State v. Altamirano, No. 2008 KA 2083 (La. App. 3/27/2009)
| Decision Date | 27 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008 KA 2083,2008 KA 2083 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JULIO ALTAMIRANO |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER 422259, DIV. I, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE REGINALD T. BADEAUX, III, JUDGE.
WALTER REED, District Attorney, KATHRYN W. LANDRY, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant State of Louisiana
IVAN A. ORIHUELA, Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Julio Altamirano
BEFORE: KUHN, GUIDRY, AND GAIDRY, JJ.
Defendant, Julio Altamirano, was charged by bill of information with operating a vehicle without lawful presence in the United States, a violation of La. R.S. 14:100.13. Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information, arguing that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal law and that he is a victim of a selective police enforcement policy of profiling, targeting, and arresting Latino drivers pursuant to La. R.S. 14:100.13. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash. The State now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's ruling granting the motion to quash and remand for further proceedings.
In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash the bill of information. As noted by the State, the trial court's reasons for granting the motion to quash are unclear. On appeal, the State addresses both of defendant's arguments in support of the motion to quash. Noting that State v. Ramos, 2007-1448 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/28/08), 993 So.2d 281 (en banc), is controlling, the State submits that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is not preempted by federal law. The State further urges that defendant produced no evidence at the hearing on the motion to quash to support his profiling claim and that he did not contest the fact that the traffic offense for which he was initially cited was valid.
At the motion to quash hearing, defendant contended that La. R.S. 14:100.13 is preempted by federal regulations because it makes the travel of illegal aliens within the United States a criminal felony, whereas federal regulations only make such action a civil violation of immigration laws. Defendant reasoned that the statute does not mirror federal objectives and oversteps federal law by attempting to regulate immigration matters. Defendant further contended that the statute conflicts with federal law because there is no requirement in federal law that legal aliens in the United States carry documentation of their status at all times. Defendant maintained that the Louisiana statute places a higher burden on both legal aliens and citizens than federal law does.
As additional basis to support his motion, defendant asserted that the bill of information should have been quashed because the arrest was based on profiling. Defendant concluded that his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated. Defendant specifically argued that there was no reason for the arresting officer to inquire as to the defendant's legal status in the United States. Defendant maintained that he could have been charged with driving without a driver's license or a motor vehicle inspection sticker, noting that the lack of a sticker was the reason for the stop. He further claimed that the arrest was made without probable cause, noting that there was no indication that the officer investigated or inquired into defendant's legal status prior to the arrest or that defendant confessed that he was illegally in the United States, citing State v. Lopez, 2005-0685 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/20/06), 948 So.2d 1121, writ denied, 2007-0110 (La. 12/7/07), 969 So.2d 619.
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires the invalidation of any state legislation that burdens or conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or treaties. See U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate matters of naturalization and immigration. See U.S. Const, art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4. in DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976), the Supreme Court established three tests to use in determining whether a state statute related to immigration is preempted: (1) constitutional preemption. (2) field preemption, and (3) conflict preemption. Pursuant to DeCanas, if a statute fails any one of the three tests, it is preempted by federal law. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768 (CD. Cal. 1995), outlined the tests provided in De Canas as follows:
Under the first test, the Court must determine whether a state statute is a "regulation of immigration." Since the "[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power," [DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S.] at 354, 96 S.Ct. at 936, any state statute which regulates immigration is "constitutionally proscribed." [DeCanas, 424 U.S.] at 356, 96 S.Ct. at 936.
Under the second test, even if the state law is not an impermissible regulation of immigration, it may still be preempted if there is a showing that it was the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to effect a "complete ouster of state power-including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws" with respect to the subject matter which the statute attempts to regulate. [DeCanas, 424 U.S.] at 357, 96 S.Ct. at 937. In other words, under the second test, a statute is preempted where Congress intended to "occupy the field" which the statute attempts to regulate.
Under the third test, a state law is preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." [DeCanas, 424 U.S.] at 363, 96 S.Ct. at 940 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)). Stated differently, a statute is preempted under the third test if it conflicts with federal law making compliance with both state and federal law impossible. Michigan Canners & Freezers v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2523, 81 L.Ed.2d 399 (1984); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-18, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963).
The issue raised herein presents a question of law and is, therefore, subject to de novo review. See State v. Smith, 99-0606, p. 3 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501, 504. In construing La. R.S. 14:100.13, we consider two established rules of statutory construction: (1) all criminal statutes are construed strictly, and (2) the words of a statute must be given their everyday meaning. See State ex rel. Robinson v. Blackburn, 367 So.2d 360, 363 (La. 1979) and La. R.S. 14:3.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:100.13 provides as follows:
A. No alien student or nonresident alien shall operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person is lawfully present in the United States.
B. Upon arrest of a person for operating a vehicle without lawful presence in the United States, law enforcement officials shall seize the driver's license and immediately surrender such license to the office of motor vehicles for cancellation and shall immediately notify the INS of the name and location of the person.
C. Whoever commits the crime of driving without lawful presence in the United States shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, imprisoned for not more than one year, with or without hard labor, or both.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:100.13 was enacted by 2002 La. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. No. 46, § 1. As part of the same act, the legislature enacted La. R.S. 14:100.11, which sets forth the findings of the legislature and the purpose of La. R.S. 14:100.12 et seq.:
A. The legislature finds that the devastating consequences of the barbaric attacks on September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as well as the pervasive bomb threats and biological terrorism in various parts of the country were committed for the purposes of demoralizing and destabilizing our society and creating a climate of fear. These heinous deeds designed to kill maim, and strike terror into the hearts of innocent citizens of this country cannot be tolerated, nor can those less violent acts to the infrastructure of our state which are designed to intimidate, confuse, and disrupt everyday commerce and the delivery of goods and services to the populace be permitted.
B. The legislature further finds that it is imperative that state laws be enacted to complement federal efforts to uncover those who seek to use the highways of this state to commit acts of terror and who seek to gain drivers' licenses or identification cards for the purposes of masking their illegal status in this state. Accordingly, the legislature finds that state law must be strengthened with a comprehensive framework for punishing those who give false information in order to obtain drivers' licenses or identification cards from the office of motor vehicles of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, to limit the issuance of such documentation to correspond to the time limits placed by the federal Immigration and Naturalization Service on documentation, and to make operating a motor vehicle in this state when not lawfully present in the United States a crime.
The state of Louisiana is vested with the authority to regulate its public roads and highways under its police power, provided that the legislation does not prove repugnant to the provisions of the state or national constitutions. See Kaltenbach v. Breaux, 690 F.Supp. 1551, 1553 (W.D. La. 1988).
The presumption is that Congress does not intend to preempt state law, unless it speaks with clarity otherwise. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Congress has exercised its power over...
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