State v. Allison

Decision Date09 February 2000
Docket NumberNo. 20505.,20505.
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. John W. ALLISON, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Craig M. Eichstadt, Deputy Attorney General, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellant.

Daniel W. Lias, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

KONENKAMP, Justice

[¶ 1.] Defendant failed to return government issued equipment at the end of his military service with the South Dakota Army National Guard. When he was charged with theft under a law making it a crime to retain military property, the circuit court dismissed the indictment, concluding that the statute violated our constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt. We reverse. Service in the armed forces is not a debtor-creditor relationship, and issuance of military equipment is not a loan or an extension of credit, but a temporary entrustment of public property, which must be restored to the government.

Facts

[¶ 2.] After John W. Allison ended his service with the South Dakota Army National Guard, he failed to turn in certain government issued ammunition, clothing, footwear, and other equipment, totaling approximately $650 in value. The National Guard sent him certified letters demanding return of the items. The letters were sent back unclaimed. Allison was indicted and arrested for grand theft of military equipment under SDCL 33-5-15.1. That statute provides:

Any person who fails to return any military property, equipment, or other items belonging to the armed forces of the United States, any reserve component, or the South Dakota national guard, or any element or component thereof, is guilty of theft. The degree of theft shall be determined pursuant to § 22-30A-17.

If the value of the property exceeds five hundred dollars, then the crime is grand theft. SDCL 22-30A-17. Theft is defined as taking or exercising "control over [the] property of another with intent to deprive him of it...." SDCL 22-30A-1.

[¶ 3.] On its own cognizance, the circuit court questioned the constitutionality of § 33-5-15.1 under article VI, section 15, of the South Dakota Constitution. That provision states: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded upon a contract." Allison then moved to dismiss. In its opinion, the court held the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that the "relationship and bailment of property arise out of a contract of employment." Failure to return the items, the judge thought, created a debt to the National Guard originating from the enlistment contract. The court dismissed the indictment.

[¶ 4.] On appeal, the State composes its sole issue as follows: "Is a statute, making a member of the South Dakota National Guard guilty of theft if he fails to return military property, unconstitutional as imprisonment for failing to pay a debt that arises out of contract, where the statute does not contain an intent requirement, and where the statute gives no exemption to the guardsman if he pays for the equipment?"

Standard of Review

[¶ 5.] "Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute meet formidable restrictions." State v. Hauge, 1996 SD 48, ¶ 4, 547 N.W.2d 173, 175. We review such challenges de novo. Wegleitner v. Sattler, 1998 SD 88, ¶ 4, 582 N.W.2d 688, 689 (citation omitted). We recognize a strong presumption of constitutionality. Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 898 (S.D.1995) (citing Specht v. City of Sioux Falls, 526 N.W.2d 727, 729 (S.D.1995)). To be invalidated a statute must be proved a breach of legislative power beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130, 131 (S.D.1994). Only when the unconstitutionality of a statute is plainly and unmistakably shown will we declare it repugnant to our constitution. South Dakota Educ. Ass'n v. Barnett, 1998 SD 84, ¶ 22, 582 N.W.2d 386, 392 (quoting Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 241 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted)). "If a statute can be construed so as not to violate the constitution, that construction must be adopted." Cary v. City of Rapid City, 1997 SD 18, ¶ 10, 559 N.W.2d 891, 893 (citation omitted). Our function is not to decide if a legislative act is unwise, unsound, or unnecessary, but rather, to decide only whether it is unconstitutional.

Imprisonment for Debt Arising from Contract

[¶ 6.] When Allison joined the South Dakota Army National Guard, he signed an enlistment agreement. Its principal purpose was to "record [the] enlistment... into the U.S. Armed Forces." The contract specifically stated that it was "more than an employment agreement." It anticipated service in combat and hazardous situations, required obedience to assigned duties and lawful orders, and entitled Allison to pay and benefits. The contract specified that the laws governing military personnel may change without notice and that such changes may affect one's responsibilities as a member of the Armed Forces, regardless of the provisions of the enlistment agreement. Nothing in this document, however, extended credit or created debt. Nor did it produce any type of debt repayment obligation. Plainly, it was an agreement to serve in the National Guard and be subject to the laws governing military service.

