State v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 21 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | SC S058504).,CA A135075,(CC 05C51184 |
| Citation | 313 P.3d 1113,354 Or. 440 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Alem Jonathan ANDERSON, Respondent on Review. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Anna Marie Joyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Ryan T. O'Connor, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.
Before BALMER, Chief Justice, and KISTLER, WALTERS, LINDER, and BALDWIN, Justices.**
This is one of three cases that we decide today in which we examine the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.1 All three cases involve police contacts with individuals in which, at the outset of the contact, the officers asked the individuals for identification. In the first of the three cases, State v. Backstrand, 354 Or. 392, 412-13, 313 P.3d 1084 (Nov 15, 2013) (decided this day), we held that an officer's request for and verification of a person's identification are not acts that, in and of themselves, convert an encounter that is not a seizure for constitutional purposes into one that is. We further concluded in Backstrand that nothing in the accompanying circumstances of that case— i.e., the context of the officer's contact with the individual, the content of the officer's request for identification, or the manner in which he made the request—resulted in a seizure of the defendant. Id. at 415-17, 313 P.3d 1084.
In this case, we examine a different set of circumstances that surround the officers' request for and verification of identification. As we will explain, we likewise conclude in this case that the officers did not seize defendant and his companion by asking them for identification. We further conclude, however, that the actions that the officers took after asking for that identification did result in seizing defendant and his companion. Defendant does not dispute, however, that by then the officers had reasonable suspicion for his seizure. Consequently, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court judgment.
The circumstances that gave rise to this case occurred when several police officers were executing a nighttime search warrant at an apartment. The officers were members of a “Community Response Unit” that is specially charged with investigating suspected drug activity in local neighborhoods in response to citizen complaints. They were looking for evidence that the person who resided at the apartment, Wilson, was involved in drug dealing.
While police were searching Wilson's apartment, a car pulled into the parking lot directly in front of it. By then, police had found evidence in the apartment of illegal drug activity. Two people got out of the car, walked up to the apartment, and “peeked” inside the open front door. When they saw the officers searching the living room, the two immediately turned around, walked “briskly” back to the car, and got back inside. Officer Zavala, who was immediately informed about their approach and quick retreat, left the apartment to contact them. Two other officers, Officer Johnson and Detective Bamford, followed Zavala. When the three officers reached the car, it was still parked, the engine was not running, the windows were partially rolled down, and the two were sitting inside. Zavala approached the driver, while Johnson and Bamford approached defendant, who was sitting in front on the passenger's side. Zavala was wearing his badge and was in uniform. Johnson was wearing a “raid vest,” which is an outer vest with the word “police” displayed in large yellow letters across the front.2
Zavala explained to the driver that the officers were executing a search warrant at the apartment and that they were contacting them “to find out who [defendant and the driver] were, what interest they might have had with what [the police] were doing there, or maybe they knew the * * * individual that lived there.” The driver immediately responded that she knew Wilson and that she and defendant were there to “meet with” him and his girlfriend.
Zavala asked the driver for identification. She denied having any but gave Zavala her name and date of birth. As Zavala talked to the driver, Johnson asked defendant for identification. Defendant, too, denied having any identification, but told Johnson that his name was Steve Tipton. Johnson, however, knew Steve Tipton, who was a member of the Tipton family that lived in the area. Johnson also recognized defendant from past “patrol contacts.” Although Johnson could not “put [defendant's] name with his face,” Johnson was sure that defendant was not Steve Tipton. Believing that defendant was lying about his name, Johnson responded by telling defendant that Johnson knew the Tipton family, knew Steve Tipton, and “you're not him, I recognize you.”
Johnson then asked defendant to step out of the car, which defendant did. Johnson did so both to better determine if defendant had any identification on him and for officer safety reasons. In Johnson's 15 years of experience as a police officer, when a person gives him a false name, that person is trying to hide his or her identity “for a reason,” such as to avoid arrest on an outstanding arrest warrant or otherwise to evade detection in connection with some kind of illegal activity. As Johnson explained: “If he's lying to me at this point or not giving me a truthful name, I want to make sure that * * * I can see his hands[.]”
