State v. Anderson, No. 23225.

CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota
Writing for the CourtGILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
Citation693 N.W.2d 675,2005 SD 22
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. David Lynn ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Docket NumberNo. 23225.
Decision Date16 February 2005

693 N.W.2d 675
2005 SD 22

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
David Lynn ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant

No. 23225.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs January 10, 2005.

Decided February 16, 2005.


693 N.W.2d 677
Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Gary Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee

Rick L. Ramstad of Wilka & Ramstad, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] David Lynn Anderson appealed the denial of a second motion to correct his 125-year sentence on a 1995 conviction for vehicular homicide. Defendant's sentence was enhanced under the habitual offender provision after he pled guilty to a Part II Information that included a 1988 felony conviction for grand theft, and two 1990 felony drug convictions. Defendant contended his sentence was illegally enhanced using three prior felony convictions under SDCL 22-7-8.1, rather than two prior felony convictions under SDCL 22-7-7. Defendant argued his two 1990 felony drug convictions stemmed from one transaction, and therefore could not be counted as two separate convictions for purposes of enhancing his sentence under SDCL 22-7-8. 1. Defendant requested his illegal sentence be corrected using two felony convictions. In the alternative, Defendant argued his guilty plea to the Part II habitual offender information must be set aside due to a manifest injustice, and that he be permitted to plead anew. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] On September 22, 1989, David Lynn Anderson sold a quantity of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer at the Alpine Inn in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The agreed upon price was $275 for one-eighth of an ounce. After the sale was concluded and the money and methamphetamine had been exchanged, Defendant contacted the undercover officer and explained that he had inadvertently given the undercover officer one-fourth of an ounce for $275 instead of the one-eight of an ounce as negotiated. The undercover officer agreed to meet with Defendant and provide an additional $250. Defendant also informed the undercover officer that he had additional methamphetamine for sale and would be able to provide it at their meeting set for the next day at the Holiday Inn.

[¶ 3.] On September 23, after the undercover officer arrived at Defendant's hotel room at the Holiday Inn, the undercover officer gave Defendant the additional $250 in cash as final payment for the one-quarter ounce of methamphetamine purchased on September 22. Defendant then showed the undercover officer four plastic bindles each purportedly containing one-eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine and offered the drugs for $250 per one-eighth ounce. The undercover officer told Defendant he would have to retrieve his money from his car, and left the hotel room telling Defendant he would return with the money. After the undercover officer left the room, Defendant was arrested.

[¶ 4.] Defendant was charged with 1) distribution of a controlled substance on September 22, 1989; 2) possession of a controlled substance on September 22, 1989; and, 3) possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute on September 23, 1989. Defendant was represented by Patrick Schroeder, of the Minnehaha County Public Defender's Office. Defendant pleaded guilty to Count 1, distribution of a controlled substance on September 22, 1989, and Count 3, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute

693 N.W.2d 678
on September 23, 1989.1 Defendant was sentenced to seven years for the distribution charge, and five years for the possession with intent to distribute charge. The two sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, with the seven year sentence to be served first. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Gene Paul Kean, Second Judicial Circuit, specifically noted that he was imposing the two sentences consecutively as this was a case of two different crimes occurring on two different occasions

[¶ 5.] In 1995, Defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide and vehicular battery for the death of Galen Barta and injury to one of his sons in an automobile accident. State v. Anderson, 1996 SD 46, ¶ 6, 546 N.W.2d 395, 397 (hereinafter Anderson II). On Sunday, October 2, 1994, Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at speeds of 86 to 100 miles per hour in a 30-mile per hour zone on 10th Street in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.2 Id. ¶ 2. After hydroplaning on the wet pavement, crossing the centerline and colliding with the Barta car, Defendant fled the scene of the accident, leaving his passenger, his girlfriend Terese Paxton, and the occupants of the Barta car at the scene. Id.

[¶ 6.] Defendant was again represented by Patrick Schroeder of the Minnehaha County Public Defender's Office. After his conviction before a jury on the vehicular homicide and vehicular battery charges, Defendant pleaded guilty to the Part II habitual offender information that indicated Defendant had three prior felony convictions, two based on the convictions in Anderson I, and one from an unrelated 1988 felony conviction for grand theft in Yankton County. In the findings of fact on the Part II habitual offender information, Judge Judith Meierhenry, Second Judicial Circuit, held that the two 1990 drug convictions in Anderson I were for separate offenses committed on separate dates, and therefore the convictions arose from separate transactions. Judge Meierhenry concluded the sentences and sentence enhancement in Anderson II were legal. Finally, the trial court imposed a 125-year sentence for the vehicular homicide conviction and a 15-year sentence for the vehicular battery conviction to run concurrently, but consecutively to Defendant's remaining sentence for the parole violation on the two 1990 Anderson I drug convictions used to enhance the conviction in Anderson II. Id. ¶ 6, 546 N.W.2d at 397.

[¶ 7.] In 1996, Defendant first challenged his sentence in Anderson II on direct appeal. Anderson II, 1996 SD 46, ¶ 7, 546 N.W.2d at 397. Defendant contended the sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment and were prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 Id. We affirmed Defendant's convictions and affirmed the sentences. Id. ¶ 35, 546 N.W.2d at 403. We held the 125-year sentence for vehicular homicide, enhanced by three prior felony convictions, was not so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id.

