State v. Andrews, No. SC91006.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri
Writing for the CourtZEL M. FISCHER
Citation329 S.W.3d 369
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Antonio A. ANDREWS, Appellant.
Docket NumberNo. SC91006.
Decision Date25 January 2011
329 S.W.3d 369

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,
v.
Antonio A. ANDREWS, Appellant.


No. SC91006.

Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.


Dec. 21, 2010.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearin Jan. 25, 2011.

329 S.W.3d 370

Brocca Smith, Public Defender's office, St. Louis, for Andrews.

Evan J. Buchheim and Shaun J. Mackelprang, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for the State.

ZEL M. FISCHER, Judge.

Antonio Andrews appeals the jury's verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder for shooting and killing a police officer and the sentence imposed on him for that crime of life without parole. This case came directly to this Court because Andrews challenges the constitutional validity of two Missouri statutes. He challenges Missouri's juvenile-certification statute, § 211.071, RSMo 2000, as violating his right to a jury trial in a criminal prosecution under the Sixth Amendment as applied in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He also challenges the validity of the mandatory sentencing of a minor to life without parole for committing first degree murder as prescribed by § 565.020, RSMo 2000, as violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, Andrews appeals the jury's verdict claiming that there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude Andrews committed first degree murder. Finally, Andrews claims the trial court erred by overruling his motion in limine, which sought to prevent uniformed police officers from being present during the jury trial. Affirmed.

Facts

On August 15, 2007, Andrews, a 15-year-old male, and three friends were hanging out on a porch in St. Louis. Andrews and one of his friends, Lamont Johnson, decided to walk down to the corner to pick up some Chinese food. Before leaving, Andrews requested and was given a .38 caliber revolver by one of his other friends to carry on the walk to the restaurant.

329 S.W.3d 371
During this walk, Officer Norvelle Brown attempted to stop and question Andrews and Johnson. Both Andrews and Johnson fled; Brown pursued them in his patrol car. Andrews eventually stopped in a vacant lot, where he told Johnson that he was "tired of him chasing us." Andrews then pulled the revolver out of his pocket and waited for Brown to arrive. When Brown stopped his car in the alley and got out, Andrews shot him once in the upper back. Officer Brown died later that night due to his injury.

Because Andrews was a minor, the juvenile justice system had exclusive original jurisdiction over him pursuant to § 211.031, RSMo Supp.2007. 1 On December 26, 2007, a judgment that included findings of fact and conclusions of law was entered certifying Andrews to be prosecuted under the general laws of the State of Missouri. The judgment found and concluded that the juvenile justice system could not rehabilitate Andrews before his 21st birthday when it would lose jurisdiction.

On January 31, 2008, Andrews was indicted for first degree murder and armed criminal action. In Andrews' trial, the jury was given instructions on both first and second degree murder. On August 12, 2009, the jury announced its verdict, which found Andrews guilty of first degree murder and armed criminal action. He waived jury sentencing and was sentenced by the circuit court to life without parole for first degree murder, the only sentence available under § 562.020.2, RSMo 2000; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). He was also sentenced to a consecutive 50-year sentence for armed criminal action.

Point I: Constitutional Challenges

Andrews challenges the procedure of juvenile certification under § 211.071, RSMo 2000, as unconstitutional because he alleges that by certifying his case, the juvenile division increased his punishment based on facts that have not been submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of Apprendi. Andrews also challenges the validity of § 565.020, which requires a sentence of a minor to life without parole for committing first degree murder as violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Standard of Review

Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's determination. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc 1998). "A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be invalidated unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision and palpably affronts a fundamental law embodied in the constitution." Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366, 368-69 (Mo. banc 2001) (internal citations omitted).

A

Analysis of Andrews' Certification by the Juvenile Division

Section 211.031 gives exclusive original jurisdiction to the juvenile justice system over all children under the age of 17. However, § 211.071.1 allows the juvenile division to hold a hearing and dismiss at its discretion any case that involves a child between the age of 12 and 17 who is alleged to have committed a felony. If the child is alleged to have committed first

329 S.W.3d 372
degree murder or one of the other serious crimes listed in § 211.071.1, then the hearing is mandatory. While the juvenile division has discretion in making the decision as to whether to certify the child, it must analyze ten factors listed in § 211.071.6 and set out its reasons for certifying the juvenile in a judgment. The effect of certifying a juvenile is to transfer jurisdiction over that individual's case to a court of general jurisdiction and to allow the child to be prosecuted as an adult under the general law. § 211.071, RSMo 2000.