Zavala, who had heard the conversation between Johnson and defendant about the false name, asked the driver to step out of the car as well, and she did so. Based on the birth date that she had given him, Zavala realized that the driver might be 17 years old and, therefore, a minor. From Zavala's observations, the driver seemed nervous and unsure of herself, and was watching defendant for cues as to whether she should say anything to the officers. After the driver stepped out of the car, Zavala moved her several yards away from the car and out of defendant's “earshot,” thinking that she might be more willing to “let us know what exactly is happening” or produce identification if she did not have to talk in front of defendant.
As Zavala was getting the driver get out of the car, Johnson again asked defendant if he had any identification. Defendant immediately admitted that he did and said that it was in his wallet, which was in his pocket. Defendant produced the identification for Johnson. Johnson then ran a warrant check on defendant and, within “a couple of minutes,” determined that defendant was wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant. Johnson placed defendant under arrest. He then went over to where Zavala and the driver were standing and interrupted their conversation to ask the driver for consent to search the car and its contents. Zavala left them to call dispatch and verify the information that the driver had given him about her identity and the car's registration (the driver had said that she did not own the car). The information appeared to be correct. Zavala also determined that there were no warrants or “holds of any kind” on the driver.
Johnson, meanwhile, told the driver that he would like to search the car for controlled substances and weapons. He asked her, as the person who had custody and control of the car, if she “had an issue with that.” She said that she did not. Johnson then read her a “consent to search” card and asked her if she would sign it. She did. The driver identified where her purse was in the car, and Zavala, who by then had rejoined Johnson and the driver, retrieved it. Zavala searched the purse pursuant to the consent that the driver had given Johnson. In the purse, Zavala discovered a glass pipe with white residue that he believed was a controlled substance. Zavala, therefore, took the driver into custody at that point and proceeded to search the car. In the car, the officers discovered methamphetamine on the floor behind the passenger's seat, along with drug-related paraphernalia ( e.g., glass pipes, packaging materials, a straw, tweezers), money, and weapons found throughout the car. In a duffle bag in the rear of the car, officers found, along with some personal items, a two-way radio, a police scanner, and a stun gun. Defendant acknowledged to the officers that the duffle bag was his but asserted that the drugs belonged to the driver. The driver told the officers that the drugs seized from the car belonged to defendant.
Defendant was charged with delivery of methamphetamine. Before trial, he moved to suppress “any and all evidence” that had been discovered during the encounter. In support of his motion, defendant argued that the officers had unlawfully stopped and detained him, and that the evidence obtained in the search was a product of that illegal stop. Defendant also argued that the driver's consent had not been given voluntarily. At the hearing on the motion, relying on the events as described by the officers, the state argued that the officers' initial contact with defendant and the driver was not a stop. By the time that the officers asked the two to step out of the car, defendant had lied about who he was, which the state urged gave the officers reasonable suspicion to detain him by at least that point, especially in combination with the surrounding circumstances ( i.e., that the two had approached a “drug house,” saw police, and then quickly left). As to the voluntariness of the driver's consent, the state urged that the officers' testimony was “extremely different” from that of the driver, that the driver was not a credible witness, and that, if...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Soto-Navarro
...more than seeking an individual's cooperation is required of an officer's conduct to constitute a seizure); cf. State v. Anderson , 354 Or. 440, 454, 313 P.3d 1113 (2013) (order to get out of car constituted a seizure, given the officer's expressed disbelief in the veracity of the identific......
-
State v. Newton
...transformed the encounter into a seizure," even if the circumstances, individually would not create a seizure. State v. Anderson , 354 Or. 440, 453, 313 P.3d 1113 (2013) ; see also State v. Charles , 263 Or.App. 578, 585, 331 P.3d 1012 (2014) (The "question is whether all of the officer's a......
-
State v. Acuna
...called upon to articulate a certain level of suspicion in justification if a particular encounter proves fruitful.” State v. Anderson, 354 Or. 440, 450, 313 P.3d 1113 (2013) (citing State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 410, 813 P.2d 28 (1991)). In contrast, a “stop” is a type of seizure “that invo......
-
State v. Charles
...actions. The Supreme Court emphasized that point in other cases that it decided on the same day as Backstrand. In State v. Anderson, 354 Or. 440, 313 P.3d 1113 (2013), the court addressed the constitutionality of an interaction between police officers and two individuals who arrived at an a......