State v. Allgood

• Decision Date: 25 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 12341,12341
• Citation: 98 Idaho 525,567 P.2d 1276
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Dale ALLGOOD and Duane E. Grimes, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1276

567 P.2d 1276

98 Idaho 525

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert Dale ALLGOOD and Duane E. Grimes, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 12341.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Aug. 25, 1977.

Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Arthur J. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard P. Wallace, Michael Verbillis, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-respondents.

DONALDSON, Justice.

This case involves a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained by an illegal search and seizure. The facts as found by the trial court can be briefly summarized. While on patrol in the vicinity of a local tavern in Kootenai County, Idaho, two police officers, Robert E. Hill and Robert Rapp, observed defendants Duane Grimes and Robert Allgood exit from the tavern and enter a parked 1970 Dodge automobile with Washington license plates. The driver of the automobile, defendant Allgood, moved the vehicle from the parked position 180o to the same location facing the tavern and stopped the vehicle.

The officers observed beer cans on the ground on the driver's side of the car and since the two defendants appeared young in age, the officers thought that there might be a liquor law violation. As the officers drove up to the car, both defendants hastily left the vehicle and proceeded back across the parking lot towards the tavern. The two officers got out of their patrol car, stopped the two defendants in the parking lot about thirty feet from their car, and asked for their identification. Their identification showed that both defendants were of age.

In the course of the questioning, defendant Allgood stated that the car was not his but belonged to his brother-in-law. Suspecting that the vehicle may have been stolen, Officer Hill required Allgood to produce the registration to the vehicle.

From this point forward, the testimony is conflicting. The arresting officers testified that they escorted Allgood to the car where, after Allgood opened the door, the officers observed two plastic bags of green leafy substance in plain view inside the automobile. The defendants testified however that the plastic baggies were concealed within the glove compartment and behind the passenger's visor and that they were not uncovered until after the officers made a formal search of the vehicle.

The district court resolved this motion in favor of the defendants. The court held that after the officers determined that the defendants had not violated the liquor laws they could not have had any reasonable suspicions of criminal activity. From that point on the detention of the defendants was unlawful. Since the detention was unlawful, the arresting officers' presence by the defendant's car was not legal and hence the plain view doctrine could not justify the seizure of the evidence.

We disagree with the district court's conclusion that reasonable suspicions of criminal activity did not exist after the defendants showed that they were of legal drinking age. We reverse on this ground but before addressing that issue we believe that some clarification of the plain view doctrine is in order. The state argues that the presence of the marijuana baggies in plain view should dispose of this case, irrespective of whether the arresting officers unlawfully detained the defendants.

Under that interpretation of the plain view doctrine, it would not be necessary for the court to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the detention. We disagree. The plain view doctrine as we interpret it would not validate the seizure of evidence in plain view, if the plain view observation had its genesis in a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue of whether the detention was illegal is therefore dispositive of this case.

The plain view doctrine as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) is that "objects falling in the plain view of an arresting officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." The plain view doctrine has been applied in cases in which officers standing on public property looked in car windows, Nunez v. United States, 370 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1967), or the windows of dwellings, People v. Wright, 41 Ill.2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 1993, 23 L.Ed.2d 448 (1969), and also when the observations were by officers while on defendant's property in the pursuit of legitimate business, Ellison v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 206 F.2d 476 (1953).

The crucial issue on appeal then is whether the defendants were unlawfully detained after they produced their drivers' license. Only if the detention was lawful can the evidence be admitted under the plain view doctrine.

The state admits that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendants until they observed the marijuana baggies in the defendants' vehicle. The state relies on the investigative stop doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) to validate the detention. Police have traditionally followed the practice of stopping suspicious persons for purposes of questioning them or conducting some other form of investigation. Because this investigative technique is ordinarily employed when there are not grounds to make a formal arrest, it was often questioned whether the practice was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Terry and Adams shed some light on this question.

In Terry a Cleveland detective with thirty-nine years of experience observed three men who appeared to be casing a store for a robbery. His suspicions aroused, he approached the three men, identified himself, and asked for their names. Receiving only a mumbled response, he searched the men and discovered that the two were carrying fully-loaded weapons. Both men were convicted of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon.

In upholding the defendants' convictions, ostensibly the majority declined to rule upon the constitutionality of an investigative stop. The Court limited its holding to the constitutionality of a search initiated pursuant to an investigative stop. Searches pursuant to an investigative stop were justified only when the investigative stop was motivated by the observation of unusual conduct which lead to the reasonable conclusion that criminal activity may be afoot.

"(W)here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifie(d) himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him." 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.

But as Justice Harlan observed in his concurring opinion, it appears that the Court approved investigative stops by implication because the conclusion that an officer was entitled to frisk for his own protection must necessarily be predicated upon the assumption that the officer was justified in creating the danger in the first instance by stopping the suspect for investigation. 392 U.S. at 32-33, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

The majority opinion itself, included several statements supporting the constitutionality of investigative stops. In speaking of the government's interest in effective crime prevention and detention the court said:

"it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly...