State v. Amore
| Decision Date | 01 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 12975,12975 |
| Citation | 530 A.2d 582,205 Conn. 104 |
| Parties | , 19 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 297, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 17,539 STATE of Connecticut v. Enrica AMORE. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Edward F. Reynolds, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellant (plaintiff).
John L. Pottenger, Jr., with whom were Stephen Wizner and, on the brief, Miriam Berkman, New Haven, Sally Zanger, Robert A. Solomon, New Haven, Mary A. McCarthy and Craig Parrish, Elyn Saks and Stephen Behnke, Legal Interns, for the appellee (defendant).
Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, FRANCIS X. HENNESSY and SPADA, JJ.
In this action, which comes to us by way of reservation from the Superior Court, the parties seek advice on the following questions: (1) "Does Section 207 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 407, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, preclude the State of Connecticut from using legal process to require the defendant representative payee of social security benefits belonging to Charles Amore, a patient confined at a state mental hospital, to pay over any of those benefits received during the period June 13, 1978, through October 29, 1983, to satisfy the institutional support charges assessed under Conn.Gen.Stat.Sec. 17-295(c) for that period?" (2) "Does Section 207 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.Sec. 407, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, preclude the State of Connecticut from attaching the individually owned assets of the defendant representative payee to recover the costs of the confined beneficiary's care and treatment at a state humane institution pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat.Sec. 17-295(c)?"
The parties have stipulated to the following facts: From June 13, 1978, through October 29, 1983, Charles Amore a/k/a Cataldo Amore was a patient at the Connecticut Valley Hospital, a state humane institution for the care of mentally ill persons. During this time period, the defendant, Enrica Amore, was the representative payee of his social security benefits and, on his behalf, received social security benefits totaling $32,765.10. Pursuant to General Statutes § 17-295(c), 1 the state billed the defendant in her capacity as representative payee of the social security benefits belonging to Charles Amore in the sum of $14,707.71 for the support and maintenance it had provided to Charles Amore while he resided as a confined patient at the Connecticut Valley Hospital. 2 No payments have been received by the state from the defendant against her account as representative payee of social security benefits belonging to Charles Amore.
In an attempt to collect the $14,707.71 in outstanding charges, the state filed suit against the defendant. On June 7, 1984, the court, O'Brien, J., granted the state's application for an ex parte prejudgment real estate attachment upon the defendant's real property in the amount of $17,000. On October 5, 1984, the defendant moved to strike the state's complaint on the ground that § 207 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407, "bars the use of any legal process against the only funds for which the defendant, as representative payee, may be liable." On April 22, 1985, the court, Hon. Harold M. Mulvey, state trial referee, denied the defendant's motion. The parties then requested that the court reserve the aforementioned questions for the advice of the Appellate Court. On April 25, 1986, the court, Fracasse, J., granted that request. On June 16, 1986, this court transferred the reservation to itself.
The first question reserved to this court presents the issue of whether, under the facts of this case, 42 U.S.C. § 407 prohibits the state from using legal process to require the defendant, the representative payee of social security benefits of Charles Amore, a confined patient at a state humane institution, to pay over any of those benefits to satisfy the institutional support charges assessed by the state.
It is clear that General Statutes § 17-295(c) provides the state with a cause of action against a representative payee for the support of a patient confined to a state humane institution. Section 17-295(c) provides in part: "The guardian, conservator and payee of Social Security or other benefits on behalf of any [patient confined to a state humane institution] shall be [legally liable from the date of admission] for the support of such patient, but shall be liable in such capacity only in accordance with the amount of the patient's estate or the benefits received, or both, as the case may be." The question presented here is whether 42 U.S.C. § 407, by virtue of the supremacy clause, precludes the state from asserting such a cause of action. 3
The relevant portion of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407, provides that "[t]he right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law."
The defendant maintains that the state is precluded from asserting its claim under § 17-295(c) because "[o]n its face ... the federal Social Security Act shields the disability benefits it generates from the legal grasp of creditors," including the state, and that by virtue of the supremacy clause the Connecticut statute cannot be used as a vehicle for attaching those funds. Specifically, the defendant argues that § 407's prohibition of the use of "legal process" to reach social security payments bars the state from recouping any part of the support costs. In support of this interpretation of § 407, the defendant points to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413, 93 S.Ct. 590, 34 L.Ed.2d 608 (1973). In opposition to the defendant's argument that the federal statute and the Philpott case clearly prohibit the state from pursuing its claim against the defendant in this case, the state argues that Philpott is distinguishable from this case and that both federal and state case law subsequent to Philpott, as well as the pertinent federal regulations, make it "evident that the bar created by Section 407 is not absolute and may be defeated if the legislative intent is not frustrated in the process."
In Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, supra, Wilkes, a disabled person who was capable in part of providing his own care, applied for and received welfare assistance from the Essex County welfare board in the state of New Jersey. The county determined monthly maintenance needs by taking into consideration "any other benefits." Because at the time Wilkes applied for the welfare benefits he was not receiving "any other" benefits, full welfare benefits were awarded to him. As a precondition to receiving such aid, Wilkes executed an agreement to reimburse the county welfare board if and when he later received assets. Thereafter, Wilkes applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act and was awarded benefits retroactively in one lump sum. This money was deposited in a bank account Philpott held as trustee for Wilkes. Pursuant to the agreement to reimburse, the county sued for repayment. The United States Supreme Court rejected the county's claim and held that the "all inclusive" language of the Social Security Act barred the state of New Jersey from reaching the federal disability payments paid to Wilkes.
The state argues that the critical difference between this case and Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, supra, is that in Philpott the state sought to attach social security funds which were in a bank account of a welfare beneficiary who was a nonconfined patient then living independently in the community at large. The state argues that "unlike the fact pattern extant in Philpott [v. Essex County Welfare Board ], supra, the case at bar involves not the recovery of public welfare assistance from the Social Security beneficiary himself, but rather involves the payment of the customary charges assessed for the support and maintenance of an institutionalized-atient from the representative payee of his Social Security benefits." (Emphasis added.) The state argues that this distinction is "crucial" because the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 407 has been refined by certain provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations as well as by federal case law. We agree with the position advocated by the state.
The language of the pertinent federal regulations provides that the general proscription of 42 U.S.C. § 407 does not necessarily prohibit the state from seeking reimbursement in a situation where the state is providing for the current maintenance needs of an institutionalized social security beneficiary. 4 For example, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1606 (1978), which is entitled "Use of benefits for beneficiary in institution," provides in part: The defendant argues that the second sentence of this regulation supports his position that a...
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Estates of Nau v. State
...of patient care charges. A provision similar to section 27-12-109 was discussed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Amore, 205 Conn. 104, 530 A.2d 582 (1987). In that case, the state brought an action against the representative payee of social security benefits for a patient in a s......