State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 08 December 1899
• Parties: STATE v. ANDERSON
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

59 P. 180

6 Idaho 706

STATE v. ANDERSON

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 8, 1899

RAPE-UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTRIX.-While a conviction for rape may be properly had upon the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix, this would only be warranted when the reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity is unimpeached, and when the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense are corroboration and not contradictory of the statements of the prosecutrix.

SAME-INSTRUCTIONS-PREJUDICIAL ERROR.-In a prosecution for rape, an instruction which virtually instructs the jury that they may find corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix in her own statements is misleading and amounts to prejudicial error.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Blaine County.

Judgment reversed. Defendant discharged.

L. L Sullivan, for Appellant.

At common law where the accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf, the testimony of the prosecutrix might be sufficient to warrant a conviction for rape; but under the statutes of this territory where the accused avails himself of the right to testify, and clearly and explicitly denies the commission of the offense, there must be testimony corroborating that of the prosecutrix to authorize a conviction. (Bueno v. People, 1 Colo. App. 232, 28 P. 248; State v. Baker, ante, p. 496, 56 P. 81; Sowers v. Territory, 6 Okla. 436, 50 P. 257.)

Samuel H. Hays, Attorney General, for the State.

In many states by statute no conviction can be had on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. We have no such statute in this state. The difficulties, however, of securing satisfactory evidence in cases of this kind have been recognized in every jurisdiction, but in the absence of a statute the lower court had no authority to instruct the jury as to the weight which they should give to the uncorroborated statement of prosecutrix. That was a matter entirely for the jury. (State v. Wilcox, 11 Mo. 569, 33 Am. St. Rep 551, 20 S.W. 314.) Defendant in answer denies the charge and accuses the prosecutrix of improper conduct with several boys. The extreme latitude permitted defendant in introducing evidence and testifying to matters entirely irrelevant, but which tended to prejudice defendant before the jury, is the most noticeable thing in the case. He was permitted to discredit her parentage. Also to testify to her alleged misconduct with several boys. This evidence was wholly inadmissible. The weight of authority is to the effect that in cases of this kind specific acts of misconduct cannot be introduced but in case they are introduced that they only go to the question of consent. (People v. Shea, 125 Cal. 151, 57 P. 885; People v. Johnson, 106 Cal 289, 39 P. 622; People v. Glover, 71 Mich. 303, 38 N.W. 874.)

HUSTON, C. J. Quarles, J., concurs.

OPINION

HUSTON, C. J.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of rape, alleged to have been perpetrated upon the person of one Emma Anderson, an adopted daughter of the defendant, and who, at the time of the alleged crime, was some thirteen years and nine months of age. The only evidence of the commission of the offense is the testimony of the prosecuting witness, which is, in substance, as follows: "I do not understand the nature of an oath. I do not know what the clerk has just said to me. I understand he told me to tell the truth. . . . I do not know what day of the week the 25th day of June was. I know clerk Nichols. I knew when he was up before the court. . . . I was at home on that day. . . . The day before that I was at home in Bellevue. Mr. Anderson was at home. I was at home on the evening of that day. So was Mr. Anderson. I went to bed that night between 9 and 10 o'clock. Mr. Anderson went to bed at the same time. His bed and mine are in the same room upstairs. We have slept in that room since last winter. Q. Did you see Mr. Anderson after you went to bed? A. No, sir. Q. I am speaking about the day before clerk Nichols' trial. Did you see him after you went to bed that night? A. I saw him after he went to bed. Q. Well, what did he do? A. He didn't do anything. I was awakened during the night after that, by Mr. Anderson. He was in my bed. I first found out Mr. Anderson was there quite a few minutes after he was there. He was dressed in his drawers and shirt. He did not say anything when he came to my bed. Q. What did he do? A. Took part of his person and put it to my person. Q. Did he put any part of his person in your person? A. Yes, sir. He stayed there five or ten minutes, and then went to his bed." This occurred, as prosecutrix states, on the 25th of June, 1889. She fixes the date by the time clerk Nichols was on trial at Hailey. This clerk Nichols seems to have been one of several young men who had been on terms of intimacy with the prosecutrix. And this is all the testimony on the part of the prosecution which tends in the slightest degree to incriminate the defendant. The prosecutrix is not corroborated in the slightest particular. The only attempt at corroboration is by the testimony of Dr. Brown, called by the prosecution, who testifies that he made an examination of the prosecutrix, and that she had the appearance of having been "penetrated repeatedly." It is not claimed that the defendant ever had connection with her but once. When she made complaint (which she says she first made to the prosecuting attorney) does not appear, but he had his preliminary examination on the eleventh...