State v. Anderson

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: ROBERT M. MURPHY
• Citation: State v. Anderson, 121 So.3d 119 (La. App. 2013)
• Decision Date: 27 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–KA–869.,12–KA–869.
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. William ANDERSON.

121 So.3d 119

STATE of Louisiana

v.William ANDERSON.

No. 12–KA–869.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

June 27, 2013.

Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Terry M. Boudreaux, Gail D. Schlosser, Douglas W. Freese, Assistant District Attorneys, Gretna, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

Bruce G. Whittaker, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.

William Anderson, Cottonport, LA, Defendant/Appellant, In Proper Person.

Panel composed of Judges JUDE G. GRAVOIS, ROBERT M. MURPHY, and JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

ROBERT M. MURPHY, Judge.

[5 Cir. 2]Defendant, William Anderson, appeals his May 25, 2012 sentences for two counts of sexual battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1, one count of oral sexual battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.3, and one count of molestation of a juvenile in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2, as excessive. For the reasons that follow, we find defendant's assignments of error to be without merit and affirm his sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is defendant's second appeal. On original appeal, we affirmed defendant's convictions, but vacated his sentences and remanded for re-sentencing after finding that the trial court failed to observe the 24–hour delay mandated by La.C.Cr.P. art. 873. State v. Anderson, 10–779 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 1080. Defendant filed the instant appeal after his re-sentencing. The pertinent facts as to defendant's convictions are as follows.

[5 Cir. 3]On May 1, 2009, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with two counts of sexual battery (counts one and two) in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1; one count of oral sexual battery (count three) in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.3; and one count of molestation of a juvenile (count four) in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2 against the victim, L.L.P. Defendant pled not guilty at arraignment. On October 30, 2009, the State filed a “Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sex Offense Cases Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2.” On January 25, 2010, the trial court granted the State's motion, finding that the evidence introduced was indicative of defendant's lustful disposition toward children pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2.

The case proceeded to trial before a six-person jury on March 2, 2010. At the time of trial, L.L.P. was 29 years old. She testified that she knew defendant because he was her grammar school bus driver until she graduated in the eighth grade. In the spring of 1995, when L.L.P. was 14 years old and defendant was in his thirties, she began to have more regular interaction with defendant because he provided music for West Bank Mardi Gras parades, in which L.L.P. participated as a cheerleader. During this time, defendant and L.L.P. began talking over the telephone regularly about music.

After Mardi Gras ended, their phone conversations became more personal; the defendant began to ask about L.L.P.'s family. Eventually, the relationship progressed to defendant jiggling his keys as he walked by L.L.P.'s classroom; finding excuses to enter her classrooms to look at the A/C vents; and leaving notes in her locker. One day, defendant “got real close” to L.L.P. and told her that he wanted to give her a kiss, paused, and then handed her a Hershey's Kiss. At that point, L.L.P. “realized that I was special and that something was going on.”

[5 Cir. 4]In May of 1995, L.L.P.'s parents allowed her to accompany defendant to a recording studio so she could play piano on a song defendant wrote. At the studio, defendant became emotional about the fact that L.L.P. would be graduating from grammar school shortly. Defendant did not bring L.L.P. directly home; rather he took her to his home to show L.L.P. his “band room” and his waterbed. While at his home, defendant told L.L.P. that he had fallen in love with her, and kissed her. L.L.P. described the kiss as a “kiss like in the movies” and “an adult kiss.”

During the drive home defendant told L.L.P. that they were going to be in “an adult relationship” that, if exposed, would result in his six-year-old daughter becoming homeless. L.L.P. thereafter began sneaking out of her house at night to spend time with defendant after her parents had fallen asleep. L.L.P. and defendant began watching R-rated movies together and fondling each other through clothing. L.L.P. testified that the movies gradually became more “X-rated” and the “make-out sessions would increase little bit by little bit.” L.L.P. further explained that the kissing and fondling progressed from “rubbing me with my clothes on” to “shirt off” to “no bra” to “just panties.”

