree murder, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, robbery, theft, and two counts of carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. At trial, the court instructed the jury as follows on the crimes of first degree felony-murder and robbery:
Defense counsel objected to the instruction, particularly the italicized portion.
The jury convicted Allen of first degree felony-murder, second degree murder, robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, robbery, theft, and the two weapons counts. It found him not guilty of first degree premeditated murder. The court sentenced Allen to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the first degree felony-murder count, and to a term of imprisonment of thirty years for second degree murder, twenty years for robbery with a deadly weapon, and three years for each weapons count, all to be served concurrently.1
Allen noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. He argued, inter alia, that the court erroneously instructed the jury that the requisite connection between the use of force and intent to deprive the victim of property was satisfied as long as the two were "part and parcel of the same occurrence which involved the death." According to Allen, the trial court's instruction was an inaccurate statement of the law regarding robbery, which affected his robbery and first degree felony-murder convictions. The State argued that the instruction was a correct statement of the law.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed Allen's first degree felony-murder conviction. The court held as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Harris v. State
...however, is not an unintended homicide. To be sure, intent to kill is not a required element of felony murder. See State v. Allen , 387 Md. 389, 398, 875 A.2d 724 (2005) ("[T]he State need not prove that the defendant intended to commit murder, it must establish that the defendant intended ......
-
Allen v. State
...BY CHARLES COUNTY." Id. at 251, 857 A.2d 101. Our decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the same grounds. See State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 875 A.2d 724 (2005). In August 2008, the State re-tried appellant on the felony murder charge. The State proceeded on the theory that appella......
-
Ware v. State
...v. State, 160 Md.App. 531, 560 n. 22, 864 A.2d 1037 (2005); Allen v. State, 158 Md.App. 194, 249, 857 A.2d 101 (2004), aff'd, 387 Md. 389, 875 A.2d 724 (2005); Hagez v. State, 110 Md.App. 194, 204, 676 A.2d 992 The evidence clearly placed appellant at the scene of the murders on the day in ......
-
Owens v. State
...of the trial judge's decision concerning custody."); Allen v. State, 158 Md.App. 194, 229, 857 A.2d 101 (2004), aff'd, 387 Md. 389, 875 A.2d 724 (2005); Ashe v. State, 125 Md.App. 537, 549, 726 A.2d 786 (1999) ("Whether appellant was in `custody' when he made the incriminating statement is ......
-
§ 15.02 TEMPORAL CONCURRENCE
...did he decide to commit a felony; held: if the jury believes C's claim, he is not guilty of burglary).[4] . See also State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724 (Md. 2005) (A stabbed V, mortally wounding him; A thereafter decided to steal V's car; V died; A was charged with felony-murder based on the felo......
-
§ 15.02 Temporal Concurrence
...mother, did he decide to commit a felony; held: if the jury believes C's claim, he is not guilty of burglary).[4] See also State v. Allen, 875 A.2d 724 (Md. 2005) (A stabbed V, mortally wounding him; A thereafter decided to steal V's car; V died; A was charged with felony-murder based on th......