State v. Amerson, 58118

Decision Date13 January 1975
Docket NumberNo. 2,No. 58118,58118,2
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Glenn R. AMERSON, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., William F. Arnet, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Bell, Wilson, Fullwood & Harris by James A. Bell and Allen I. Harris, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

A two-count indictment charged Glenn R. Amerson with the first degree murder of Ira Rankins and assault with intent to kill James Johnson, with malice. Defendant appeals, following his conviction on the murder charge and sentence by a jury to life imprisonment. The jury acquitted defendant of the assault charge. This Court has jurisdiction under its order of April 9, 1973.

From the testimony introduced on behalf of the State the jury could find the following facts: At 2:45 a.m. on August 7, 1971 Ira Rankins and his wife Joyce, James Johnson and Dexter Dozier were sitting on the concrete pad in front of 1416 Peabody Court in St. Louis. Two black males approached. One of them asked who owned a brown 1967 Chevrolet parked on 14th Street. Ira Rankins said he owned the car. The other man, later identified as defendant, pulled a sawed-off shotgun from under his T-shirt and at a distance of 15 feet fired it at Ira Rankins, striking him in the chest, inflicting wounds from which he died. Three seconds after firing the first shot defendant fired a second shot, which struck James Johnson in the foot. Prior to the firing of the shots the four persons sitting on the concrete pad were not holding anything in their hands. None of them made any movement toward the two men, or any movement indicating that they were picking up something in their hands or taking something from their persons. They made no statement other than Ira Rankins' statement that he owned the Chevrolet. Neither of the two men who approached the group said anything other than the inquiry as to the ownership of the car. All of the State's evidence indicated that this was an unprovoked attack by defendant.

Defendant took the stand, testified to an alibi; claimed that at the time he was elsewhere, some distance from the scene of the crime, playing cards. Two witnesses corroborated the alibi. Kevin Dean, half-brother of defendant, testified that he fired the two shots. His recital of what happened disclosed a case of self-defense; that he aimed the first shot at 'the guy that was reaching for the gun'; that he did not aim the second shot,--he 'just shot.' Kevin Dean's presence at the scene of the shooting was corroborated by defense witness Michelle Golden, who testified that she saw Dean do the shooting and did not see defendant 'anywhere around there.' Defense witness Bernice Aldridge placed Dean at the scene of the crime. She did not see defendant there at the time. Irma Wilburn, grandmother of both Kevin Dean and Glenn Amerson, testified that she was awakened by the first shot; that she looked out her window and saw Dean present at the scene of the crime; that she saw Dean, not Glenn, fire the second shot. Her only testimony with respect to defendant was that she saw him later at 6 o'clock that morning, when police took defendant into custody.

Appellant's first point argues the weight of the evidence. The motion for new trial alleged that the finding of guilt was against the weight of the evidence. This assignment of error is not sufficient to preserve anything for appellate review. State v. Williams, 423 S.W.2d 736 (Mo.1968); State v. Caldwell, 434 S.W.2d 571 (Mo.1968). Apropos is the following: 'The weight of the evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling on the motion for new trial, but it is not a matter reviewable by an appellate court. State v. Hodge, Mo., 399 S.W.2d 65. This court determines only whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict, and there obviously was.' State v. Morgan, 453 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Mo.1970); State v. Talbert, 454 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1970).

The point that the court erred in not giving a credibility instruction is disallowed for four reasons. First, the court did give a credibility instruction to the jury, as follows: 'No statement, ruling, remark or instruction about the law that I make during the trial is intended to indicate my opinion of what the facts are. It is your duty and not mine to determine believability of the witnesses and the evidence, the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and the weight and value of the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. It is your duty and not mine to determine what the facts are and to decide the case. In doing this you must not indulge in guesswork or speculation, but, rather, will be governed by the evidence and the reasonable inferences arising from it.' This instruction was given at the outset of the trial; not at the close of the evidence with the other instructions. This instruction, although not full and complete, did give the jury important guidelines on the subject to credibility. 1 Second, no such instruction was offered or requested by defendant. Third a credibility instruction was not a part of the law of the case at the time this trial occurred, and was not required to be given on the court's own motion. State v. Kelley, 442 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.1969); State v. Hester, 331 S.W.2d 535 (Mo.1960); State v. Drake, 298 S.W.2d 374 (Mo.1957); State v. Shuls, 329 Mo. 245, 44 S.W.2d 94 (1931). Fourth, since the giving of a credibility instruction was a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Nelson, 459 S.W.2d 327 (Mo.1970); State v. Wolfskill, 421 S.W.2d 193 (Mo.1967), it was a fortiori discretionary whether the court, having given a credibility instruction at the commencement of the trial, should give another and more elaborate instruction on the subject at the end of the trial. In view of the sharp conflict in the evidence it would have been entirely appropriate, State v. Turner, 320 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.1959), to have done so, but under the law in effect at the time of trial we find no abuse of discretion in the failure of the court to act on its own motion in this regard. 2

There was no error in giving Instruction No. 6, which follows:

'The defendant is presumed to be innocent.

'The fact that the defendant has been charged with two offenses is not evidence against him. It creates no inference that any offense was committed or that the defendant is guilty.

'The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each offense charged.'

Appellant complains that No. 6 differs 'from the old long form burden of proof and reasonable doubt instruction that has for many years been given in the St. Louis area'; is different from presently required MAI-CR 2.20, and that further guidelines as to what constitutes reasonable doubt were required. The suggested differences do not condemn No. 6. It briefly states the essentials. That No. 6 contains no definition of the term 'reasonable doubt' does not condemn it. A definition of reasonable doubt is not required. State v. Lafferty, 416 S.W.2d 157, 161(6, 7) (Mo.1967); State v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 244(10) (Mo.1972). 9A Mo.Dig., Criminal Law, k789(1). See The Missouri Bar Committee Comments on MAI-CR, Reasonable Doubt III., by Judge Orville Richardson.

Appellant claims that the conviction should be reversed because of inconsistency in the verdicts (convicting appellant of murder and acquitting him of assault when the 'two shots were fired in rapid fire sequence and * * * no defense existed to one that did not exist as to the other'). In the first place, there is no inconsistency. 'When a defendant is charged with committing two criminal offenses that involve different elements, a jury may find him guilty of one crime and acquit on the other charge. State v. Burns, 263 Mo. 593, 173 S.W. 1070.' State v. Thomas, 452 S.W.2d 160, 164(11) (Mo.1970). The elements of first degree...

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  • Hankins v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
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    ...forbid a trial judge from giving any other instruction that elaborates on, or attempts to define, 'reasonable doubt.' State v. Amerson, 518 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Mo.1975); State v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo.1972); State v. Lafferty, 416 S.W.2d 157, 161 "Respondent seeks to harmonize the requ......
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    ...Indeed, this Court and the court of appeals have reached this same conclusion under parallel circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Amerson, 518 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Mo.1975) (holding the trial court properly refused to instruct on second-degree murder when the crime was either “a cold-blooded and wh......
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