State v. Andres C., AC 43081
Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
Writing for the Court | ALEXANDER, J. |
Citation | 208 Conn.App. 825,266 A.3d 888 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. ANDRES C. |
Docket Number | AC 43081 |
Decision Date | 30 November 2021 |
208 Conn.App. 825
266 A.3d 888
STATE of Connecticut
v.
ANDRES C.*
AC 43081
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued March 1, 2021
Officially released November 30, 2021
Richard Emanuel, New Haven, CT, for the appellant (defendant).
Matthew A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, Palos Hills, IL, and Mary A. SanAngelo and Brian K. Sibley, Sr., senior assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).
Moll, Alexander and DiPentima, Js.**
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J.
The defendant, Andres C., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a court trial, of sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) (1) and risk of injury to a child in violation of
General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly admitted uncharged misconduct evidence, (2) his right to a fair trial was violated by prosecutorial impropriety, (3) the court improperly denied him access to the victim's journals, and (4) his rights under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), were violated.1 We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as the court reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. When she was ten years old, the victim, along with her mother and siblings, moved into her grandmother's home. Shortly thereafter, the defendant, the victim's uncle, moved in. At some point, during the time that the victim and the defendant were living at the grandmother's house, the defendant came out of the shower dressed only in a towel and took the victim into his bedroom. The defendant removed his towel, lay upright on the bed, and had the victim apply lotion to his penis and masturbate him. After the defendant ejaculated, he directed the victim to wash her hands. This type of abuse occurred more than ten times over the next two years while the victim lived at her grandmother's house and continued after she had moved to another house.
The victim described other instances of inappropriate behavior by the defendant. On one occasion, the defendant, while dressed only in boxer shorts, went into the victim's bedroom, got under the covers with her, and rubbed the victim's stomach and legs under her shirt and pajama bottoms. After the victim had moved to another house, she would, on occasion, sleep over at her grandmother's home. During several of these occasions, the defendant got into bed with the victim and rubbed himself against her so that she felt his penis against her back.
A few years later, the then sixteen year old victim began speaking with a therapist, and she disclosed the sexual abuse during her first session. At a therapy session attended by her mother and brother, the victim disclosed the sexual abuse by the defendant. Thereafter, on October 28, 2015, the victim reported the defendant's conduct to the police. The defendant was arrested in March, 2016.
In an information filed on February 7, 2019, the state charged the defendant with sexual assault in the third degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and risk of injury to a child. After trial, the court, Alander , J. , found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the third degree and risk of injury to a child and not guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree. The court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after twelve years, and fifteen years of probation. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly admitted uncharged misconduct evidence that he also had sexually abused the victim's cousin, D. The defendant has presented two distinct arguments with respect to this claim. First, he argues that the court erred in its preliminary decision to permit the state to present
evidence regarding D to show the defendant's propensity for such acts. Second, he contends that the court improperly denied his motion to strike all of the testimony regarding this uncharged misconduct after the prosecutors did not call D as a witness. We are not persuaded.
The following additional facts are necessary for our discussion. Approximately one week before the trial was to begin, the
state filed a motion to allow the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to § 4-5 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.2 In this motion, the state indicated that this uncharged misconduct evidence consisted of the victim's testimony that, in 2009, she learned that the defendant had sexually abused D over a period of time. The state represented that the victim would testify as to the reactions of her family with respect to D's disclosure and how that impacted her decision to report her own abuse. The state also indicated that D would testify as to the details of the sexual abuse. According to the state's motion, "[s]aid evidence will be offered to prove intent, identity, absence of mistake or accident, a system of criminal activity or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony." On the first day of the trial, the defendant filed an objection to the state's motion to present uncharged misconduct evidence.
Prior to the start of evidence, the court heard argument regarding the uncharged misconduct evidence.
The prosecutor represented that the victim was between the ages of eleven and fourteen years old during the alleged sexual abuse, and that D had been between the ages of ten and thirteen years old when the defendant had sexually abused her. The prosecutor indicated that the victim and D are related to each other and to the defendant, and that the sexual abuse occurred in a similar time frame, and, in part, at the same residence. The prosecutor acknowledged that, contrary to the facts of the present case, the sexual abuse of D involved digital and penile penetration. After hearing from defense counsel, the court granted the state's motion to present the uncharged misconduct evidence regarding the defendant's sexual abuse of D.
The victim testified that, at some point, she had learned that the defendant had sexually abused D. The court indicated that, during a conversation in chambers, the prosecutor had indicated that this aspect of the victim's testimony was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that the defendant had sexually abused D, but, rather, "just to show the effect on [the victim] about her receiving information concerning those incidents to then show why she acted as she did." After hearing from defense counsel, the court stated: "So, I will allow [the victim] to discuss what she heard about those incidents and relate what effect it had on her. It is my understanding it is the state's position that that led to her reluctance to disclose and that is why it is relevant."
The victim testified that she learned that D had made an allegation of abuse against the defendant to the police. The victim's mother, the victim's grandmother, and the rest of the family "sided" with the defendant and ostracized D and her mother, N. When asked how the family's reaction made her feel while her own abuse by the defendant was ongoing, the victim responded: "It made me feel like I was surrounded by adults who
did not want to believe [D], who didn't believe a kid, who did not want—who would prefer to cover
up and side with [the defendant], and I saw them bash her and criticize, and it felt in that moment safer for me to stay quiet and it felt safer to be with everyone else on his side and pretend like nothing happened and cover up my abuse, cover up her abuse." The victim subsequently stated that she did not disclose her own sexual abuse because no one in her family believed her cousin.
The next day, the victim's mother testified. The prosecutor asked her if, in 2011, she had learned that the defendant had sexually abused D. After an objection based on hearsay, the prosecutor indicated that this evidence was not being offered for its truth. The court ruled that the evidence was admissible for its effect on the victim's mother and her subsequent reaction. The victim's mother stated that, following the allegations of sexual abuse made by D against the defendant, the rest of the family "shunned" D and N.
The state subsequently sought to have a certified copy of the defendant's conviction for sexually abusing D admitted into evidence. The state noted that this document was not offered to establish the facts regarding...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Andres C.
...A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, in opposition.The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 208 Conn. App. 825, 266 A.3d 888 (2021), is granted, limited to the following issues:"1. Did the Appellate Court incorrectly conclude that the defendant had wa......
-
Michael G. v. Comm'r of Corr., AC 43327
...habeas court, however, any argument that Judge Newson was actually biased against the petitioner is waived. See State v. Andres C. , 208 Conn. App. 825, 853–54, 266 A.3d 888 (2021) ("[W]aiver is [t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or notice. .........
-
State v. Andres C.
...A. Weiner, assistant state's attorney, in opposition.The defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, 208 Conn. App. 825, 266 A.3d 888 (2021), is granted, limited to the following issues:"1. Did the Appellate Court incorrectly conclude that the defendant had wa......