State v. Amorin

• Decision Date: 21 December 1979
• Docket Number: Nos. 6936,s. 6936
• Citation: 61 Haw. 356,604 P.2d 45
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Gilbert AMORIN, Defendant-Appellant, and Dennis G. Asuncion, Defendant. STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Gilbert AMORIN, Defendant-Appellant. TO 6938.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 45

604 P.2d 45

61 Haw. 356

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Gilbert AMORIN, Defendant-Appellant, and Dennis G. Asuncion, Defendant.

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald Gilbert AMORIN, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 6936 TO 6938.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Dec. 21, 1979.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The mandate of Miranda is unequivocal: before any questions are asked of an in-custody suspect, the required warnings must be given and unless and until such warnings are proven by the prosecution, no statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation may be used.

2. The Miranda restriction applies to a defendant's statement obtained during custodial interrogation even though the statement may in fact be wholly voluntary.

3. A volunteered confession is one made independent of any custodial interrogation; volunteered confessions fall outside the scope of the Miranda rule.

4. Where there exists a reasonable possibility that a constitutional error of the trial court contributed to the conviction of the defendant, the error necessitates reversal.

Raymond E. Gurczynski, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Sandra Lynne Alexander, Deputy Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., Retired Justice KOBAYASHI and Circuit Judge LUM, assigned by reason of vacancies.

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice.

The defendant-appellant, Ronald Gilbert Amorin, appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury conviction for the unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS § 708-836 (1976). Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress as evidence his inculpatory statement made without Miranda warnings in response to police questioning after his arrest. The trial judge denied his motion on the ground that the defendant's incriminating statement was spontaneously and voluntarily made and therefore admissible notwithstanding the absence of the required warnings.

The defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress and that jury consideration of his illegally obtained confession violated his right against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution. ¹ We agree.

We reverse the judgment in Criminal No. 50065 and remand the case for new trial.

On the morning of January 7, 1977, Mr. Minoru Tsukada reported the theft of his 1965 Buick. Six days later, on January 13, 1977, Police Officer Robert Kupukaa pulled over a 1965 Buick for running a stop sign at an intersection. The defendant at the time was a passenger in the vehicle in question and Mr. Dennis Asuncion was driving.

Officer Kupukaa, before leaving his car, radioed in for an auto theft check. He then approached the driver of the detained vehicle and asked to see his license. When Mr. Asuncion responded that he did not have one, Officer Kupukaa returned to his car and was informed over the radio that the detained automobile had been reported stolen. Thereupon, he requested a back-up unit, ordered Mr. Asuncion and the defendant out of the car and placed them both under arrest for auto theft. To prevent their escape, the officer took the defendant and Mr. Asuncion to the rear of the detained vehicle and ordered them to stand next to each other. With the suspects so petitioned, Officer Kupukaa began his questioning. Without first reciting Miranda warnings, the officer turned to the defendant and asked him if he knew who owned the detained car. The defendant shook his head indicating that he did not. Officer Kupukaa then turned to Mr. Asuncion and again, without prior Miranda warnings, asked him if he knew who owned the vehicle.

At this point, the defendant stated, "Oh, he didn't steal the vehicle; I did." Officer Kupukaa asked no further questions of either the defendant or Mr. Asuncion.

The issue before us is whether the arresting officer's failure to recite proper Miranda warnings prior to questioning the defendant rendered inadmissible at trial his inculpatory statement uttered shortly after questioning had begun.

In State v. Kalai, 56 Haw. 366, 537 P.2d 8 (1975), we stated:

Where an individual is being subjected to custodial interrogation, He may not be asked any questions without his first being advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him, that he has the right to have his attorney present, and that if he cannot afford counsel, one will be appointed for him prior to any interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).

56 Haw. at 368, 537 P.2d at 11 (emphasis added). After being so informed, the defendant may waive these rights provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. ² Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602; State v. Green, 51 Haw. 260, 457 P.2d 505 (1969).

Unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution, no statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation may be used against the defendant either as direct evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief or to impeach the defendant's credibility during rebuttal or cross-examination. ³ State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. at 266, 492 P.2d 657; State v. Pahio, 58 Haw. 323, 568 P.2d 1200 (1977). This restriction applies to a statement obtained during custodial interrogation "even though the (defendant's) statement may in fact be wholly voluntary." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100, 96 S.Ct. 321, 325, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.3d 182 (1974), the Court stated that "Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared . . . that a defendant's statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles." 417 U.S. at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 2363. See also State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 336, 587 P.2d 1347 (1978); State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43 (1976).

Despite the absence of Miranda warnings in this case, the trial judge concluded that the defendant's statement was admissible as a volunteered confession. We recognize that volunteered confessions fall outside the scope of the Miranda rule. ⁴ In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Court stated:

The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.

384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Courts have since uniformly held that unsolicited, spontaneous statements made by a defendant Before any police questioning and in the absence of any coercion are admissible. Klamert v. Cupp, 437 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Trosper, 450 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1971); Phillips v. Attorney General of State of California, 594 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979); People v. Orr, 38 Ill.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424 (1967); People v. Bostic, 97 Misc.2d 1039, 412 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1978). A volunteered confession is thus a confession made independent of any custodial interrogation.

Hence, the issue here is whether the defendant's statement constituted a confession made independent of any custodial interrogation. If so, Miranda warnings were not required and the defendant's statement was admissible as a volunteered confession. If not, the absence of Miranda warnings before questioning should have barred the use of the defendant's statement as evidence.

We find that Officer Kupukaa's questioning of the defendant constituted custodial interrogation. In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; See also State v. Kalai, 56 Haw. at 368, 537 P.2d 8. It is undisputed that after his arrest, the defendant was in the custody of Officer Kupukaa. State v. Patterson, 59 Haw. 357, 581 P.2d 752 (1978). Further, the officer twice testified that he questioned the defendant about the ownership of the stopped vehicle while the defendant was in custody. ⁵

Furthermore, we find that the defendant's inculpatory statement was a product of that custodial interrogation. In determining that the defendant's statement was made independent of custodial interrogation, the trial judge relied on the fact that the defendant did not utter his inculpatory remark immediately after he was questioned by the officer. Rather, the defendant's incriminating statement was made after the officer had turned his attention to Mr. Asuncion and has asked him if he knew who owned the detained car. It was at this time that the defendant confessed, "Oh, he didn't steal the vehicle; I did." Based on the timing and content of the defendant's remark, the trial judge concluded that the defendant's statement was not a result of the officer's questioning and therefore was volunteered; he thus ruled that the confession did not fall within the proscription of Miranda and permitted its use as evidence.

We differ from the conclusion of the trial judge. The record below clearly establishes that the defendant's incriminating statement was made during the course of custodial interrogation. At the start of his questioning, Officer Kupukaa knew that the detained automobile had been stolen. His inquiry as to the ownership of the car...