State v. Alston

• Decision Date: 19 December 1893
• Citation: 18 S.E. 692,113 N.C. 666
• Parties: STATE v. ALSTON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

18 S.E. 692

113 N.C. 666

STATE v. ALSTON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 19, 1893

Appeal from superior court, Franklin county; Hoke, Judge.

Dock Alston was convicted of burglary in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

An instruction authorizing a conviction of a lower grade of crime than that charged in the indictment is not prejudicial error, and will not avail defendant.

N. Y Gulley, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for the State.

CLARK J.

The defendant was indicted for burglary. The court charged the jury that, "although all the evidence was that the family were present in the house" at the time it was alleged to have been entered, they might find the prisoner guilty of burglary in the first degree, or they might find him guilty of burglary in the second degree. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree, and the prisoner assigns the above instruction as error. The court should have charged the jury that if they believed from the evidence that the family were present in the house at the time of the felonious entry, as charged they should convict the defendant of burglary in the first degree. Under such circumstances the jury are not vested with the discretionary power to convict of burglary in the second degree. The power to commute punishment does not reside with the jury. This very point was passed upon and decided in State v. Fleming, 107 N.C. 905, on page 909, 12 S.E 131, on page 132. But there was no prayer by defendant for such instruction. The court could not have charged, as this exception implies, that because "all the evidence was that the family was in the house at the time of the felonious entry," etc., the jury should find the defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree. It is only when the jury believe that to be the fact that they could return such verdict. The jury must pass upon the credibility of the evidence, and although all the evidence was that the family were then present, still if the jury did not believe that part of the evidence, but believed only the evidence tending to show that the prisoner entered the dwelling in the nighttime, with the felonious intent, as charged, as verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree was proper. There is nothing which indicates how the jury found as to the truth of the evidence of the presence of the family. There was no exception as to the charge in other respects. Besi...