State v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 24 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-3362-CR,96-3362-CR |
| Citation | 217 Wis.2d 289,577 N.W.2d 386 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Oscar ANDERSON, Jr. Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: John A. Franke, Judge.
Before WEDEMEYER, P.J., SCHUDSON and CURLEY, JJ.
Oscar R. Anderson, Jr., appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, for first-degree intentional homicide. He argues that the trial court erred by not enforcing an alleged agreement he had with a detective who, Anderson claims, promised him that if he confessed he would be charged with second-degree intentional homicide. Alternatively, Anderson argues that the trial court should have suppressed his statement because it was coerced by the detective's alleged promise of a lesser charge. Anderson also contends that the trial court erred in: (1) admitting other-acts evidence; (2) refusing to submit the lesser-included instruction on second-degree intentional homicide; (3) refusing to submit the lesser-included instruction on second-degree reckless homicide; and (4) declining to instruct the jury on self-defense. We affirm.
On the evening of November 30, 1995, Anderson and his live-in girlfriend, Mica Beckom, quarreled over their relationship. According to Anderson, at some point during their argument, Beckom threatened him with a butcher knife. Anderson claimed that in response to her threat, he tried to seize the knife. In the struggle that followed, Anderson gained control of the knife and stabbed Beckom more than twenty-five times.
Trial evidence established that before he fled the scene, Anderson bathed, dressed, and telephoned Beckom's employer to inform her that she (Beckom) would not report to work that morning because she had to go to the hospital. On December 4, 1995, Beckom's body was discovered on the bedroom floor of her apartment.
Anderson was arrested on December 20, 1995, and was charged with first-degree intentional homicide. Following a four-day trial, the jury convicted Anderson. On May 21, 1996, Anderson was sentenced to life imprisonment with a parole eligibility date of September 5, 2036.
Anderson first argues that the trial court erred by not enforcing his alleged agreement with the detective who interrogated him following his arrest. Anderson claims that City of Milwaukee Police Detective Ricky Burems told him that if he gave a statement he would be charged with second-degree intentional homicide, not first-degree intentional homicide. In the alternative, he argues that the trial court should have suppressed his statement because it was given under the mistaken impression that a plea agreement had been made and, therefore, the statement was involuntary. Neither argument has any merit.
At the motion to suppress, Detective Burems testified that after he read Anderson his rights and informed him of the charges, he told him that he did not need to make a statement because there was already sufficient evidence against him. Detective Burems denied ever having told Anderson that if he were to make a statement, he (Burems) would or could reduce the charges. Detective Burems testified that he merely encouraged Anderson to tell his version of the events that preceded the stabbing.
By contrast, Anderson testified that Detective Burems never read him his Miranda 1 rights. He also testified that Detective Burems told him that if he gave a statement, the charges would be reduced and the friends with whom he had been arrested would be released.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
I find that the detective did use certain fairly standard techniques for encouraging the defendant to make a statement. These included attempting to build a rapport with the defendant....
At some point the detective encouraged the defendant to take responsibility for what he [had] done. At some point he indicated to him he didn't need to make a statement. I believe that this was done in the context of conveying to the defendant that they had a strong case against him and didn't really need more evidence against him, and primarily included indicating that the defendant--that he was charged with first degree intentional homicide. And that if he were to make a statement, it might result in the case being resolved on some lesser charge....
I find that no specific promises were made. I'm finding that the defendant was not given any specific promise to the effect that some particular charge would result if he cooperated.... And to the extent that there may have been evidence of some other particular promises, I'm finding that no specific promises were made.
On appeal, Anderson has not challenged these findings. Consequently, we are bound by them. See State v. Friday, 147 Wis.2d 359, 370-71, 434 N.W.2d 85, 89 (1989) (); see also § 805.17(2), STATS. Therefore, even if specific performance were an appropriate remedy to enforce any promise made by a police detective to obtain a statement, Anderson would not be entitled to the remedy because the trial court explicitly found that no promises were made to him and because Anderson has failed to show that these findings were clearly erroneous.
In the alternative, Anderson argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement on the ground that it was involuntary. Anderson claims his statement was involuntary because he mistakenly believed that, in exchange for his statement, he would be charged with a lesser-degree of homicide. We disagree.
"In determining whether a confession was voluntarily made, the essential inquiry is whether the confession was procured via coercive means or whether it was the product of improper pressures exercised by the police." State v. Clappes, 136 Wis.2d 222, 235-36, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987). While evidence that police are taking subtle advantage of a person's personal characteristics may be a form of coercion, see State v. Xiong, 178 Wis.2d 525, 534, 504 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Ct.App.1993), "there must be some affirmative evidence of improper police practices deliberately used to procure a confession." Clappes, 136 Wis.2d at 239, 401 N.W.2d at 767. On review, a trial court's findings of evidentiary or historical fact will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Owens, 148 Wis.2d 922, 927, 436 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1989). We independently review the facts as found to determine whether any constitutional principles have been offended. See Clappes, 136 Wis.2d at 235, 401 N.W.2d at 765.
Here, the trial court found Detective Burem's testimony more credible than Anderson's and determined that no promises were made by the detective. The court also found that Detective Burem's tactics did not consititute impermissible police conduct, but rather, were merely techniques to encourage Anderson to make a statement. The trial court noted:
There's some point in which deception or trickery or other police pressure rises to the level which renders a confession involuntary.
I'm satisfied that this interview, while it involved a certain amount of use of techniques here, does not come close to anything that constitutes improper police conduct or pressure that shocks the public consc[ience] about what's appropriate or not appropriate.
We agree. Detective Burem's techniques were well within the ambit of acceptable police conduct. See United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1130-31 (7th Cir.1990) (); see also State v. Deets, 187 Wis.2d 630, 636-37, 523 N.W.2d 180, 182-83 (Ct.App.1994) (). Accordingly, we conclude that Anderson's statement was voluntary.
Anderson next claims that the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning other-acts evidence regarding an incident in which Beckom's cousin witnessed him fighting with her (Beckom). We disagree.
Questions regarding the admissibility of evidence are addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will be sustained on appeal if it has "a reasonable basis" in the record. See State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis.2d 722, 745-746, 467 N.W.2d 531, 540 (1991). Other-acts evidence is admissible under RULE 904.04(2), STATS., if used for a purpose other than to show propensity. See id.; see also State v. Bedker, 149 Wis.2d 257, 264-265, 440 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Ct.App.1989) (). Application of RULE 904.04(2) requires a two-step test: (1) whether the evidence is admissible under RULE 904.04(2); and, if so, (2) whether the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See RULE 904.03, STATS.; see also State v. Johnson, 121 Wis.2d 237, 252-254, 358 N.W.2d 824, 831-832 (Ct.App.1984). Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case. See State v. C.V.C., 153 Wis.2d 145, 162, 450 N.W.2d 463, 469 (Ct.App.1989). Our review of this issue is governed by the erroneous-exercise-of-discretion standard. See State v. Jones, 151 Wis.2d 488, 492-493, 444 N.W.2d 760, 792 (Ct.App.1989).
At trial, Wanda Nichols testified that approximately two months before the murder, she witnessed Beckon running from her apartment, exclaiming that Anderson had kicked her and hit her in the face. According to Nichols, she and Beckom then fled the building, with Anderson pursuing them. She and Beckom then got into Beckom's van, and as they were...
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