State v. Anagnos (In re Anagnos)
| Decision Date | 26 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010AP1812.,2010AP1812. |
| Citation | 2012 WI 64,815 N.W.2d 675,341 Wis.2d 576 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the REFUSAL OF Dimitrius ANAGNOS. State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Appellant–Petitioner, v. Dimitrius Anagnos, Defendant–Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by Phillip A. Koss, district attorney for Walworth county, Zeke S. Wiedenfeld, assistant district attorney for Walworth county, Elkhorn and the cause was argued by Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
For the defendant-respondent there were briefs and oral argument by Barry S. Cohen and Barry S. Cohen, S.C., Elkhart Lake.
[341 Wis.2d 579]¶ 1 The petitioner, State of Wisconsin, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court. The order of the circuit court determined that the traffic stop of Dimitrius Anagnos's vehicle was unconstitutional and that his operating privileges should not have been revoked on account of his refusal to take a chemical test to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol in his blood or breath.1
[341 Wis.2d 580]¶ 2 In this case, an officer conducted a traffic stop of Anagnos's vehicle. Once the vehicle was stopped and the officer spoke with Anagnos, he determined that Anagnos was intoxicated and arrested him for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI). It is undisputed that after the officer stopped the vehicle and spoke with Anagnos, the officer had probable cause to believe that Anagnos was operating while under the influence of an intoxicant. The parties' arguments center on an earlier point in time, that is, the officer's initial decision to conduct the traffic stop.
¶ 3 The State argues that the circuit court erred when it refused to revoke Anagnos's operating privileges. Citing Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a., it contends that during a refusal hearing, a defendant cannot contest the constitutionality of the officer's initial decision to conduct a traffic stop. Rather, it asserts, the statute limits the defendant to contesting whether there was probable cause to believe that he was operating under the influence of an intoxicant based on all the information the officer had gathered during a traffic stop and up until the moment of the arrest.2 In the alternative, the State argues that the traffic stop in this case was constitutional because it was based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
¶ 4 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a. does not limit the defendant to contesting whether the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was operating while under the influence of an intoxicant. The language of the statute provides that a defendant may also contest whether he was lawfully placed under arrest. As part of this inquiry, the circuit court may entertain an argument that the arrest was unlawful because the traffic stop that preceded it was not justified by either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
¶ 5 When we consider the totality of the facts and circumstances in this case, we conclude that the arresting officer pointed to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary for an investigative stop. Because the stop of Anagnos's vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion, the circuit court erred in concluding that the stop was unconstitutional and that Anagnos was not lawfully placed under arrest. Under these circumstances, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court to revoke Anagnos's operating privilege under Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(d).
¶ 6 The events leading up to Anagnos's refusal to take a chemical test occurred at approximately 1:15 a.m. on January 31, 2010. At that time, Deputy Frami was on patrol in Lake Geneva when he observed a vehicle pull out of a parking lot and make a left turn by crossing a highway divided by an elevated median. He observed the vehicle accelerate rapidly to a stoplight, execute a second left turn without signaling, and again accelerate rapidly. Based on these observations, Deputy Frami stopped the vehicle.
[341 Wis.2d 582]¶ 7 Once Deputy Frami approached the vehicle, he determined that its driver, Anagnos, was intoxicated. He read Anagnos the Informing the Accused form as required by Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4)(2009–10) 3 and asked Anagnos to consent to chemical testing. Anagnos refused. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a), Deputy Frami promptly filed a notice of intent to revoke Anagnos's operating privileges.
¶ 8 Anagnos retained counsel and requested a hearing on the revocation notice. During the hearing, defense counsel stipulated that once Deputy Frami stopped the vehicle and observed Anagnos, he had probable cause to believe Anagnos was driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defense counsel also stipulated that Deputy Frami properly read the Informing the Accused form to Anagnos, and that Anagnos refused to take the chemical test. The only issue challenged by defense counsel was the constitutionality of the stop.