[¶ 7.] Our constitution forbids imprisonment "for debt arising out of or founded upon a contract." S.D. Const. art. VI, § 15. Many learned scholars have discoursed on the bane of imprisonment for debt. Although the practice is of ancient origin, in truth, the term "imprisonment for debt" has no fixed meaning. Oftentimes, it meant that a debtor could be imprisoned at the will of the creditor or upon perfunctory legal process. In the Nineteenth Century, however, it came to be understood as a form of private civil remedy against the actual person of the debtor. As the United States Supreme Court once explained:

[B]y suing out a capias ad satisfaciendum1 upon their judgment, and by taking into actual custody the body of the [debtor] under this process, ... [creditors] had obtained that complete and highest satisfaction of their demand, of which they could be deprived only by the act of God, by operation of law, or by their own voluntary acknowledgment, or by a release of their debtor....

Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 281, 302, 14 L.Ed. 696, 705 (1853). The predominant view came to disfavor such a harsh remedy. The Supreme Court later reflected:

Imprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. It has descended with the stream of time. It is a punishment rather than a remedy. It is right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and dooms him, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud, it is the opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when such a blot is removed from the statute-book.

Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 595, 602, 24 L.Ed. 793, 797 (1877) (internal citation omitted). With changing attitudes, most states included in their constitutions clauses prohibiting imprisonment for debt. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 272 (2d ed. 1985). The purpose was to

protect the honest, but unfortunate, debtor from imprisonment ... while at the same time leaving the Legislature at liberty, "as public policy and experience may dictate, to reach the fraudulent and dishonest shifts and devices of the debtor; and to subject him to imprisonment, for the debt he is seeking to avoid the payment of."

State v. Madewell, 63 N.J. 506, 309 A.2d 201, 204 (1973) (quoting Ex parte Clark, 20 N.J.L. 648, 650 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1846)).

[¶ 8.] The precise meaning of "imprisonment for debt arising from contract" remains elusive.2 In the Twentieth Century, most states construing these types of constitutional provisions concluded that "the debt intended to be covered by the constitution must be a debt arising exclusively from a personal contractual obligation, express or implied, and judgments rendered thereon." 16B Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 629 (1998) (citing Davis v. State, 237 Ala. 143, 185 So. 774 (1938) (personal contractual obligation); State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 935 P.2d 183 (Idaho Ct.App. 1997) (personal contractual obligation); Payne v. State, 462 So.2d 902 (Miss.1984) (personal obligation); Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St.2d 95, 253 N.E.2d 749 (1969) (judgments) (other citations omitted); Voelkel v. City of Cincinnati, 112 Ohio St. 374, 147 N.E. 754 (1925) (express or implied obligations)). Similarly, in South Dakota we interpreted our constitutional provision to mean that "the Legislature is without authority to provide that a contractor shall be deemed guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment for failure to pay the claims of creditors furnishing labor and materials from money paid to him under contract." Commercial Nat'l Bank of Sturgis v. Smith, 60 S.D. 376, 244 N.W. 521, 523 (1932).

[¶ 9.] Allison's obligation to return government issued military equipment created no debt. Black's Law Dictionary defines debt:

A sum of money due by certain and express agreement. A specified sum of money owing to one person from another, including not only obligation of debtor to pay but right of creditor to receive and enforce payment.... A fixed and certain obligation to pay money or some other valuable thing or things, either in the present or in the future. In a still more general sense, that which is due from one person to another, whether money, goods, or services. In a broad sense, any duty to respond to another in money, labor, or service; it may even mean a moral or honorary obligation, unenforceable by legal action....

Black's Law Dictionary 403 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). A majority of courts reviewing challenges similar to this one describe debt as a liability to pay money growing out of an express or implied contract. Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 83 (Alaska 1969) (footnote...

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