State v. Allery, Cr. N
Decision Date | 01 July 1982 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 322 N.W.2d 228 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Glenn ALLERY, Defendant and Appellant. o. 821. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Arne F. Boyum, Jr., State's Atty., Rolla, for plaintiff and appellee.
Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant; argued by Charles L. Chapman, Bismarck.
This is an appeal by the defendant, Glenn Allery [Allery], from a jury verdict of guilty for theft of property worth more than $100, a class C felony, in violation of North Dakota Century Code Sec. 12.1-23-02.
On 20 July 1980 the remains of a freshly butchered Hereford calf and a black white-faced calf were found in a pasture near Allery's father's home in Couture Township in Rolette County, North Dakota. A 1967 Ford two-door automobile belonging to Germaine DeCoteau, Allery's wife at the time, was also found in the pasture, along with a butcher knife, several other knives, and a hacksaw. Two law enforcement officers testified that they observed hair from calf hides and blood stains in the trunk of the automobile.
On 22 July 1980 Irvin Schoonover reported to the Rolette County sheriff's office that a Hereford calf and a black white-faced calf were missing from a pasture he rented in Currie Township of Rolette County, near Dunseith, North Dakota. Schoonover testified that each calf had a value of approximately $400.00. Schoonover also testified that he observed tire tracks in the pasture and that he found a power steering belt near the tracks.
Allery was ultimately charged with theft of property and a jury returned a verdict of guilty. The State's evidence implicating Allery in the theft of the cattle was mostly circumstantial.
Germaine DeCoteau testified that she was married to Allery and that he had access to her car at the time of the alleged theft of property. Germaine also testified that she assumed Allery had taken her car at that time.
Barry DeCoteau, Germaine's 11-year old son, testified on direct examination that he had gone for a ride in the summer of 1980 with Allery when Allery drove the car into a pasture near Dunseith, North Dakota. Barry testified that Allery chased cattle in the pasture with the car. However, Barry testified that Allery did not stop the car when they were in the pasture, and, further, that after they left the pasture, Allery took him home. Barry also testified that he talked with law enforcement officers Ken Sayers and Bryant Mueller about the incident in March 1981; however, Barry testified that he did not remember if his testimony on direct examination was the same as he told Sayers and Mueller.
Sayers testified, without objection by counsel, as follows concerning his questioning of Barry in March 1981:
Mueller testified, without objection by counsel, as follows concerning the questioning of Barry in March of 1981:
Mueller also testified that he questioned Allery about the cattle in April 1981 after Allery was read his Miranda warnings. Mueller testified, without objection by counsel, concerning the questioning of Allery:
Judy McCloud testified that Allery stopped by her house in either July or August of 1980 and offered to sell her some meat contained in a plastic garbage bag. She further testified that the meat had an odor of spoiled meat and that she did not buy it.
The State also presented evidence that red-brown cattle hair was found on the handle of a knife found in the pasture, that cattle blood was found on paper towels found at the scene, and that hair from cattle hides and blood stains were observed in the trunk of the automobile.
Allery was found guilty by a jury of theft of property and sentenced to three years in the state penitentiary to be followed by two years of probation. As part of his sentence, he was also required to make restitution to Schoonover in the amount of $750.00. Allery appealed to this Court.
The first issue raised by Allery concerned the testimony by Mueller at trial as to statements made by Allery during questioning in April of 1981. Allery asserted that the use of Mueller's testimony was prejudicial error because it was an improper comment upon his right to remain silent.
Initially, we note that Mueller testified that Allery was given a Miranda warning prior to making statements in April 1981, and that the testimony of Mueller concerning those statements was not objected to at trial by counsel for Allery.
In State v. Schneider, 270 N.W.2d 787, 792 (N.D.1978), we found that testimony concerning a defendant's decision to remain silent 1 was an improper comment upon the defendant's privilege of self-incrimination and was "constitutional error which may be reviewed on appeal even though not objected to at the time of trial."
Our initial consideration is whether or not the testimony of Mueller concerning his questioning of Allery, as previously set out, constituted an improper comment upon Allery's right to remain silent. If that testimony was an improper comment upon Allery's right to remain silent, then we must determine whether the error constituted "harmless error" or "obvious error" so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted, even though there was no objection at the time. Rule 52, NDRCrimP; State v. Schneider, supra.
We do not believe Allery's statements to the effect of "Well, you'll have to prove it," and "Well, maybe I'm the incredible hulk," in and of themselves can be construed to be improper comments upon the defendant's right to remain silent. We must remember that these statements were made within a short time after Allery was advised of his Miranda rights and they do not convey a decision to remain silent. However, the testimony of Mueller that Allery, in response to whether or not he wanted to tell Mueller anything about the incident, "grinned and did not reply" approaches an improper comment on his right to remain silent. This statement coupled with the two previous statements may have had the effect of an improper comment upon Allery's right to remain silent. The testimony of Mueller does not reflect that any further questions were asked of Allery on that date in April. Although Mueller's testimony concerning Allery's responses approaches an improper comment on the right to remain silent, we do not believe those statements, by themselves, would be grounds for reversal. 2 However, in this instance we must also consider the effect of those statements and the prior inconsistent statements of Barry DeCoteau in conjunction with the remaining evidence implicating Allery.
The crucial issue for our consideration relates to the possible use as substantive evidence of prior inconsistent statements made by Barry DeCoteau. Barry testified at trial that Allery did not stop the car in the pasture. Law enforcement officers Sayers and Mueller testified at trial that Barry DeCoteau had made a prior statement in March 1981 about Allery's activities in the pasture which was inconsistent with Barry's trial testimony. Sayers and Mueller testified that Barry had previously told them that he had been with Allery in the pasture when Allery shot a cow and loaded it in the car.
North Dakota Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(i) provides as follows:
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