693 N.W.2d 679
[¶ 8.] On July 26, 1996, Defendant filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his 1995 conviction, and counsel was appointed to assist him. (Anderson III). In his petition, Anderson alleged Patrick Schroeder, his trial counsel in Anderson II, was ineffective when he failed to argue that the two drug convictions in Anderson I used to enhance the 1995 sentence in Anderson II were actually a single transaction, and therefore should have been counted as just one felony for enhancement purposes.4

[¶ 9.] On, January 13, 1997 while his first habeas petition was working its way through the court system, Defendant challenged the enhancement of his sentence in circuit court by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence. For purposes of the motion to correct illegal sentence, Defendant was represented by attorney Nichole Carper. Defendant contended the two drug convictions in Anderson I stemmed from a single transaction, and therefore could only be counted as one felony conviction for sentence enhancement purposes in Anderson II.

[¶ 10.] The original trial judge in Anderson II, Judge Judith Meierhenry, reviewed the motion and orally ruled that the trial judge in Anderson I had correctly sentenced Defendant for two separate offenses that constituted two separate transactions. In her written conclusions of law entered on March 21, 1997, Judge Meierhenry noted it was clear from the Anderson I transcripts that Defendant was apprised of three separate drug charges against him, and that he was sentenced for two separate charges stemming from two separate transactions which occurred on September 22, 1989 at the Alpine Inn and on September 23, 1989 at the Holiday Inn. With regard to the Part II Information, Judge Meierhenry noted that Defendant had been similarly apprised that two separate felony convictions stemming from two separate transactions, along with the 1988 grand theft felony conviction, were used to enhance his sentence in Anderson II under SDCL 22-7-8.1.

[¶ 11.] Defendant's 1996 habeas petition, Anderson III, was considered on its merits after the circuit court's ruling on the motion to correct an illegal sentence was denied on March 21, 1997. On May 28, 1998 in a letter opinion, Judge William J. Srstka rejected the single transaction argument and issued a judgment and order quashing the writ of habeas corpus. In his letter opinion, Judge Srstka noted that the trial judge in Anderson II had held the two drug convictions in Anderson I were separate transactions. Judge Srstka deemed that the res judicata effect of the March 21, 1997 ruling on Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was sufficient to preclude habeas relief. Judge Srstka also noted that no prejudice resulted to Defendant in Anderson II when his trial counsel failed to advance the Anderson I single transaction argument, as the argument had no merit and was unlikely to succeed.

[¶ 12.] Defendant then appealed Judge Srstka's order quashing the writ of habeas corpus to this Court. The second issue in Defendant's brief to this Court was "the failure of Defendant's [Anderson II trial] attorney to challenge the double enhancement of his sentence by two prior convictions arising from the same transaction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel."

693 N.W.2d 680
In fourteen pages of his brief, Defendant argued at length that attorney Schroeder was ineffective for failing to argue...

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11 practice notes
  • State v. Med. Eagle, No. 26346.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 7, 2013
    ...on the issue, and left only habeas corpus” and other post-conviction remedies as “possible avenues for ... relief.” 2005 S.D. 22, ¶ 24, 693 N.W.2d 675, 682. This Court has also affirmed a trial court's decision to sentence a defendant as a habitual criminal despite the State's failure to re......
  • State v. $1,010.00 in American Currency, No. 23878.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • September 6, 2006
    ...by this Court under the de novo standard of review." Chapman v. Chapman, 2006 SD 36, ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 572, 576 (citing State v. Anderson, 2005 SD 22, ¶ 19, 693 N.W.2d 675, 681 (quoting Block v. Drake, 2004 SD 72, ¶ 8, 681 N.W.2d 460, 463) (internal quotations omitted)). Statutes are to be c......
  • In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • March 20, 2012
    ...meaning and effect, and read statutes as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.’ ”) (quoting State v. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d 675, 681 (S.D.2005)). 19. As to the South Dakota antitrust law, some federal courts have determined that in order to allege that a plaintiff is en......
  • In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • March 19, 2012
    ...plain meaning and effect, and read statutes as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.'" (quoting State v. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d 675, 681 (S.D. 2005)). 19. As to the South Dakota antitrust law, some federal courts have determined that in order to allege that a plaintiff ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
11 cases
  • State v. Med. Eagle, No. 26346.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 7, 2013
    ...on the issue, and left only habeas corpus” and other post-conviction remedies as “possible avenues for ... relief.” 2005 S.D. 22, ¶ 24, 693 N.W.2d 675, 682. This Court has also affirmed a trial court's decision to sentence a defendant as a habitual criminal despite the State's failure to re......
  • State v. $1,010.00 in American Currency, No. 23878.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • September 6, 2006
    ...by this Court under the de novo standard of review." Chapman v. Chapman, 2006 SD 36, ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 572, 576 (citing State v. Anderson, 2005 SD 22, ¶ 19, 693 N.W.2d 675, 681 (quoting Block v. Drake, 2004 SD 72, ¶ 8, 681 N.W.2d 460, 463) (internal quotations omitted)). Statutes are to be c......
  • In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • March 20, 2012
    ...meaning and effect, and read statutes as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.’ ”) (quoting State v. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d 675, 681 (S.D.2005)). 19. As to the South Dakota antitrust law, some federal courts have determined that in order to allege that a plaintiff is en......
  • In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2002
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • March 19, 2012
    ...plain meaning and effect, and read statutes as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.'" (quoting State v. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d 675, 681 (S.D. 2005)). 19. As to the South Dakota antitrust law, some federal courts have determined that in order to allege that a plaintiff ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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