State v. Anderson

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McENERY, J.
• Citation: State v. Anderson, 45 La.Ann. 651, 12 So. 737 (La. 1893)
• Decision Date: 01 April 1893
• Docket Number: 11,255
• Parties: THE STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RANDELL ANDERSON AND ALLEN BLACKSTONE

12 So. 737

45 La.Ann. 651

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RANDELL ANDERSON AND ALLEN BLACKSTONE

No. 11,255

Supreme Court of Louisiana

April 1, 1893

APPEAL from the Second District Court, Parish of Webster. Watkins, J.

M. J Cunningham, Attorney General, for the State, Appellee.

L. K Watkins, for the Defendants and Appellants.

OPINION

McENERY J.

The defendants were indicted for murder, tried and sentenced, the jury returning a verdict of guilty without capital punishment.

The defendant Blackstone in the body of the indictment was described as Allen Blackstone. The indictment returned and filed in court was endorsed Randell Anderson and Allen Blackshire.

The title of the case was docketed as endorsed, and the accused were arraigned and the defendant Blackstone pleaded not guilty. It was then immaterial whether the case was prosecuted as docketed, as the defendant had pleaded to the indictment. One of the objects of the arraignments is to identify the defendant, and he appeared and answered and thus identified himself as the person accused in the body of the indictment. But this clerical error was corrected. It appears from the judge's statement that the defendant Blackstone was also called Blackshire, and on being questioned he said his name was Blackstone.

On this statement made by him the name was changed to Blackstone, in open court, with the consent of the defendant and his counsel. The district attorney stated that he would prepare a written motion to change the endorsement so as to read Blackstone, if the defendant required a written motion, but if he did not require it he would make the change in the record, whereupon, by the consent of defendant and his counsel he changed the endorsement. Conceding that there was error in the endorsement, his consent cured the defect and is a sufficient waiver of a formal written notice.

The State offered a witness to prove the details of a difficulty between one of the accused and deceased on the day before the homicide. This witness' testimony was objected to by defendants on the ground that the "details of the transaction on Sunday could not be received in evidence, as it was a separate and distinct offence and no part of the present transaction, and not a part of the res gestae."

The objection was overruled, the trial judge assigning as reasons therefor "that it was sought to be proved by the State that Randell Anderson and Jim Watson, the deceased, had a difficulty on Sunday, the day before Randell Anderson killed Jim Watson, in which difficulty Randell Anderson threatened Jim Watson. The details were allowed to show the threats and feeling between the parties."

There are exceptions to the rule that no evidence is admissible of other felonies or distinct offences committed by the defendant than that charged in the indictment, one of which is that when it is material to show the intent with which the act charged was done, evidence of the distinct offence may be received in evidence.

In the instant case the details of the difficulty were admitted to show the intent of the defendant. Threats against the deceased are always admissible to show malice. Whar. Homicides, Secs. 701, 702; State vs. Patza, 3 An. 512; State vs. Rohfrischt, 12 An. 382; State vs. Mulholland, 16 An. 377; State vs. Vines, 34 An. 181; State vs. Deschamps, 42 An. 568.

The trial judge, in applying the above principle to the facts incorporated in bill No. 2, we think was correct in his ruling.

In bill No. 2 it was shown that a witness was put on the stand in behalf of the State, and was asked by the district attorney "to tell what was said in a conversation by the defendant Randell Anderson, about the hog of John Snell, or the taking of John Snell's hog." This question was objected to by the defendants for reasons assigned in bill No. 1, and for the additional reason that the offence had no connection with the crime under investigation, and that it was only admissible to prove a threat against deceased.

The trial judge permitted the evidence to go to the jury, with the understanding that the district attorney should not ask the witness anything about the hog, unless he could prove a threat coupled with it. This ruling seems to have been satisfactory to defendants. The district attorney repeated the identical question, which was again objected to by defendants. The trial judge permitted the question to be answered subject to the ruling of the court. The witness answered that he had not heard the accused say anything at the time about the hog, but the deceased had stated that the defendants had killed John Snell's hog. The defendants were not present at this conversation.

In his reason for overruling the motion the trial judge says, the effort on the part of the...