State v. Anderson

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: PENZATO, J.
• Docket Number: 2023 KA 0271
• Decision Date: 03 November 2023
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BRANDON LEE ANDERSON

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STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BRANDON LEE ANDERSON

No. 2023 KA 0271

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit

November 3, 2023

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

On Appeal from the 32nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Terrebonne State of Louisiana, Trial Court No 839823 Honorable Juan W. Pickett, Judge Presiding

Joseph L. Waitz, Jr., District Attorney, J. Christopher Erny, Ellen Daigle Doskey, Assistant District Attorneys Houma, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana

Jane Hogan, Hammond, Louisiana, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Brandon Lee Anderson

BEFORE: THERIOT, PENZATO, AND GREENE, JJ.

PENZATO, J.

The defendant, Brandon Lee Anderson, was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated (DWI), fourth offense, a violation of La. R.S. 14:98.4(A).^[1] He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, which were denied by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied by the trial court. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's denial of challenges to strike three potential jurors, and contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel and an excessive sentence. For the following reasons we affirm the conviction and sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 25, 2022, at 6:32 p.m., Sergeant Darryl Cunningham, Jr. of the Houma Police Department (HPD) was dispatched to a car accident at Bayou Express Seafood ("Bayou Express"), located at 243 Grand Caillou Road. According to the complainant, Sierra Mebane, as she was exiting the seafood store, between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., a vehicle ran into the building and hit her right knee, knocking her into the store door. Ms. Mebane provided a description of the driver and the license plate number for the vehicle. Sergeant Cunningham obtained the address to which the vehicle was registered, which was near the store, and proceeded to the address.

When Sergeant Cunningham arrived at the residence, he observed the vehicle and the defendant, who was standing in the front yard. After approaching the defendant, Sergeant Cunningham detected the odor of alcohol from the defendant's breath and person. He further observed the defendant as he swayed while standing and spoke with slightly slurred speech. After being advised of his Miranda^[2] rights, the defendant admitted drinking "a few beers" after work and coming from Bayou Express, but denied being in an accident. The defendant was non-compliant with Sergeant Cunningham's attempt to conduct a field sobriety test. Sergeant Cunningham placed the defendant under arrest for DWI and hit and run and transported him to the HPD where he took a breathalyzer test, which showed that he had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.231 grams percent. Ms. Mebane came to the HPD and identified the defendant as the driver of the truck that ran into the store and hit her, and she identified the defendant again at trial.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE: ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant notes that three prospective jurors, James Griffin, Robin Lapeyrouse and Louise Hebert, stated that they believed the defendant was likely guilty given his prior record, revealing bias. He argues the trial court's refusal to grant challenges for cause of these three prospective jurors was reversible error.

The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797 provides, in pertinent part, that the State or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that the juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. La. C.Cr.P. art. 797(2). Additionally, La. C.Cr.P. art. 797(4) provides that the State or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that "[t]he juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court." A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. State v. Odenbaugh, 2010-0268 (La. 12/6/11), 82 So.3d 215, 237, cert, denied, 568 U.S. 829, 133 S.Ct. 410, 184 L.Ed.2d 51 (2012). However, a prospective juror's seemingly prejudicial response is not grounds for an automatic challenge for cause, and a trial judge's refusal to excuse him on the grounds of impartiality is not an abuse of discretion, if, after further questioning, the potential juror demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Id. at 242.

Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied by a trial court and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges.^[3] This is because an erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge is a substantial violation of his constitutional and statutory rights and constitutes reversible error. See Odenbaugh, 82 So.3d at 237. A trial court's ruling on a motion to strike jurors for cause is afforded broad discretion because of the court's ability to get a first-person impression of prospective jurors during voir dire. State v. Halford, 2020-0585 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/4/21), 327 So.3d 1004, 1012, writ denied, 2021-00866 (La. 11/3/21), 326 So.3d 884, cert, denied,___U.S.___, 142 S.Ct. 2658, 212 L.Ed.2d 612 (2022).

Herein, during voir dire, defense counsel asked the first prospective juror at issue, Mr. Griffin, if the fact that someone has three previous convictions for DWI suggested that it was more likely that the person might have committed a fourth DWI offense. In response, Mr. Griffin stated, "I don't think he should've committed a 4th time. If he already had 3, he shouldn't have had the 4th one." Mr. Griffin likewise agreed that the fact that someone has three DWI convictions indicates that the person is probably guilty if charged with a fourth DWI offense. When asked if there was anything that could be said to change his mind, Mr. Griffin stated, "No, if you already got three convictions, I don't think you should have a 4th conviction."

Ms. Lapeyrouse, the second prospective juror at issue, was then asked about the probability of guilt for a fourth DWI offense after commission of three offenses and stated, "I think it's a strong possibility." After additional probing, Ms. Lapeyrouse stated, "I mean, I would hope that after being . . . convicted three times, that he wouldn't do it again - but, I would just have to see the evidence and see if they were or not - it just depends on what is presented." She confirmed that she agreed with Mr. Griffin in that it was a "strong possibility" that someone who had three DWI convictions "would do it again."

Ms. Hebert, the third prospective juror at issue, gave initial responses similar to those of Mr. Griffin and Ms. Lapeyrouse, specifically stating that she would find someone guilty of a fourth offense of DWI based on his commission of three prior DWI offenses. She stated, "he should have learned his lesson after the first time, not to do it again. And then, his second and his third - now, his fourth." When the defense attorney asked her if there was anything he, the prosecutor, or the judge could say that might change her mind, she replied, "Not at the moment."

Subsequently, after the prospective jurors were thoroughly advised of the State's burden of proof in a criminal case and the presumption of innocence, the trial court asked them if they could promise that regardless of what the State proved as to a first, second, or third prior conviction, they would hold the State to its burden of proving all elements of the fourth offense. Tn response, Mr. Griffin stated, "Right, first, second and third have nothing to do with the fourth one." After individually questioning Mr. Griffin, the trial court asked Ms. Lapeyrouse and Ms. Hebert if they could also hold the State to its burden of proving every element of the fourth offense, and they replied in the affirmative.

Defense counsel moved to strike all three jurors, arguing that their responses indicated that they would not give the defendant the presumption of innocence. In denying the challenge of Mr. Griffin, the trial court noted that after it read the jury instructions, Mr. Griffin agreed that he would hold the State to its burden of proving each and every element. The trial court similarly found that Ms. Lapeyrouse and Ms. Hebert had been rehabilitated and denied defense counsel's challenges against the prospective jurors.

We note that defense counsel did not object to the trial court's denial of his challenges for cause. In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 800(A), a defendant may not assign as error a ruling refusing to sustain a challenge for cause made by him unless an objection thereto is made at the time of the ruling. The nature of the objection and grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of objection. Thus, by failing to object to the trial court's refusal to grant for-cause challenges, the defendant waived any claims on appeal regarding the challenges at issue. Odenbaugh, 82 So.3d at 237; State v. Mullen, 2018-0643 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/21/18), 269 So.3d 772, 778-79, writ denied, 2020-00408 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 529 (finding that where the record did not indicate any objection by defense counsel to trial court's denial of his challenge for cause, any claim on appeal was waived).^[4] Moreover, a charge of juror bias may be...