State v. Andrews

• Citation: 108 Conn. 209,142 A. 840
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 16 July 1928
• Parties: STATE v. ANDREWS.

142 A. 840

108 Conn. 209

STATE v. ANDREWS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 16, 1928

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Robert L Munger, Judge.

Stephan Andrews was convicted of violating the motor vehicle law and of a second offense, and he appeals. No error.

Franklin Coeller, of New Haven, for appellant.

Edwin S. Pickett, Pros. Atty., of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

HAINES, J.

The defendant was convicted on the first and third counts of an information for driving recklessly and driving under the influence of liquor, and he entered a plea of guilty to another information charging second offense. On another count for driving so as to endanger the life and property of others, he was acquitted. A motion to set aside the verdict and a motion in arrest of judgment were both denied.

The provisions of the statute are as follows:

" (a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway, the intersection of streets and the weather conditions, or so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person. (b) No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway, the intersection of streets and the weather conditions." Public Acts of 1925, c. 195, § 13 (a) and (b).

" The operation of a motor vehicle upon any public highway at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person other than an occupant of such motor vehicle shall constitute a violation of the provisions of * * * subsection (a) of section 13 of chapter 195 of the Public Acts of 1925. * * * The operation of a motor vehicle upon any public highway at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any occupant of such motor vehicle, but not the life of any other person than such an occupant, shall constitute a violation of the provisions of * * * subsection (b) of section 13 of chapter 195 of the Public Acts of 1925." Public Acts of 1927, c 75.

" No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of any drug." Public Acts of 1921, c. 400, § 30.

The various assignments of error may be stated generally as follows: (a) That the provisions as to driving recklessly and driving so as to endanger life, limb, or property, are a nullity, for the reason that they do not establish a standard of conduct sufficiently definite to inform a person of the nature and extent of his offense, and afford no ascertainable test of guilt; (b) that driving recklessly, driving so as to endanger life, limb, or property, and driving under the influence of liquor, are identical, and are one and the same operation, and cannot serve as the basis for three separate convictions, that the first two offenses are merged in that of operating under the influence of liquor, also that the acquittal on the charge of endangering life, limb, or property barred the charge of reckless driving, otherwise the defendant is subjected to two or more different and distinct penalties for the same offense in violation of his constitutional rights; (c) that the jury were not properly instructed upon the law of reasonable doubt.

As to the first proposition: The Act of 1921, c. 400, § 25, contains the same general provisions, though differently arranged, as the Act of 1925, c. 195, § 13 (a) and (b). We held that the statute of 1921 prohibited three acts of negligence (1) operating recklessly; (2) at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper; and (3) so as to endanger life, limb, or property. Pietrycka v. Simolan, 102 Conn. 42, 45, 127 A. 717. Under similar provisions of the statute, we recognized the soundness of the following charge:

" It requires that no person shall operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state recklessly, or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person. It therefore follows that if any person does operate an automobile upon the highways of this state contrary to the provisions of this statute, he is not doing so with reasonable care, and that it is negligence on his part to do so. * * *" Dunbar v. Jones, 87 Conn. 253, 259, 260, 87 A. 787, 789.

Again, with reference to these statutory provisions we have said:

" The Legislature, with unquestionable authority, has established an arbitrary standard for the test of conduct in operating motor vehicles in the highways of this state. It has prescribed that certain acts, plainly stated or specifically defined, shall not be done." Pietrycka v. Simolan, 98 Conn. 490, 495, 120 A. 310, 312.

These provisions of the statute relate to three acts, separate and distinct in character. It is clearly within the police power of the state to thus regulate the driving of automobiles on the public highways. Cotter v. Stoeckel, 97 Conn. 239, 245, 116 A. 248; Huddy on Automobiles, p. 48, § 53.

The validity of a statute prescribing a penalty for a given act of this character requires that the elements of the offense be stated with legal certainty. State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97, 22 A. 497; Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500, 143 N.E. 322; Huddy on Automobiles, p. 1051, § 892; Berry on Automobiles (5th Ed.) p. 1284, § 1796.

Various and conflicting decisions are found in different jurisdictions as to the validity of statutory provisions attacked for failure to meet this requirement. Thus in Texas a statute making it an offense to drive automobiles other than in a careful manner has been held void on this ground. Russell v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. App. 512, 228 S.W. 566. And in Georgia a statute has been held void which prohibited driving so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person. Howard v. State, 151 Ga. 845, 108 S.E. 513; Carter v. State, 12 Ga.App. 433, 78 S.E. 205. Both of these provisions would be held valid in this state.

In most jurisdictions statutes will not be held void for uncertainty, if any practicable or sensible effect may be given to them. Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law, vol. 3, p. 2045, § 3. So statutes prohibiting an unreasonable rate of speed are generally sustained. Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172; People v. Beak, 291 Ill. 449, 126 N.E. 201; Gallaher v. State, 193 Ind. 629, 141 N.E. 347, 29 A.L.R. 1059; State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio.St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, L.R.A. 1918B, 945, Ann.Cas. 1918E, 1137; Huddy on Automobiles, p. 57, § 63.

In Massachusetts, a statute has been sustained which makes it an offense to drive so as to endanger the lives or safety of the public. Commonwealth v. Pentz, 247 Mass. 500, 143 N.E. 322.

Statutes prohibiting reckless driving, or driving at a rate of speed which was unreasonable under all the conditions, are very generally, and by the great weight of authority, upheld. Huddy on Automobiles, p. 408, § 396, and page 1052, § 892.

The offense of driving " recklessly" in view of the conditions, as set forth in our own statute, sufficiently meets the requirements of definiteness and certainty. State v. Goetz, 83 Conn. 437, 76 A. 1000, 30 L.R.A. (N. S.) 458. The word has a clear and commonly understood meaning, so that one of ordinary intelligence is not left in doubt as to its purport. Though the speed limit formerly imposed in this state has been removed, the term " recklessly" still remains definite. Its test does not lie in speed alone, but in that and other circumstances which together show a reckless disregard of consequences. The claim seems to be that the statute fails to state with particularity the acts prohibited. Of such a claim we have said:

" It would seem to require that all general words used to indicate the offense * * * should be particularly defined. * * * The objection overlooks the fact that the prohibited acts may have a general name to characterize them, as well understood without as with a definition." State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97, 102, 22 A. 497, 498.

It will be seen that the same reasoning applies to the offense of driving " so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person."

As to the second contention: We cannot...