State v. Andujar

• Decision Date: 13 July 2021
• Docket Number: A-6 September Term 2020,084167
• Citation: 254 A.3d 606,247 N.J. 275
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edwin ANDUJAR, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

247 N.J. 275

254 A.3d 606

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Edwin ANDUJAR, Defendant-Respondent.

A-6 September Term 2020

084167

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 30, 2021

Decided July 13, 2021

Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat and Emily M.M. Pirro, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

Joseph J. Russo, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender; attorney; Joseph J. Russo, Alison Perrone, First Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Kevin S. Finckenauer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs, and John Douard, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the briefs).

Adam D. Klein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Adam D. Klein, of counsel and on the brief).

Karen Thompson argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Karen Thompson, Alexander Shalom, Newark, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

Raymond M. Brown argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief).

Jonathan Romberg argued the cause for amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jonathan Romberg, on the brief).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, defendant argues he was denied the right to a fair trial because racial discrimination infected the jury selection process. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction on that ground, and we modify and affirm the court's judgment. In doing so, we address for the first time when a criminal history check can be run on a prospective juror.

The appeal centers on the selection process for F.G., a Black male from Newark who was summoned for jury service. The prosecution questioned F.G. extensively about people he knew who had been accused of crimes, or were victims of crimes, and then asked the trial judge to remove him for cause. The State argued that F.G.'s background, associations, and knowledge of the criminal justice system were problematic, and also suggested that F.G. had been evasive. The trial judge rejected the challenge and found F.G. "would make a fair and impartial juror."

Relying on the same reasons the trial judge did not accept, the State chose to run a criminal history check on F.G. It did not investigate any other prospective jurors in that way.

The prosecution promptly notified the trial judge and defense counsel of what the background check revealed: F.G. had two prior arrests that did not result in a conviction and an outstanding municipal court warrant for simple assault. Nothing in the results disqualified F.G. from serving as a juror.

By the time court resumed the next day, however, the prosecution had already taken steps to arrange for F.G.'s arrest. After further discussion in court, he was removed from the jury panel and arrested. The outstanding charges against him were dropped two months later.

Courts, not the parties, oversee the jury selection process. On occasion, it may be appropriate to conduct a criminal history check to confirm whether a prospective juror is eligible to serve and to ensure a fair trial. That decision, though, cannot be made unilaterally by the prosecution. Going forward, we direct that any party seeking to run a criminal history check on a prospective juror must present a reasonable, individualized, good-faith basis for the request and obtain permission from the trial judge. We refer to a check of a government database that is available to only one side. The results of the check must be shared with both parties and the court, and the juror should be given an opportunity to respond to any legitimate concerns raised.

That standard was not met here. Nor is there anything in the record that justified the State's decision to selectively focus on F.G. and investigate only his criminal record. Based on all of the circumstances, we infer that F.G.'s removal from the jury panel may have stemmed from implicit or unconscious bias on the part of the State, which can violate a defendant's right to a fair trial in the same way that purposeful discrimination can.

We require defense counsel to make precise, timely objections during jury selection. Here, counsel raised multiple serious concerns but should have leveled a more precise objection. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the evidence of implicit bias that appears in the extensive record. Under the circumstances, we find that defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury, selected free from discrimination, was violated. We therefore reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.

This appeal highlights the critical role jury selection plays in the administration of justice. It also underscores how important it is to ensure that discrimination not be allowed to seep into the way we select juries. Potential jurors can be removed for cause if it appears they cannot serve fairly and impartially. The parties can also strike individual jurors, without giving a reason, by exercising peremptory challenges. N.J.S.A. 2B:23-13(b).

New Jersey today allows for the highest number of peremptory challenges in the nation -- more than double the national average -- based on a statute enacted in the late 1800s. Yet, as the United States Supreme Court acknowledged decades ago, peremptory challenges can invite discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

Although the law remains the same, our understanding of bias and discrimination has evolved considerably since the nineteenth century. And federal and state law have changed substantially in recent decades to try to remove discrimination from the jury selection process. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ; State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986).

It is time to examine the jury selection process -- with the help of experts, interested stakeholders, the legal community, and members of the public -- and consider additional steps needed to prevent discrimination in the way we select juries. We therefore call for a Judicial Conference on Jury Selection. The Conference will convene in the fall to assess this important issue and recommend improvements to our system of justice.

I.

A.

Defendant Edwin Andujar was accused of killing his roommate in August 2014 by stabbing him twelve times with a knife. At trial, a neighbor from the apartment downstairs testified that she heard a noise, ran upstairs, and saw defendant holding a bloody knife next to the victim. The victim was in a wheelchair at the time. The neighbor heard the victim exclaim that defendant had stabbed him and was killing him. She then ran downstairs and called 9-1-1. When a police officer arrived, defendant reportedly said, "I stabbed him, I couldn't take it anymore."

Defendant testified that his roommate had told him he had to move out of the apartment and then came at him with a knife. Defendant claimed he took the knife during a struggle and then swiped at the victim and stabbed him in an effort to get the victim off of him. Defendant said he never meant to hurt the victim, who was a friend.

Five days later, after several surgeries, the victim died from his wounds. In June 2017, a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder and two weapons offenses. He was sentenced to forty-five years in prison with a period of parole ineligibility of approximately thirty-eight years.

B.

According to the State, jury selection in this case lasted eight days; the record contains only two days of transcripts. On May 31, 2017, F.G., a prospective juror, was questioned at sidebar for about a half hour. More than thirty pages of the transcript from that day relate to him. Throughout the questioning, F.G. told the court he believed he could be a fair and impartial juror.

F.G. volunteered that he had answers to multiple voir dire questions, which the court carefully reviewed one by one. F.G. first relayed that he had two cousins in law enforcement -- "a Newark cop and ... an Irvington cop." He said that he did not discuss their work with them and that those relationships would not interfere with his ability to serve on the jury.

F.G. next responded to this question: "Have you, any family member, or close friend ever been accused of committing an offense other than a minor motor vehicle offense?" He reported that he knew "[a] host of people" who had been accused of crimes -- five or six close friends in all.

One had been accused of selling what F.G. referred to as "CDS" -- a controlled dangerous substance -- five or six months before in Newark. F.G. did not know the details of the case aside from the outcome: "[T]hey get locked up after that it ain't got nothing to do with it." F.G. had gone to high school with the person and believed he had been treated fairly. F.G. did not know whether the individual was still in jail because F.G. had "moved away."

A second friend had also been charged with selling drugs in Newark the prior summer. F.G. assumed the result was the same as the first matter. He explained he had no impression whether the second person had been treated fairly, noting, "[h]onestly, I don't have any problem as long as I stay out of it."

F.G. believed the third person sold a "CDS" together with the second individual and assumed both had been treated fairly. He did not know the details of the cases and told the court, "I don't get into their case. I don't get into their business."

A fourth friend had been charged with...