¶ 9 The State and the defense disagreed about whether the relevant statutes permitted Anagnos to defend against revocation by contesting the constitutionality of the traffic stop. The circuit court agreed that the permissible scope of a refusal hearing was “an interesting legal question,” but it decided to take evidence about the constitutionality of the stop prior to ruling on that question.
¶ 10 Deputy Frami testified that he was stopped at a red light at approximately 1:15 in the morning when he witnessed Anagnos's vehicle pulling out of a Taco Bell parking lot and turning left onto Highway 120. That highway is divided by an elevated median, and Deputy Frami testified that Anagnos drove over the median in the course of turning left.
¶ 11 Deputy Frami described the elevated median as “a concrete curb with ... concrete paved in between the two curbs dividing northbound and southbound Highway 120 lanes.” He continued: “[The curb] raises maybe four or five inches, standard curb height, whatever height that would be; and then it's flat across the top with concrete until the other side of the curb where it comes back down again.”
¶ 12 Deputy Frami testified that he was “familiar with other ... concrete dividers for highways,” including “dividers that are designed to permit an individual to cross over them.” He explained: “They're usually gradually sloped, either convex or concaved angles and usually are not [perpendicular] to the roadway.”
¶ 13 Upon questioning by the circuit court, Deputy Frami agreed that the elevated median crossed by Anagnos
¶ 14 Deputy Frami testified that after executing the turn, Anagnos “rapidly accelerated” up to the nearest stoplight. When the stoplight turned green, Deputy Frami observed Anagnos turn left onto Highway 50 without activating his turn signal and again “[take] off at a rapid acceleration.” On cross-examination, Deputy Frami acknowledged that there were not any vehicles in addition to the ones driven by Anagnos and Deputy Frami in the vicinity, and that he could not confirm that Anagnos exceeded the speed limit at any time.
[341 Wis.2d 584]¶ 15 The circuit court also heard testimony from Anagnos, who testified that he did not exceed the speed limit at any time and that he knew he had activated his turn signal because “I always put on a turn signal.” He also testified that, based on his own measurements, the height of the median he crossed was not four to five inches, but rather, was only one-and-a-half to two inches. After further investigation, the State later conceded that the elevated median was not four or five inches high as Deputy Frami estimated, but rather was two inches high and five feet, eight inches wide.
¶ 16 Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the circuit court determined that Deputy Frami did not have probable cause to stop Anagnos because he did not observe Anagnos violate any law prior to the traffic stop. The court asserted that Anagnos did not violate Wis. Stat. § 346.15 when he crossed the elevated median because the curb was only two inches high, rather than four to five inches as Deputy Frami had estimated.4 It further determined that there was no evidence that Anagnos exceeded the speed limit, and that Anagnos was not required to activate his turn signal prior to turning onto Highway 50 because the movement did not affect other traffic. Wis. Stat. § 346.34(1)(b).
[341 Wis.2d 585]¶ 17 The circuit court pointed to the “mistakes [made] by the officer,” specifically Deputy Frami's belief that the two left turns were illegal, when it concluded that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the court determined that the stop was unconstitutional, and it entered an order “suppressing” the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Ultimately, the circuit court dismissed the State's case.5
¶ 18 The court of appeals affirmed. It concluded that the refusal hearing statute, Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.a., permitted the circuit court to consider the lawfulness of the traffic stop at the refusal hearing. State v. Anagnos, 2011 WI App 118, ¶ 15, 337 Wis.2d 57, 805 N.W.2d 722. Like the circuit court, the court of appeals' reasonable suspicion analysis relied heavily on the premise that Anagnos broke no traffic laws. Id., ¶ 13. Noting that Deputy Frami did not testify that he suspected that Anagnos was intoxicated prior to the stop, the court of appeals concluded that the stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Id.
¶ 19 This case presents two questions for our review. First, we must determine whether a...
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