State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 16 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 9088,9088
• Citation: 589 A.2d 372,24 Conn.App. 438
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Phillip ANDERSON.

Page 372

589 A.2d 372

24 Conn.App. 438

STATE of Connecticut v. Phillip ANDERSON.

No. 9088.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 7, 1990.

Decided April 16, 1991.

Brian M. O'Connell, for appellant (defendant).

Judith Rossi, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were John Bailey, State's Atty., and Edward Wilson, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and SPALLONE and LAVERY, JJ.

LAVERY, Judge.

The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction on a charge of driving while his license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215. ¹ The conviction was based on a conditional plea of nolo contendere in accordance with General Statutes § 54-94a. ² The sole issue on appeal is whether an anonymous telephone tip corroborated by independent police work, under all the circumstances of this case, had sufficient indicia of reliability to provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion to warrant an investigatory stop of the defendant. ³ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are pertinent to the resolution of this appeal. On September 27, 1989, at 3 p.m., Commander David C. Foran, Jr., of the Glastonbury police department received an anonymous telephone call. The caller indicated that a brown Mack garbage truck, occupied by a driver and a passenger and owned by the C & R Sanitation Company, was being operated in the Wells Village area of Glastonbury. The caller informed Foran that the truck was being driven by an individual whose operator's license was under suspension. Foran dispatched Officer Keith O'Brien to the area and relayed the specific information contained in the anonymous tip to the officer.

O'Brien drove to the area indicated by the tipster and observed a brown Mack garbage truck with C & R Sanitation markings proceeding along Harris Street in the Wells Village area. The truck was occupied by a driver and one passenger. Using the strobe lights on his cruiser, O'Brien signaled the driver to pull over. As O'Brien exited his cruiser, the defendant exited his vehicle on his own initiative, meeting O'Brien at the rear of the truck. O'Brien requested the defendant's driver's license and vehicle registration. The defendant produced the vehicle registration but indicated that he was unable to produce his driver's license.

O'Brien asked the defendant if his driver's license was suspended, and the defendant admitted that it was. O'Brien then confirmed with the motor vehicle department that the defendant's driving privileges were suspended. O'Brien issued a motor vehicle summons to the defendant, charging him with operating a motor vehicle while his right to drive was suspended, and released him. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the allegedly unconstitutional stop of the vehicle he was driving. After a hearing, the motion to suppress was denied and the defendant entered a subsequent plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.

The defendant claims that the trial court was incorrect in its denial of his motion to suppress because the stop of the garbage truck was not based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion. The defendant asserts that the anonymous telephone tip, which triggered the stop, did not have the constitutionally required indicia of reliability and was not corroborated by independent police work prior to the stop.

The stop of a motor vehicle and detention of its occupant constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. State v. Martin, 2 Conn.App. 605, 611, 482 A.2d 70 (1984), cert. denied, 195 Conn. 802, 488 A.2d 457, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 2706, 86 L.Ed.2d 721 (1985). This is true even if the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Such brief investigatory seizures and detentions are permitted under both the United States and the Connecticut constitutions, even in the absence of probable cause, provided the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle have engaged, are engaged, or are about to engage in criminal activity. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-52, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480-82, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); State v. Carter, 189 Conn. 611, 617, 458 A.2d 369 (1983). The purpose of such a detention is to maintain the status quo while investigating the circumstances that give rise to the suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); State v. Carter, supra, 189 Conn. at 618, 458 A.2d 369. The United States Supreme Court has held that in situations where police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, stopping a motor vehicle and detaining the operator in order to check his driver's license and registration is not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401.

What constitutes a reasonable and articulable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 690, 501 A.2d 370 (1985); State v. Aillon, 202 Conn. 385, 399, 521 A.2d 555 (1987). The determination of whether a specific set of circumstances provides a police officer with a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity is a question of fact for the trial court and is subject to limited appellate review. State v. Martin, supra, 2 Conn.App. at 612A, 482 A.2d 70. Thus, an appeal challenging the factual basis of the trial court's decision requires only that we determine, in light of the record taken as a whole, whether the court's decision is supported by the evidence, or is clearly erroneous. State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 238, 456 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 1014, 79 L.Ed.2d 244 (1984); Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980).

In reviewing the police officer's actions in this case, we must determine, first, whether the stop was justified at its inception and whether the ensuing police response was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This analysis requires our examination of the facts available to the police officer and any rational inferences derived therefrom. State v. Aillon, supra.

The trial court found that the stop was initiated by an anonymous tip. The facts contained in that tip were specific with regard to time, location of the truck, and the alleged offense. The tip also provided a detailed description of the truck, including its markings, make and number of occupants.

The trial court also found that, when the officer arrived in the area indicated by the tip, he made independent observations confirming that every detail of the tip was accurate and the information was current. The officer's ability to make an empirical confirmation that the details of the anonymous tip were accurate provided a reasonable basis for the suspicion that the truck was being driven by an operator without a license. This reasonable suspicion was sufficient to allow the officer to proceed with a minimally intrusive stop to determine if the operator's driving privileges had been suspended. The brief and limited stop provided the least intrusive means of determining whether the scope of the investigation should be expanded.

The investigative stop was based on information that provided a substantial basis for a suspicion and not an inarticulable hunch. The officer's actions pass constitutional muster because the stop does not represent the kind of spot check executed at the unbridled whim of law enforcement officials that violates fourth amendment protection. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400.

When law enforcement officials corroborate the details of an anonymous informant's tip, the tip can give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion. Alabama v. White, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 837 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Rodriguez, 835 F.2d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir.1988).

In United States v. McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500, 502 (D.C.Cir.1981), the D.C. Circuit Court held that an anonymous tip can provide sufficient reasonable suspicion when the tip was corroborated in every significant detail by prestop surveillance. The McClinnhan court noted that it is possible for anyone with a grudge to fabricate a tip, the neutral details of which lack the facial indicia of reliability. Nevertheless, when an officer's suspicions are corroborated by prestop surveillance confirming those details, an investigative detention of the suspect is justified. Id., 502-503.

In Alvarez, an anonymous tip provided police officers with a description of a man in a motor vehicle parked behind a bank. The anonymous informant told police that the man intended to rob the bank. After several minutes of police surveillance the vehicle departed the bank when one of the police cruisers passed within the line of sight of the driver. The police pulled the vehicle over and conducted a frisk of the defendant which yielded a handgun. United States...