State v. Aloi

• Citation: 911 A.2d 1086,280 Conn. 824
• Decision Date: 02 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 17350.,17350.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Paul ALOI.

911 A.2d 1086

280 Conn. 824

STATE of Connecticut v. Paul ALOI.

No. 17350.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 9, 2006.

Decided January 2, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, and Louis Luba, Jr., assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Glenn T. Terk, Wethersfield, with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (defendant).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, JS.

PALMER, J.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the defendant, Paul Aloi, guilty of interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-167a, as amended by Public Acts 2001, No. 01-84, § 11 (P.A. 01-84),¹ criminal trespass in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a108 and criminal mischief in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-117.² The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of imprisonment of ninety days, execution suspended, with two years of conditional discharge, and imposed a total of $2000 in fines. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded, inter alia, that the defendant's refusal to provide identification to a police officer who reasonably suspected that the defendant had been involved in criminal activity did not support the defendant's conviction of interfering with a police officer under § 53a-167a. State v. Aloi, 86 Conn.App. 363, 374, 861 A.2d 1180 (2004). Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction pertaining to that count.³ Id., at 381, 861 A.2d 1180. We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly construe and apply . . . § 53a-167a?" State v. Aloi, 273 Conn. 901, 867 A.2d 840 (2005). We answer the certified question in the negative and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court with respect to the defendant's conviction of interfering with a police officer.

The opinion of the Appellate Court contains the following facts that the trial court reasonably could have found. "Since 1985, the defendant has resided adjacent to Mill Woods Park, a public park in Wethersfield. Winding Brook Turf Farm (Winding Brook) is located on the opposite side of Mill Woods Park from the defendant's residence." Winding Brook has pumped water from a stream in Mill Woods Park for several years to irrigate its crops. The noise associated with the pumping activities has been a cause for contention between the defendant and Winding Brook for some time. In 2002, Winding Brook began using a fire truck, which was stationed in close proximity to the defendant's home, to pump water from Goff Brook at Mill Woods Park. During the summer of 2002, some Winding Brook employees discovered that the fire truck had been vandalized and contacted the Wethersfield police department. In response, the police installed a video surveillance camera to monitor the fire truck.

"On August 2, 2002, the defendant approached Winding Brook's fire truck and stood on its side platform." He subsequently opened the door to the cab of the fire truck, leaned inside and placed his hands on the dashboard as well as on the front seat. The exterior emergency lights on the fire truck flickered on and off while the passenger door was still open. The emergency lights remained on for approximately fifty minutes. Consequently, William D. Morgan, the owner of Winding Brook, filed a complaint against the defendant for trespassing. In response, a Wethersfield police officer told the defendant to stay off of the Winding Brook property and to stay away from the pumping equipment.

"On August 14, 2002, after the fire truck unexpectedly ceased operating, Richard Peruta, an employee of Winding Brook, approached the fire truck to inspect the equipment. He noticed that the defendant was standing nearby. The defendant stated to Peruta: `Why don't you call the police, and I'll have you arrested for false arrest.' Peruta, consequently, contacted the Wethersfield police and complained that the defendant was trespassing. [Sergeant Robert LaBonte and Officers Jay Salvatore and Jenny Keys of the Wethersfield police department] arrived at Mill Woods Park in response to Peruta's complaint and found the defendant [with mud all over his shirt] standing on public property near the fire truck. . . . Salvatore approached and advised the defendant that Peruta had complained that the defendant was trespassing and possibly had damaged the fire truck.<sup>4</sup> Salvatore requested that the defendant produce identification. The defendant did not immediately hand over his identification. The defendant also stated that he did not need to produce identification, that he was on public property and that `this isn't Russia. I'm not showing you any [identification]. . . .'"⁵ State v. Aloi, supra, 86 Conn. at App. 365-66, 861 A.2d 1180. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found the defendant guilty of several charges, including interfering with a police officer in violation of § 53a-167a.

In explaining why the state had proven the elements of the offense of interfering with a police officer,⁶ the trial court stated that the police "[were not] asking for identification just to ask for identification" but, rather, were acting within the scope of their duties in investigating the defendant's alleged trespass. The court further stated that, "although [the defendant] may not have known what in particular the police were interested in" when Salvatore asked him for identification, in view of the "past history" of police involvement in the dispute between the defendant and Winding Brook, the defendant "had every reason to know" that the police were investigating that matter.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to establish a violation of § 53a-167a because his comment and refusal to provide identification immediately did not hinder Salvatore in the performance of his duties.⁷ State v. Aloi, supra, 86 Conn.App. at 368, 861 A.2d 1180. The defendant also claimed that the state had failed to establish that he had the requisite intent to interfere with Salvatore in the performance of his duties.⁸ Id., at 367 n. 2, 861 A.2d 1180. In response, the state maintained that " § 53a-167a proscribes verbal as well as nonverbal conduct that is intended to interfere with a police officer in the performance of his or her duties"; id., at 369, 861 A.2d 1180; and, further, that a refusal to comply with a legitimate police request is equivalent to interfering with an officer. See id. The state also maintained that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a.

The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant that his refusal to produce identification did not constitute a violation of § 53a-167a. Id., at 374, 861 A.2d 1180. In support of its conclusion, the Appellate Court relied on General Statutes § 14-217,⁹ which expressly requires that a motor vehicle operator provide identification to the police on demand. Id., at 370, 861 A.2d 1180. The Appellate Court reasoned that, if the legislature had intended a refusal to provide identification to come within the purview of the conduct proscribed under § 53a-167a, the legislature would have said so explicitly, as it did under § 14-217. Id. The Appellate Court also concluded that mere declaratory words ordinarily cannot constitute interference for purposes of § 53a-167a unless those words "exhort or incite others in their dealings with [the] officer" or unless the words represent "a threat of violence to the officer."¹⁰ Id., at 374, 861 A.2d 1180; cf. State v. Williams, 205 Conn. 456, 473, 534 A.2d 230 (1987) ("we construe § 53a-167a to proscribe only physical conduct and fighting words that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" [internal quotation marks omitted]). In light of its determination that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant had hindered Salvatore in the performance of his duties, the Appellate Court did not address the defendant's claim that the state had failed to prove that the defendant intended to interfere with Salvatore. State v. Aloi, supra, 86 Conn.App. at 367 n. 2, 861 A.2d 1180.

On appeal to this court, the state maintains that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to warrant a finding of guilty with respect to the charge of interfering with an officer under § 53a-167a. Specifically, the state first contends that, under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny, Salvatore was justified in approaching the defendant and questioning him because Salvatore reasonably suspected that criminal activity had occurred and that the defendant was involved in it. The state further contends that when, as in the present case, a police officer makes a legitimate investigatory stop under Terry, the person subject to the Terry stop must honor the officer's reasonable demand for identification. Finally, the state maintains that the defendant's refusal to identify himself to Salvatore promptly provided a sufficient factual basis for the defendant's conviction under § 53a-167a. The defendant contends that his peaceable refusal to provide identification does not constitute a violation of § 53a-167a and that, in any event, the evidence adduced in the present case was insufficient to establish either that he had hindered Salvatore in the performance of his duties or that he had intended to do so.¹¹ We agree with the state.

I

We first must determine whether a person lawfully may be convicted of interfering with a police officer under § 53a-167a for refusing to provide identification to that police officer who is investigating possible criminal activity...