State v. Allen

• Decision Date: 30 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 800 S.W.2d 82
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randy ALLEN, Appellant. 42317.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 82

800 S.W.2d 82

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Randy ALLEN, Appellant.

No. WD 42317.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Oct. 30, 1990.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Dec. 4, 1990.

Application to Transfer Denied Jan. 9, 1991.

David S. Durbin, Appellate Defender, Terri L. Backhus, Asst. Appellate Defender, Kansas City, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.

Before KENNEDY, P.J., and SHANGLER and GAITAN, JJ.

KENNEDY, Judge.

Appellant Randy Allen was convicted upon jury trial on the charge of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident in violation of § 577.060, RSMo 1986. The court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict and sentenced appellant to a five-year term of imprisonment. He has appealed to this court and raises the following two allegations of error: (1) that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of defense witness Tommy Allen; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

I.

We consider first appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In deciding this issue, we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences supportive of the verdict in the light most favorable to the verdict, and disregard those portions of the record contrary to a finding of guilt. State v. Seeger, 725 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Guinan, 665 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 227, 83 L.Ed.2d 156 (1984); State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1875, 85 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985); State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Mo. banc 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 931, 102 S.Ct. 1982, 72 L.Ed.2d 448 (1982); State v. Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo. banc 1980). The test is whether the evidence, so viewed, was sufficient to make a submissible case from which rational jurors could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty. Seeger, 725 S.W.2d at 40; State v. Bonuchi, 636 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983); State v. Kelly, 539 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. banc 1976); State v. Eaton, 504 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Mo.1973).

Viewed in that light, the evidence establishes that at around 5 o'clock on the evening of July 23, 1988, 5-year-old Rodney Lollis and several other children were riding their bikes near 59th and Lawn in Kansas City, Missouri. When the children got to the corner of the street, 11-year-old Karana McReynolds signaled for the children to stop, but Rodney, who was riding his Big Wheel, continued on into the intersection. Rodney's Big Wheel collided with the driver's side door of an automobile being driven westbound on 59th Street. Upon impact, the Big Wheel exploded into pieces and flew up into the air. Rodney was dragged down the street under the car for approximately 25 yards.

Harry Gumby was coming out of the side door of his house when his attention was diverted by a "loud noise" in the street in front of his house. Gumby turned and saw a white vehicle coming west on Lawn and dragging a little boy underneath it. Gumby testified that the loud noise was the vehicle's initial point of impact with Rodney. The noise, Gumby said, was "[l]oud enough for me to turn around and look and see what was happening." Gumby saw Rodney being carried on the front of the car and then fall under the car and come out the back end of the car. After Rodney came out from underneath the car, the car "kind of hesitated" and then took off. Gumby testified that the car's hesitation was as if the brakes were momentarily applied.

Rodney's head was crushed under the wheels of the vehicle. He appeared dead at the scene. He suffered severe head injuries which consisted of a skull fracture and hemorrhages of the brain. The official cause of death was "multiple blunt injuries to the head, chest, and abdomen."

Approximately one week after the accident, 10-year-old Sonya Striplin was at the home of her grandmother, Carolyn Allen, when she heard some of her family members talking about "a little boy who got hit by a car." Dennis Striplin asked appellant whether he had hit the little boy. Sonya testified that appellant answered, "Yes." Sonya's grandmother, Carolyn Allen, then asked, "What about the car?" Appellant's brother, Chris Allen, answered, "Let's blow it up." Appellant was outside when his family members talked about blowing up his car. Later, Chris Allen left alone in appellant's car, and appellant left in a second car with Tommy Allen and Dennis Striplin. Appellant, Tommy Allen and Dennis Striplin eventually came back to the house in the same car they were driving when they left the house. Chris Allen, however, did not come back in appellant's car; he came walking back to the house. Sonya testified that she never saw appellant's car again.

On July 29, 1988, police discovered appellant's white, two-door 1975 Mercury Marquis burning on 350 Highway, about three-quarters of a mile northwest of Bannister Road. Two days earlier, on July 27, appellant went to the Lake of the Ozarks. Appellant was driven to the lake by Elizabeth Mathews, who also drove appellant's brothers, Chris and Tommy Allen. Mathews testified that only appellant remained at the lake, and she, Chris and Tommy immediately drove back to Kansas City.

Appellant remained at the lake until August 11, 1988, when his parents surrendered him to police. At the police station, appellant stated that he had been at 59th and Lawn at around the time of the accident on July 23, 1988. Appellant told a detective that "he hit what he thought was a bump in the road, a chuckhole or something, slowed down a little bit, and continued on over to ... his brother's house." Appellant stated that he realized the Thursday following the accident that he had hit the little boy. Investigator Clarence Gibson of the Kansas City, Missouri police department testified that appellant stated that he "[w]ent to the Ozarks" once he realized he was a suspect in the case. Appellant also indicated that his brothers took his car and "were going to dispose of it." Appellant denied that he was involved in his brothers' disposal of the car.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required mental state for a conviction under § 577.060.1, ¹ that he knowingly left the scene of the accident. That statute provides that the offense of leaving the scene of an accident is committed only where a defendant leaves the scene "knowing that an injury has been caused to a person or damage has been caused to property." Thus, appellant particularly complains that the State failed to produce substantial evidence that he failed to stop "knowing" that he had been involved in an accident or had caused injury to the little boy.

In support of his argument, appellant cites the case of State v. Dougherty, 358 Mo. 734, 216 S.W.2d 467 (1949). In Dougherty, the Missouri Supreme Court, in construing the predecessor to § 577.060, discussed the element of "knowledge." The court stated:

We think the word "knowing", as used in the statute, means actual knowledge rather than mere constructive knowledge, or such notice as would put one on inquiry, and more than mere negligence in failing to know, or the mere presence of facts which might have induced the belief in the mind of a reasonable person.

Id. 216 S.W.2d at 472.

That standard was applied in State v. Teter, 633 S.W.2d 417 (Mo.App.1982), and State v. Seeger, 725 S.W.2d 39 (Mo.App.1986), both of which construed the meaning of "knowledge" under § 577.060. In both Teter and Seeger, it was held that the jury was entitled to infer that the defendants "knew" that they had been involved in accidents. In Teter, the defendant was being pursued by police when he struck a motorcycle and inflicted fatal injuries to the motorcyclist. The defendant's vehicle lost a rim and a wheel hub, and the glass in the passenger window was cracked. The defendant accelerated from the accident scene, but was eventually apprehended. Appealing his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident, the defendant argued that there was no evidence that he "knew" that an injury had been caused to a person or that damage had been caused to property. The court pointed out that the defendant admitted hearing a loud noise and feeling something flying onto him, and that the windshield was cracked, one side window was smashed and parts of his vehicle fell off. In light of this evidence, the court rejected the defendant's contention, and held that the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant not only knew that he had collided with some object but, at the very least, that he had damaged property. Teter, 633 S.W.2d at 419-20.

Similarly, the court in Seeger rejected the defendant's argument that he did not have the requisite "knowledge" to be convicted of leaving the scene of an accident. In that case, the defendant and a passenger were injured when the passenger grabbed the steering wheel, causing the defendant's car to swerve off the highway, strike a sign and collide with a pole. The defendant maintained that he did not know until later that there had been an accident, that anyone had been injured, or that property had been damaged. The court noted that the front end of defendant's car was completely smashed in, the windshield and part of the roof were damaged, and the sign that was struck was completely damaged. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant, when he left the accident scene, knew that he had been in an accident and knew that he, or one of his passengers, had been injured. Seeger, 725 S.W.2d at 44.

These authorities should be considered in conjunction with the general rule, well settled in...