State v. Anglin, 971049656.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | 971049656.,A134849. |
| Citation | 206 P.3d 193,227 Or. App. 325 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael ANGLIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Travis S. Eiva, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Christina M. Hutchins, Senior Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and BREWER, Chief Judge, and RIGGS, Senior Judge.
In 2007, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, and reckless driving, ORS 811.140; he had committed those crimes 10 years earlier, in 1997. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the case on statute of limitations and statutory speedy trial grounds. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
After leaving a bar in the early morning hours of October 5, 1997, defendant and his friend sped north on Interstate 5 in the friend's truck toward the interstate toll bridge; defendant was driving. Although the bridge was up and traffic was stopped, defendant approached the bridge at 70 miles per hour. Too late, defendant attempted to bring the truck to a stop. He collided with a stopped vehicle, which then struck other vehicles in front of it. When police officers arrived, they found several open cans of beer scattered around the wrecked truck. Defendant told one officer, "I was too intoxicated to drive." Defendant was transported to the hospital, where an officer issued him citations for DUII and reckless driving.
The citations that were issued to defendant required him to appear in court on October 22, 1997. On that day, the district attorney filed an information charging defendant with the same offenses that he had already been cited for — DUII and reckless driving. The information listed the citation numbers of the citations that the police officer had issued to defendant. In addition, the information added a charge of recklessly endangering another person, ORS 163.195, based on the same facts as the other charged offenses. That charge, however, was ultimately dismissed and is not at issue in this appeal. The day before the information was filed, the district attorney had stamped the citations with the notation, "PROSECUTION DECLINED."
Defendant never appeared for the October 22 arraignment, and the court issued an arrest warrant. That arrest warrant, in fact, was never executed. Rather, defendant went on with his life, eventually pursuing a career as a security officer. In October 2006, a police officer he was in contact with regarding an incident he had responded to told him that there was a warrant outstanding for his arrest. When he completed his shift that day, defendant went to a police station and turned himself in.
Pretrial, defendant moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that the prosecution was not commenced within the statutory period of limitations and that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion, defendant waived a jury, and the trial court convicted him of DUII and reckless driving.
On appeal, defendant reprises his trial-level arguments. We begin with his argument that the criminal action was not commenced within two years, as required by ORS 131.105 and ORS 131.125(6)(b). "A prosecution is commenced when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that the warrant or other process is executed without unreasonable delay." ORS 131.135.1 The purpose of criminal statutes of limitation is to provide notice to a defendant of a pending prosecution. State v. Hinkle, 225 Or. App. 347, 351, 201 P.3d 250 (2009). Defendant does not dispute that the district attorney's information was filed within the period of limitations, but argues that, because the arrest warrant was not executed "without unreasonable delay," the action was not commenced within the time required by the statute of limitations. The state responds that the reference in ORS 131.135 to "other process" includes the criminal citation that was issued in this case, that the citation was executed the day of the traffic accident, and that the state's failure to execute the later-issued arrest warrant is irrelevant. Defendant replies that the district attorney terminated the prosecution on the citations when he stamped "PROSECUTION DECLINED" on them and filed the information. It is the citations, he asserts, that are irrelevant.
The pivotal issue is whether the filing of the information commenced a new prosecution. If it did, the nearly nine-year delay before defendant turned himself in and the arrest warrant was effectively executed would appear to be unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. Huskey, 171 Or.App. 550, 17 P.3d 541 (2000) ().2 In contrast, if the citations commenced the prosecution that ultimately led to defendant's convictions and if they constitute "other process," the prosecution was commenced the day of the traffic accident, and the trial court correctly rejected defendant's statute-of-limitations argument.
As an initial matter, because they were "other process," the citations issued the day of the traffic accident were sufficient to commence a prosecution. State v. Sisneros, 84 Or.App. 306, 308, 734 P.2d 355, rev. den., 303 Or. 455, 737 P.2d 1249 (1987). Thus, because the citations were executed within the two-year period of limitations, a prosecution was timely commenced. Defendant nonetheless argues that prosecution was terminated by the district attorney's later actions in declining prosecution and filing an information. According to defendant, no process was ever executed, as required by ORS 131.135, in the criminal action that led to his conviction. After considering the 1997 statutory provisions bearing on the issuance of citations and the record in this case — in light of the purpose of the provision imposing a limitations period — we reject that argument.
The citations issued in this case were authorized by ORS 133.055(1), which provided, "A peace officer in lieu of taking the person into custody may issue and serve a citation to the person to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the person would be taken pursuant to ORS 133.450." The first two subsections of ORS 133.060 governed the procedure to be followed after a citation was issued:
(Emphasis added.) That provision demonstrates the legislature's assumption that a complaint or information would be issued in the same case (or to use the statutory language, the same "criminal action") as the citation. That is, it shows that the legislature did not anticipate that a later-filed information would terminate one prosecution and commence another.
Two other provisions support that conclusion. ORS 133.065(2)(g) required the following notice to be included in a citation:
Similarly, ORS 133.075 provided:
"If any person knowingly fails to appear before a court pursuant to a citation issued and served under authority of ORS 133.045 to 133.080, 133.110 and 156.050 and a complaint or information is filed, the person commits the crime of failure to appear on a citation which is a Class A misdemeanor."
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, in this case, the information included references to the citation numbers, again indicating that the information was intended by the district attorney to be part of the prosecution that was commenced by execution of the citations. In short, the statutory scheme governing criminal citations and the record in this case — including the information's specific reference to the earlier — issued citations — demonstrate that defendant was prosecuted only once and that the prosecution began with execution of the criminal citations. Moreover, that conclusion is consistent with the notice purpose of criminal statutes of limitations: Defendant was aware that the state was proceeding criminally against him when he was handed the citations the day of the accident.
In support of his contrary argument, defendant cites a number of cases holding that the dismissal of one accusatory instrument and the filing of another ends the first prosecution and commences a new one. Yet each of those cases involved superseding indictments, rather than informations filed in a case initiated by a criminal citation; moreover, each is inapposite for additional reasons. Thus, for example, in State v. Nichols, 236 Or. 521, 388 P.2d 739 (1964), trial had already begun when the court dismissed the indictment and gave the state leave to resubmit the matter to the grand jury. The second indictment charged a crime greater than had been charged in the first indictment, and the defendant argued that such an indictment was void. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining:
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...thus, did not consent to the delay of, when he failed to appear on that date. The state remonstrates that our decision in State v. Anglin, 227 Or.App. 325, 206 P.3d 193, rev. den., 346 Or. 364, 213 P.3d 578 (2009), compels the opposite conclusion. In particular, the state contends that in ......
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...of “complainant's information” noting that it “serves to commence an action”). 4 Defendant argues that we determined in State v. Anglin, 227 Or.App. 325, 206 P.3d 193,rev. den.,346 Or. 364, 213 P.3d 578 (2009), that the issuance of a citation alone commenced a prosecution under ORS 135.747.......
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