State v. Amado

• Decision Date: 15 August 2000
• Docket Number: (SC 16058)
• Citation: 756 A.2d 274,254 Conn. 184
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ERIC AMADO

254 Conn. 184

756 A.2d 274

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ERIC AMADO

(SC 16058)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 23, 2000.

Officially released August 15, 2000.

McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js. Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Ellen A. Jawitz, assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, for the appellant-appellee (state).

Lauren Weisfeld, assistant public defender, for the appellee-appellant (defendant).

Opinion

MCDONALD, C. J.

After a jury trial, the defendant, Eric Amado, was found guilty of two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a,¹ two counts of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c,² and one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b.³ The trial court merged the defendant's felony murder and intentional murder convictions into the capital felony conviction and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-35a.⁴ On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the trial court properly determined that, as a matter of law, the defense of self-defense does not apply to a charge of felony murder.⁵State v. Amado, 42 Conn. App. 348, 362, 680 A.2d 974 (1996). We granted the defendant's petition for certification; State v. Amado, 242 Conn. 906, 697 A.2d 368 (1997); and remanded the case to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of State v. Johnson, 241 Conn. 702, 709, 699 A.2d 57 (1997), in which we held that a conviction for felony murder could not serve as a predicate felony for a conviction of capital felony. On remand, the Appellate Court reversed the intentional murder and capital felony convictions, concluding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the victims' right to use reasonable force in defense of premises pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-20,⁶ and the defendant's duty to retreat pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-19 (b).⁷State v. Amado, 50 Conn. App. 607, 624, 719 A.2d 45 (1998). Because our remand was confined to the issue relating to our holding in State v. Johnson, supra, 702, the Appellate Court did not revisit its previous holding that, as a matter of law, self-defense does not apply to a charge of felony murder. Consequently, the defendant's felony murder convictions remain in effect, but he stands to receive a new trial on the intentional murder and capital felony counts. The state and the defendant both petitioned for certification to appeal to this court, and we granted both petitions.⁸ We conclude that the trial court's instructions concerning the defendant's duty to retreat and the victims' right to use force in defense of premises did not constitute clear error of constitutional magnitude, and we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment in that respect. We also conclude that the Appellate Court, in its earlier opinion, correctly determined that self-defense is not available as a defense to a charge of felony murder. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court in part and affirm it in part.

The evidence that was before the jury is set forth in the first Appellate Court opinion; State v. Amado, supra, 42 Conn. App. 351-56; and need not be repeated in detail for purposes of this appeal. It is sufficient to note that the jury reasonably could have found the following: "The defendant, accompanied by several other people, went to the home of Anthony Young in Bridgeport, after the defendant received information that Young had taken a quantity of cocaine from the defendant's West Haven apartment. As the defendant stood on the porch of Young's home, Young opened the door. After accusing Young of having his cocaine, the defendant pulled out his [nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun] and fired five shots, wounding both Young and Peter Hall, who was standing behind Young. Both men were alive when emergency medical personnel arrived at the house. Young was [found] clutching a fully loaded magazine for an automatic weapon, and Hall was [found] holding a small automatic pistol. Both men later died [from their wounds].

"The defendant testified that as Young was denying complicity in the theft of the defendant's cocaine, Hall reached for the waistband of his trousers and started to draw a gun. The defendant claimed that he pulled his gun and fired into the house in self-defense only after Young had taken a step toward him and Hall had started to draw a gun from his waistband." State v. Amado, supra, 50 Conn. App. 613. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.

I

On appeal, the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the defendant was entitled to prevail under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), on his unpreserved claim regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury concerning selfdefense, in particular, the defendant's duty to retreat and the victims' right to use reasonable force in defense of their premises. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. During its instructions on the intentional murder and capital felony charges, the trial court initially charged the jury on the victims' right to use reasonable force in defense of premises under § 53a-20. The trial court explained to the jury that "we all understand that we are here for the trial of [the defendant]. But the trial involves two people who are dead as well, so, we have to look at both positions.... [T]he two guys Young and Hall in the house ... they have a right to be in that home and as such the law protects them from intruders, invaders, trespassers or anybody coming into the home that they do not want into that home even to the extent of using force to repel the persons attempting to come there.... The statute reads as follows: A person in possession or control of premises... is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.... That's the perspective of Young and Hall in that house. Under the law they have a right to remain there, they have a right to be armed in their house, they have a right to repel anybody that's coming by the utilization of force, even deadly force, if they reasonably believe that they are going to be subject to a violent act or it is necessary to repel the trespass which is eminent. Now, that applies to them.... That's not self-defense. Self-defense in this case is the self-defense claim that applies to the defendant." The trial court then proceeded to instruct the jury as to the defendant's defense of self-defense with regard to the intentional murder charge.⁹ The trial court charged the jury as to the defendant's duty to retreat under § 53a-19 (b). The court stated that "[a] person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety.... You may not be [justified] in using deadly force if [the defendant] knew that he could avoid the necessity of using such... with complete safety by, one, retreating, except that an actor who used force [would] not be required to retreat if he is in his dwelling .... Now, you have to put that in the context of this case.... The law is clear that the issue is what the defendant reasonably believes at the time of the incident. That is the issue. What the defendant reasonably believes at the time of the incident. The question is what he reasonably believed under the circumstances as he saw them but is not the actual danger but what reasonably appeared to be—to the defendant." The trial court later revisited the defendant's duty to retreat, stating that "[t]he defendant may not use deadly force even in self-defense unless he has no reasonable basis of avoiding the threatened injury in some other manner. The defendant would not have been justified in standing his ground against the threatened attack to fend it off if he could with complete safety, avoid the confrontation by retreating. However, in considering whether the defendant could have retreated in safety the element of practicality must be considered."

During deliberations, the jury requested clarification regarding the rights available to lawful residents of the house. The court recharged the jury on the substance of § 53a-20, noting that "[t]he statute ... applies to the people that are within the house...." In addition, the trial court stated that "the occupant of the home has no obligation to retreat. When you are in your home and if you reasonably feel there's an attempt by someone to commit a trespass and you are concerned about the use of deadly physical force you need not retreat. That is distinguished from the requirement when utilizing the defense of self-defense outside the presence of a home or workplace. The first obligation is to consider, is it possible to retreat...." The trial court then instructed the jury that the defendant has a duty to retreat "if he knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety .... The law is clear that the issue is what the defendant reasonably believes at the time of the incident."

The Appellate Court held that, under State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40,¹⁰ the defendant was entitled to prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court's instructions to the jury violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The Appellate Court stated that "[b]ecause the [trial] court's instructions and the defendant's claims regarding both the duty to retreat and the victims' rights to use reasonable force in defense of their premises are so intertwined, we will discuss them together." State v. Amado,...