Andrews argues that this certification in effect is a sentence enhancement. He argues that certification increases the punishment placed on the child for committing a felony because the juvenile system only maintains jurisdiction until the child is 21 years old. § 211.041, RSMo 2000. This places an upper limit on the length of sentence that the juvenile division can impose on a child. In Andrews' case, he claims that his certification increased his sentence for first degree murder from six years to life without parole. He asserts that because the juvenile division considered the ten factors set out in § 211.071.6 in determining whether to certify his case, then, these ten factors must be determined by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to Apprendi.2

In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Court stated that this analysis applied to any fact that "expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's verdict." Id. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Apprendi limited a trial court from sentencing a criminal defendant to a penalty that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence based on any fact not determined by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 482-83, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Apprendi, however, did not make it impermissible for a court to exercise its discretion in imposition of a judgment within the range of sentence provided by statute. Id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348.

The juvenile division's consideration of the statutorily defined criteria in determining whether it should retain jurisdiction over a juvenile is not the type of factual determination that was understood to be within the jury's domain by the framers of the Bill of Rights and, therefore, is not controlled by Apprendi and its progeny. In fact, the determination of those criteria

329 S.W.3d 373
does not increase the statutory maximum punishment the juvenile will face; it only determines which court has final jurisdiction over the juvenile. The statutory maximum punishment is established by statutes found in the criminal code, not by a juvenile division in a certification proceeding.

The United States Supreme Court most recently articulated the limited nature of the Apprendi decision in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009). The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as interpreted in Apprendi, did not apply to findings of fact required under state law as a predicate to imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences on an offender. Id. at 714-15. In reaching this holding, the Court explained that the holdings of Apprendi and its progeny were based on the historic jury function of deciding whether the State has proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the Court had not extended these holdings beyond the offense-specific context of those cases:

Those decisions are rooted in the historic jury function—determining whether the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. They hold that it is within the jury's province to determine any fact (other than the existence of a prior conviction) that increases the maximum punishment authorized for a particular offense. Thus far, the Court has not extended the Apprendi and Blakely [ v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ] line of decisions beyond the offense-specific context that supplied the historic grounding for the decisions.
Id. at 714. The Court noted that application of Apprendi's rule to other contexts must be consistent with the "longstanding common-law practice." Id. at 717 (quoting Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007)). "The rule's animating principle is the preservation of the jury's historic role as the bulwark between the State and the accused at the trial for an alleged offense." Id. In determining whether the legislature has encroached "on the jury's traditional domain" given it by the Sixth Amendment, the Court considers "whether the finding of...

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32 practice notes
  • Doe v. Keathley, WD 72121.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • April 26, 2011
    ...circuit court's judgment. See, e.g., Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Mo. banc 2011); State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 371 (Mo. banc 2010). Since 1994, federal law has required States, as a condition for the receipt of certain law enforcement funds, to mainta......
  • Sturm v. Darnell, CASE NO. 2:10-CV-00247
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • January 25, 2012
    ...meet the needs of this particular juvenile offender does not violate petitioner's right to a jury trial.Id. See also State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 374-75 (Mo. 2010)(noting that "courts in every jurisdiction that have juvenile-certification statutes. . . have concluded that Apprendi's ru......
  • State v. Draper, No. 34667.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • September 13, 2011
    ...v. Ortiz, 17 A.3d 417, 421–22 (Pa.Super.2011); Cox v. State, 2011 Ark. 96, ––––, 2011 WL 737307, at *2 (Mar. 3, 2011); State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 377–78 (Mo.2010); Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Gonzalez v. State, 50 So.3d 633, 634–35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010......
  • State v. Mantich, S–11–301
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • February 7, 2014
    ...198 (2011). 27.Id. (citing Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103 (2011), reversed, Miller, supra note 1; State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369 (Mo.2010)). 28. Brief for appellant at 22. 29.Id. at 21. 30.Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). 31.Tison v......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
30 cases
  • Doe v. Keathley, No. WD 72121.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • April 26, 2011
    ...circuit court's judgment. See, e.g., Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Mo. banc 2011); State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 371 (Mo. banc 2010). Since 1994, federal law has required States, as a condition for the receipt of certain law enforcement funds, to mainta......
  • Sturm v. Darnell, CASE NO. 2:10-CV-00247
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • January 25, 2012
    ...meet the needs of this particular juvenile offender does not violate petitioner's right to a jury trial.Id. See also State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 374-75 (Mo. 2010)(noting that "courts in every jurisdiction that have juvenile-certification statutes. . . have concluded that Apprendi's ru......
  • State v. Draper, No. 34667.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • September 13, 2011
    ...v. Ortiz, 17 A.3d 417, 421–22 (Pa.Super.2011); Cox v. State, 2011 Ark. 96, ––––, 2011 WL 737307, at *2 (Mar. 3, 2011); State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 377–78 (Mo.2010); Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 195 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Gonzalez v. State, 50 So.3d 633, 634–35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2010......
  • State v. Mantich, No. S–11–301
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • February 7, 2014
    ...198 (2011). 27.Id. (citing Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103 (2011), reversed, Miller, supra note 1; State v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369 (Mo.2010)). 28. Brief for appellant at 22. 29.Id. at 21. 30.Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). 31.Tison v......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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