State v. Anderson, 42296
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Writing for the Court | UTTER; HAMILTON |
| Citation | 501 P.2d 184,81 Wn.2d 234 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Madeline Loomis ANDERSON, and Lionel Edwin Jones, and each of them, Respondents. |
| Docket Number | No. 42296,42296 |
| Decision Date | 21 September 1972 |
Page 234
v.
Madeline Loomis ANDERSON, and Lionel Edwin Jones, and each
of them, Respondents.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 24, 1972.
[501 P.2d 185] Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., James E. Warme, Seattle, for appellant.
Schweppe, Doolittle, Krug, Tausend, Beezer, & Beierle, Alfred J. Schweppe, Donald L. Logerwell, Seattle, for respondents.
UTTER, Associate Justice.
The state appeals a determination by the trial court that chapter 280 of the Laws of 1971 is unconstitutional and void in its entirety and the court's
Page 235
dismissal of the state's information based on a portion of that statute.It is the state's contention that although a portion of chapter 280 relating to bingo may be void, the portions relating to professional gambling are separable and the elimination of the invalid part of the act would not render the remainder of the act incapable of accomplishing the purposes of the legislature. We conclude the act is separable, and reverse the order of the trial court dismissing the information.
Respondents were arrested and charged with violating section 2(4)(a) of chapter 280 on charges of professional gambling. At the time of trial in superior court, the trial judge heard argument of counsel, considered memoranda of authorities and entered findings of fact. The first of these findings found that the law in question was 'adopted by the legislature for the sole purpose of legitimizing bingo and certain limited raffles when operated by charitable and other non-profit organizations.' The second finding was that sections of chapter 280 relating to the attempted legitimation of bingo and raffles are 'unconstitutional because they are directly contrary to the prohibition expressed in Article II, section 24, of the Washington constitution . . .' The last finding was that 'Since the sole purpose of Chapter 280 was to legitimize bingo and since the remaining provisions of Chapter 280 not related to bingo would not have been enacted but for the attempt to authorize bingo games operated by charitable organizations, Chapter 280 is unconstitutional and void in its entirety.'
It is important to note that in this appeal appellant does not assign error to the finding of the trial court that the attempted legitimation of bingo and raffles is unconstitutional and our action in this case does not disturb that finding of the trial court.
The sole issue before us is whether the superior court erred in finding those portions of the statute enacting new laws relating to gambling unseverable from what was conceded to be an unconstitutional attempt to legitimize bingo.
Page 236
An act of the legislature is not unconstitutional in its entirety because one or more of is provisions is unconstitutional [501 P.2d 186] unless the invalid provisions are unseverable and it cannot reasonably be believed that the legislature would have passed the one without the other, or unless the elimination of the invalid part would render the remainder of the act incapable of accomplishing the legislative purposes. Boeing Co. v. State, 74 Wash.2d 82, 442 P.2d 970 (1968). The constitutionality of the remaining portion of the statute is subject to alternative tests, the first dependent upon whether the legislature would have passed the remaining portion of the statute without the unconstitutional portion, or, alternatively, whether the elimination of the unconstitutional portion so destroys the act as to render it incapable of accomplishing the legislative purposes. We deal only with the first alternative.
The determination by this court of whether the legislature would have passed one portion of the act without the other is assisted by the absence or presence of language in the act indicating legislative intent. When a provision in an act states if any section or provision should be adjudged to be invalid or unconstitutional, such adjudication should not affect the validity of the act as a whole or any provision or part thereof not adjudged invalid...
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...there is reason to believe that the Legislature would not have passed one part without the other. State v. Anderson, 81 Wash.2d 234, 236, 501 P.2d 184 (1972); Seattle v. State, 103 Wash.2d 663, 677, 694 P.2d 641 (1985), see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 507, 105 S.Ct......
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Guimont v. Clarke, 57765-0
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Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc Eikenberry v. Distributors, Inc, J-R
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