State v. Anderson

Decision Date30 June 2015
Docket NumberNo. 35432.,35432.
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Jason ANDERSON.

Daniel P. Scholfield, with whom was Hugh F. Keefe, New Haven, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Kevin D. Lawlor, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

KELLER, PRESCOTT and SCHALLER, Js.

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

This criminal prosecution arises out of a fatal motor vehicle accident. The defendant, Jason Anderson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of two counts of misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 53a–571 and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14–222. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) declined to direct a judgment of acquittal on certain counts of the information in light of the jury's answer to an interrogatory, which answer was inconsistent with the jury's verdicts of guilty with respect to those counts; (2) vacated the jury's verdicts and ordered the jury to resume deliberations; and (3) coerced or misled the jury into returning guilty verdicts after it had resumed its deliberations.2 Because we agree in part with the defendant's second and third claims, we reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 2 a.m. on June 12, 2009, the defendant, an on-duty Milford police officer, was returning from West Haven, where he and other officers had earlier been dispatched to provide assistance to the West Haven Police Department in dealing with a public disturbance. On his return to Milford, the defendant drove his cruiser westbound on the Boston Post Road in Orange at an extremely high rate of speed, despite the fact that he was not responding to any calls for assistance, and neither his emergency lights nor siren was activated. Although the posted speed limit was forty miles per hour, the defendant's speed on the Boston Post Road at times exceeded ninety miles per hour.

As the defendant approached the intersection of Boston Post Road and Dogwood Road in Orange, a Mazda driven by David Servin and also occupied by Ashlie Krakowski approached the same intersection from the opposite direction. Both Servin and Krakowski were nineteen years of age. Servin was intoxicated, and his blood alcohol level was 0.14 percent. Without coming to a complete stop at the flashing red traffic signal at the intersection or yielding to oncoming traffic, Servin then attempted to turn left onto Dogwood Road in front of the defendant's cruiser. Although the defendant applied his brakes approximately one second before the vehicles collided, the defendant's cruiser struck the Mazda at a high rate of speed in the right front passenger door. The impact caused the Mazda to roll over, and Krakowski was ejected from the vehicle. The defendant's cruiser also sustained extensive damage.

Both Servin and Krakowski died as a result of their injuries sustained in the collision. The defendant was injured, taken by ambulance to a hospital, and released later that morning.

The defendant subsequently was charged in an information with two counts of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–56(a)(1)3 in connection with the deaths of Servin and Krakowski, and one count of reckless driving in violation of § 14–222. Counts one and two pertained to the deaths of Servin and Krakowski, respectively. Following a jury trial, the jury unanimously found the defendant not guilty of both counts of manslaughter in the second degree, guilty of two counts of the lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle, and guilty of reckless driving.

The issues raised by the defendant in this appeal arise from a series of events that occurred primarily after the jury began deliberations. We, therefore, set forth the procedural history related to the jury deliberations in detail.

Prior to the commencement of jury deliberations, the court asked both parties whether they intended to request any interrogatories and gave them until the next day to submit any proposals. The following day, the defendant submitted a proposed interrogatory. The proposed interrogatory asked: “Did the conduct of [Servin] constitute an intervening cause of the automobile collision?” The interrogatory included an option for the jury to check either “yes” or “no.” After accepting the interrogatory without objection, the court instructed the jury.

As to counts one and two, the court instructed the jury on the elements of manslaughter in the second degree and the lesser included offenses of misconduct with a motor vehicle and negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. The court stated: “As to the first lesser included offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle; again, I emphasize, if you unanimously find the defendant not guilty of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree in both count one and count two, you shall then go to consider the lesser offense of misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of § 53a–57.... If ... you have unanimously found the defendant not guilty of the crime of misconduct with a motor vehicle, then you should go on to the next step and consider the lesser offense of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle, in violation of General Statutes § 14–222a. Do not consider this offense unless and until you have unanimously found the defendant not guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle.”

The court then instructed the jury on the elements of each offense. Additionally, the court discussed the doctrine of intervening cause and instructed the jury to apply it to counts one and two, including each lesser included charge it was to consider. Specifically, the court charged the jury as follows: “The defendant, Jason Anderson, claims that his conduct was not the proximate cause of [Servin's] or [Krakowski's] deaths because his acts did not set in operation the factors which caused the deaths. The defendant claims that the acts of [Servin], by his operating the motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.14 [percent] and by failing to stop at the blinking red light and by failing to yield the right-of-way to oncoming vehicles, constitutes an intervening cause which caused the death of both [Servin] and [Krakowski]. Now, this is a question of fact for you, as jurors, to determine. If you find that the state has not proven that it was the defendant's acts which set in operation the factors that caused the death, then you cannot find the defendant guilty. If you find that it was the acts of others which have actually set in operation the factors which caused the death in this case, you must find these acts to be an intervening cause. If you determine that an intervening cause exists and caused the death in the case, then the defendant's conduct, reckless or not, cannot legally be the proximate cause of [Servin's] or [Krakowski's] death.”

At the conclusion of the jury instructions, the court stated: [T]here is one other matter I almost forgot,” referring to the interrogatory submitted by the defendant. The court failed to explain the content or purpose of the interrogatory, or how it related to the court's instructions regarding the substantive offenses. The court simply instructed the jury as follows: “It's going to be marked as a court exhibit, and it's labeled as an interrogatory. The foreperson, on behalf of the jurors, will answer this one question before coming out and returning the verdict. You'll fold that interrogatory in half, hand it to the marshal and the marshal will hand it to the clerk, all right. So, there will be one question which calls for a yes or no answer, all right.” Jury deliberations began shortly thereafter. The court did not instruct the jury that its answer to the interrogatory must be unanimous. It also did not explain, with respect to the interrogatory, that the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Servin's conduct was not an intervening cause.

A short time after commencing deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking whether the issue of intervening cause was applicable only to the charge of manslaughter in the second degree in counts one and two, or if it also was to be considered in conjunction with the lesser included charges of misconduct with a motor vehicle and negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. The court referred the jury to two pages of its instructions. That portion of the instructions stated that intervening cause was to be applied to counts one and two, including each lesser included offense. The jury then returned to its deliberations.

Sometime thereafter, the jury sent a second note to the court stating that it had reached a verdict. The jury returned to the courtroom and the verdicts were announced by the foreperson. As to counts one and two, pertaining to the respective deaths of Servin and Krakowski, the jury found the defendant not guilty of both counts of manslaughter in the second degree. As to the death of Servin (count one), the jury found the defendant not guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle, but guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent homicide. As to the death of Krakowski (count two), the jury found the defendant guilty of misconduct with a motor vehicle. With respect to count three, the jury found the defendant guilty of reckless driving. The court then accepted and recorded the verdicts. The court did not, at this time, review the jury's answer to the interrogatory or make any inquiries of the jury with respect to it.

The court asked the jury to return to the deliberation room. After the jury left the courtroom, the court then reviewed the answer to the interrogatory and stated: Counsel, the interrogatory came back and the question was, did the conduct of [Servin] constitute an intervening cause of the automobile collision, and the answer was yes.”...

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