State v. Anderson, AC 39794

• Decision Date: 13 November 2018
• Docket Number: AC 39794
• Citation: 198 A.3d 681,186 Conn.App. 73
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Francis ANDERSON

186 Conn.App. 73

198 A.3d 681

STATE of Connecticut

v.Francis ANDERSON

AC 39794

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 14, 2018

Officially released November 13, 2018

Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Nancy L. Walker, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Peter McShane, former state's attorney, and Jeffrey Doskos, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Lavine, Keller and Elgo, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The defendant, Francis Anderson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of one count of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3) and four counts of reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence of the requisite mental state necessary for the trial court to have concluded that he acted recklessly. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On April 29, 2016, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it found the following relevant facts. On August 24, 2014, Joanne Aldrich was working at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting) as a forensic treatment specialist and was assigned to unit rounds during which she checked every fifteen minutes to see that the patients were in their rooms. Sometime after 10 p.m., a patient was out of his room, standing by the exit door near the defendant's bedroom. This patient was confused and making noise. While Aldrich was attempting to calm the patient, the defendant¹ exited his bedroom, which was located near where Aldrich and the patient were standing. The defendant did not approach or speak to Aldrich or the patient but, instead, proceeded down the hallway.

Meanwhile, four other forensic treatment specialists (treatment specialists), David Latronica, Iris Fuqua, William Hewitt, and Darla White, were in the employee break room. Inside the small, approximately thirteen foot by thirteen foot break room, the treatment specialists were seated around two tables that were placed together to form a larger table. Two duffel bags rested on the tables and contained various personal items. There was a shelf in close proximity to the tables that contained boxes and other items. A large metal food cart, which was approximately three inches taller than the tables, was nearby.

The defendant appeared at the open door of the break room, which was approximately eighty-two feet from his bedroom, and began to yell profanities and threatening language. He stated that he had been awakened by a patient down the hallway and that the treatment specialists in the break room were not doing their jobs, and asked why they were not helping the "old woman," in reference to Aldrich. The defendant entered the room, and the four treatment specialists stood up. The defendant appeared to be addressing Latronica, with whom he did not have a good relationship. The defendant threw the two duffel bags that were on the table and grabbed one of the tables. The treatment specialists placed their hands on the table to prevent the defendant from lifting or flipping it. The defendant then grabbed the metal food cart by the handle and flung it so that it became airborne. The cart struck White in the chest and propelled her backward into nearby cabinets. The defendant then left the room.

Lance Mack, a forensic nurse, went to the break room after learning about the incident. Mack saw the defendant in the hallway entering a bathroom. Mack entered a conference room directly across from the bathroom as he thought that the defendant, with whom he had a good rapport, would follow him into the room because it was the "logical thing to do." Just as Mack anticipated, the defendant entered the room and sat down. The defendant recounted his version of the events in a concise manner, following logical thought patterns, explaining that he lost his temper and was frustrated by being in the unit.

As a result of being hit by the metal cart, White experienced substantial pain in her chest, neck, and shoulder, and suffered headaches. After seeking treatment that failed to alleviate her symptoms, White underwent magnetic resonance imaging

that revealed a herniated cervical disc requiring surgery. Following the surgery, White experienced numbness in her hands and was unable to turn her head to the right, engage in activities with her children, or return to work.

The defendant was arrested and charged with one count of assault in the second degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (3) for flinging the metal cart that hit White and caused her serious injury. The defendant was also charged with four counts of reckless endangerment in the second degree in violation of § 53a-64 (a), each count identifying one of the treatment specialists, for throwing the two duffel bags and creating a risk of injury to them. Following a trial, the court found the defendant guilty on all counts. This appeal followed.

"The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....

"We note that the [finder of fact] must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the [finder of fact] to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the [finder of fact] is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt....

"In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical....

"On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact's] verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Calabrese , 279 Conn. 393, 402–403, 902 A.2d 1044 (2006).

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of assault in the second degree. Specifically, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, in light of his claimed mental disease or defect, he had the capacity to be aware of and to disregard the substantial and unjustifiable risk of serious physical injury to another person posed by the flinging of the cart.² He further argues that because White's injury was caused by her fall, the cart itself did not cause the injury,³ and, in any event, because he was unaware of White's preexisting condition,⁴ he did not know that there was a risk of serious injury that could result from flinging the cart in her direction. We are unpersuaded.

Section 53a-60 (a) provides in relevant part that "[a] person is guilty of assault in the second degree when ... (3) the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument ...." "According to General Statutes § 53a-3 (13), [a] person acts recklessly ... when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk .... The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter , 141 Conn. App. 377, 393, 61 A.3d 1103 (2013), aff'd, 317 Conn. 845, 120 A.3d 1229 (2015) ; see also State v. Douglas , 126 Conn. App. 192, 207–208, 11 A.3d 699, cert. denied, 300 Conn. 926, 15 A.3d 628 (2011).

"Recklessness involves a subjective realization of that risk and a conscious decision to ignore it.... It does not involve intentional conduct because one who acts recklessly does not have a conscious objective to cause a particular result.... Because it is difficult to prove this through direct evidence, the state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones , 289 Conn. 742, 756, 961 A.2d 322 (2008). "In determining whether a defendant has acted recklessly for ... [s]ubjective realization of a risk may be inferred from [the defendant's] words and conduct when viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carter ...