State v. Alvarez, (SC 16406)
Citation | 257 Conn. 782,778 A.2d 938 |
Decision Date | 28 August 2001 |
Docket Number | (SC 16406) |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WASHINGTON ALVAREZ |
Borden, Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Robert S. Bello, with whom, on the brief, were Thomas M. Cassone and Lawrence M. Lapine, for the appellant (defendant). Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, state's attorney, and James Bernardi, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The dispositive issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the defendant's prosecution for manslaughter in the first degree is barred by the federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy where he pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree and was convicted and sentenced on that charge, only later to be charged with manslaughter in the first degree after the victim of the assault died following the defendant's conviction. The defendant appeals1 from the decision of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss the charge of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1).2 We affirm the decision of the trial court.
The defendant, Washington Alvarez, claims that, because he already had entered a plea of guilty to, and had been found guilty of, inter alia, the crime of assault in the first degree in connection with the beating of the victim, Mathew Kosbob, the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the subsequent charge of manslaughter in the first degree. The manslaughter information was filed by the state following the victim's death, from the consequences of the assault, approximately eighteen months after the defendant's assault conviction. Specifically, the defendant contends that this prosecution for manslaughter in the first degree violates the prohibition against double jeopardy because it: (1) subjects him to successive prosecutions for the same offense; and (2) subjects him to multiple punishments for the same offense. In addition, the defendant also claims that the prosecution for manslaughter violates his right to due process in that he has a right to the sentence to which he agreed when he pleaded guilty to the initial charges of assault in the first degree, kidnapping and conspiracy because he did so with the expectation that he would not be prosecuted on any additional charges if the victim later died. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the defendant's claims.
In 1997, the defendant was charged with assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) and (4),3 kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92 (a) (2) (A),4 and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a),5 53a-92 (a) (2) (A) and 53a-59 (a) (1). These charges arose out of an incident involving the victim that had occurred in July, 1995. The defendant pleaded guilty to the charged offenses, and he was sentenced to a total effective sentence on all convictions of twenty-five years, suspended after fifteen years, followed by five years probation.
After the defendant's conviction on those charges, the victim died in November, 1998, from the consequences of the 1995 assault. The state then filed the information that is the subject of the motion to dismiss in the present case, charging the defendant with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1). The defendant moved to dismiss this second prosecution on the grounds that it violated principles of double jeopardy and due process under the federal and state constitutions.6 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and this interlocutory appeal followed.7
The following facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court in its memorandum of decision denying the motion to dismiss, are relevant to this appeal. "[The defendant], together with [three] others, had been arrested on July 29, 1995, because of an assault on the victim .... The assault occurred in the evening hours of July 28, 1995. Among other injuries resulting from the assault, the victim sustained a severe craniocerebral trauma and, shortly after the assault, lapsed into a coma of several months duration. He slowly regained some consciousness in mid-December of 1995, but remained hospitalized in a `vegetative' state. He was fed intravenously and breathed with the assistance of a respirator through a tracheal tube. He lingered as a patient in a rehabilitative hospital in this condition until his death on November 23, 1998. The autopsy listed the cause of death as `delayed medical complications of craniocerebral trauma' and the manner of death as [a] `homicide.'
The trial court also stated: The trial court determined that the subsequent prosecution for manslaughter did not violate the defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy or violate his due process rights.
The defendant first claims that his prosecution for manslaughter in the first degree violates the prohibition against double jeopardy because it subjects him both to a successive prosecution and a multiple punishment for the same offense. We disagree with his successive prosecution claim and do not decide his multiple punishment claim.
State v. Crawford, 257 Conn. 769, 774, 778 A.2d 947 (2001).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229-30, 114 S. Ct. 783, 127 L. Ed.2d 47 (1994). In the present case, the defendant makes both a successive prosecution and a multiple punishment claim.
We first turn to the defendant's claim that the state's prosecution of the manslaughter charge violates the prohibition against double jeopardy because it subjects him to a successive prosecution for the same offense. Specifically, the defendant contends that: (1) manslaughter in the first degree constitutes the same offense as assault in the first degree for double jeopardy purposes;8 and (2) in the alternative, the prosecution for manslaughter in the first degree should be prohibited under the principles enunciated in State v. Lonergan, 213 Conn. 74, 566 A.2d 677 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 2586, 110 L. Ed.2d 267 (1990), because the same evidence that was offered to prove assault in the first degree in the defendant's initial prosecution will be the sole evidence offered to prove manslaughter in the first degree in...
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