L.L.P. testified that she began having sex with defendant in the summer of 1995, when she was 14 years old and defendant was in his thirties. L.L.P. testified that she and defendant also engaged in oral sex on each other and that defendant penetrated her digitally. L.L.P. indicated that her relationship with defendant continued until just after she turned 16 years old.

L.L.P. admitted that she did not make a complaint to police about defendant until years later when she learned about defendant's relationship with another 15–year old girl, S.A., during the year of 2007. L.L.P. testified the she “felt responsible for her.” Evidence of defendant's relationship with S.A., which resulted in a conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile in case number 08–1207,[5 Cir. 5]was also admitted at the trial involving L.L.P. This evidence was admitted pursuant to the trial court's order granting the State's notice of intent to introduce evidence of similar crimes indicating a lustful disposition towards children under La. C.E. art. 412.2.

D.A., S.A.'s mother, testified at the trial involving L.L.P. D.A. testified that she had previously lived next door to defendant and his family and that defendant had been very close friends with S.A.'s father, who passed away on March 24, 2007. After her husband passed away, D.A. testified that she became concerned at the nature of the relationship defendant had with S.A. D.A. testified that “events evolved to the point where [she] believed that it was appropriate to seek a protective order” against defendant. On November 3, 2007, when S.A. was 16 years old, D.A. found defendant hiding in S.A.'s closet with a bag over his head. D.A. called the police and defendant was apprehended shortly thereafter.

S.A. also testified at defendant's trial. She first met defendant when she was 15 years old. In the months before her father died, S.A. and defendant began talking frequently on the telephone. S.A. testified that on New Year's Eve 2006, defendant kissed her on the lips, which she described as “more than a friendly kiss.” After her father passed away, the relationship between S.A. and defendant progressed to a point where they began talking more and started meeting at a Belle Chasse Panda King parking lot to kiss. S.A. described how she would enter defendant's car and engage in french kissing.

At the conclusion of trial, defendant was found guilty as charged on all counts. Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial and Alternatively to Arrest the Judgment on March 23, 2010. On the same date, prior to sentencing, the trial court denied defendant's post-verdict motions and ordered defendant to serve ten (10) years imprisonment at hard labor on count one, ten (10) years imprisonment at [5 Cir. 6]hard labor on count two, and fifteen (15) years at hard labor on counts three and four, with counts one, two, and three to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court further ordered that all sentences were to run consecutively to each other and consecutively with defendant's seven-year sentence imposed in case number 08–1207, division “M” of the 24th Judicial District Court. Immediately after sentencing, defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence and a Motion for Appeal. The trial court denied defendant's Motion to Reconsider Sentence, but granted his Motion for Appeal on the same day.

On his first appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences, arguing that his convictions violated the principles of double jeopardy, that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Quash, and that his sentences were illegal and excessive. On March 27, 2012, we affirmed defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences after finding that the trial court had failed to observe the 24–hour delay mandated by La.C.Cr.P. art. 873. State v. Anderson, 10–779 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 1080.

On remand, and prior to re-sentencing on May 25, 2012, defendant filed a pro se Motion for New Trial, Motion to Arrest Verdict Judgment, and a Motion for Post Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. With respect to the Motion for New Trial and Motion to Arrest Verdict Judgment, the trial court found that this Court previously upheld the denial of these motions, thus, rendering them “moot as duplicative.” The trial court then denied defendant's Motion for Post Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, finding that this Court previously reviewed defendant's case pursuant to the standard set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821 and determined that the evidence supported the verdicts rendered by the jury.

[5 Cir. 7]After disposing of defendant's pro se motions, the trial court re-sentenced defendant to ten (10) years in the Department of Corrections on counts one and two, and to fifteen (15) years at hard labor on counts three and four, to run consecutivelyto each other and consecutively with defendant's seven-year sentence imposed in the 24th Judicial District Court case number 08–1207, division “M.” The trial court also ordered counts one, two, and three to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court denied defendant's pro se Motion to Reconsider Sentence based on the excessiveness of the sentences imposed, and granted his Motion for Appeal. Defendant's second appeal now follows.

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