State v. Ameer, NO. S-1-SC-36395

• Docket Nº: NO. S-1-SC-36395
• Citation: 458 P.3d 390
• Case Date: April 23, 2018
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

458 P.3d 390

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Muhammad AMEER, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. S-1-SC-36395

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: April 23, 2018

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Scott Wisniewski, Assistant Public Defender, Matthias Swonger, Assistant Public Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee

DANIELS, Justice.

{1} Since New Mexico became a state over a hundred years ago, Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution has contained a clause providing that "[a]ll persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great...."

{2} In 2009, the legislative and executive branches statutorily abolished the penalty of capital punishment for first-degree murder, the only remaining New Mexico crime carrying a potential death sentence, for all offenses committed after July 1, 2009. See NMSA 1978, § 31-18-14 (2009) ; NMSA 1978 § 31-18-23 (2009) ; NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2 (2009).

{3} Defendant Muhammad Ameer is charged with first-degree murder committed on or after July 1, 2009. In this appeal from a district court order applying the capital offense exception to the constitutional right to bail and denying Defendant any form of pretrial release, we hold that first-degree murder is not currently a constitutionally defined capital offense in New Mexico that would authorize a judge to categorically deny release pending trial.

{4} Following briefing and oral argument, we issued a bench ruling and written order reversing the district court’s detention order that had been based solely on the capital offense exception. See Order, State v. Ameer , S-1-SC-36395 (May 8, 2017). In the same order we remanded with instructions to the district court to consider the State’s unaddressed request for detention under the 2016 amendment to Article II, Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution, allowing courts a new and broader evidence-based authority to deny pretrial release for any felony defendant "if the prosecuting authority ... proves by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably protect the safety of any other person or the community." N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. We also advised that this precedential opinion would follow.

458 P.3d 392

I. BACKGROUND

{5} Defendant was indicted for, among other offenses, first-degree murder in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A) (1994), an offense that had been statutorily defined as a "capital felony" before capital punishment was abolished in July 2009 and which is still statutorily referred to by that term, although it now carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment instead of a death sentence for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2009. See § 31-20A-2. The date of Defendant’s alleged offense was March 19, 2017, and his alleged crime therefore cannot result in capital punishment.

{6} The State moved to detain Defendant pending trial under the new detention authority provided by the November 2016 amendment to Article II, Section 13 in felony cases where "no release conditions will reasonably protect the safety" of others. N.M. Const. art. II, § 13 (amendment effective Nov. 8, 2016). But instead of relying on that new authority, the district court ordered Defendant detained on the basis of the older capital offense exception to the constitutional right to pretrial release.

{7} Defendant appealed the pretrial detention order to this Court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

{8} The New Mexico Supreme Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in criminal cases where a defendant faces possible life imprisonment or execution. State v. Brown , 2014-NMSC-038, ¶ 10, 338 P.3d 1276 (citing State v. Smallwood , 2007-NMSC-005, ¶ 11, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 ); see also N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (granting this Court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from final district court judgments "imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment"); NMSA 1978, § 39-3-3(A)(2) (1972) (permitting an appeal from a district court "order denying relief on a petition to review conditions of release"); Rule 12-204 NMRA (providing procedures for interlocutory appeals from orders denying release, effective for all cases pending or filed on or after July 1, 2017).

{9} The final responsibility for interpreting the New Mexico Constitution also rests with this Court, "the ultimate arbiter[ ] of the law of New Mexico." State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges , 1976-NMSC-033, ¶ 22, 89 N.M. 351, 552 P.2d 787, overruled on other grounds by State v. Rondeau , 1976-NMSC-044, ¶ 9, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688. In fulfilling that responsibility, we review all questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Boyse , 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 8, 303 P.3d 830. "[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature which proposed [the constitutional provision] and the voters of New Mexico who approved it." Block v. Vigil-Giron , 2004-NMSC-003, ¶ 4, 135 N.M. 24, 84 P.3d 72. And we are guided by the principle that "[t]erms used in a [c]onstitution must be taken to mean what they meant to the minds of the voters of the state when the provision was adopted." Flaska v. State , 1946-NMSC-035, ¶ 12, 51 N.M. 13, 177 P.2d 174 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Historical Meaning of "Capital Offense" as a Crime That Is Punishable by Capital Punishment

{10} Since at least the late 1400s, the term "capital" has meant "[a]ffecting, or involving loss of, the head or life," or "[p]unishable by death." See The Oxford English Dictionary vol. II (2d ed. 1989) at 862; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) at 250 (defining "capital" as "[p]unishable by execution; involving the death penalty"). The term derives from the Latin word "caput," meaning head. Merriam-Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged (1961) at 332. See Commonwealth ex rel. Castanaro v. Manley , 60 Pa. D. & C. 194, 196 (Lackawanna Cty. 1947) ("The words, [ ]‘capital offenses’, as used in the [Pennsylvania] Constitution clearly mean offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed.").

{11} This was the common understanding of capital punishment at the time New Mexico became part of the United States and drafted its constitution to follow the lead of Pennsylvania and most other states, where

458 P.3d 393

the capital offense exception to the right of bail had become part of "almost every state constitution adopted after 1776." June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail , 34 Syracuse L. Rev. 517, 531-32 (1983); Brown , 2014-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 19, 26, 338 P.3d 1276.

{12} A substantial majority of jurisdictions across the country addressing the same constitutional interpretation issue accordingly have held that an offense is a nonbailable capital offense only if it may be punished by imposition of the death penalty. See Martin v. State , 517 P.2d 1389, 1394, 1397 (Alaska 1974) (noting that where the constitution authorizes pretrial detention only for capital offenses, "a legislative enactment expressly permitting the detention of persons [charged with noncapital offenses] without right to bail would be unconstitutional unless a constitutional amendment were adopted"); In re Tarr , 109 Ariz. 264, 508 P.2d 728, 729 (1973) ("The United States Supreme Court has abolished the death penalty in statutes like Arizona’s ... and has therefore abolished ‘capital offenses’ in Arizona."); Kendrick v. State , 180 Ark. 1160, 24 S.W.2d 859, 860 (1930) ("[T]he offense charged was a felony, punishable only by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and the accused had the legal right to give bond for his appearance."); State v. Menillo , 159 Conn. 264, 268 A.2d 667, 668 (1970) ("But since the penalty for murder in the first degree could be death, a first-degree murder indictment constitutes an indictment for an offense punishable by death, that is, a capital offense."); Adams v. State , 56 Fla. 1, 48 So. 219, 224 (1908) (in banc) ("A ‘capital crime’ is one for which the punishment of death is inflicted. The crime of murder in the second degree is punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, and is not a capital crime."); Caesar v. State , 127 Ga. 710, 57 S.E. 66, 67 (1907) ("If under any circumstances the penalty of death can be inflicted, the offense is capital.... If under no circumstances the death penalty can be inflicted, the offense is not capital."); State v. Jiminez , 93 Idaho 140, 456 P.2d 784, 788 (1969) ("[Because] murder in the second degree [is] a crime not punishable by death ..., [the statute], which provides that capital offenses are not bailable, could not operate automatically to prevent the admission of appellant to bail." (footnote omitted) ); People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod , 60 Ill.2d 74, 322 N.E.2d 837, 840 (1975) ("[A] capital case is one in which the death penalty may, but need not necessarily, be inflicted."); State v. Christensen , 165 Kan. 585, 195 P.2d 592, 596 (1948) (" ‘Capital crime, felony or offense’ ... do[es]...