State v. Annala

• Decision Date: 26 November 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-2162-CR,90-2162-CR
• Citation: 484 N.W.2d 138,168 Wis.2d 453
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Martin J. ANNALA, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. . Oral Argument
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 138

484 N.W.2d 138

168 Wis.2d 453

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Martin J. ANNALA, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 90-2162-CR.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument Nov. 26, 1991.

Decided May 29, 1992.

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Peter J. Thompson, Eau Claire, and oral argument by Peter J. Thompson.

For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle.

CALLOW, Justice.

This is a review under sec. (Rule) 809.62, Stats., of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals which affirmed a judgment of conviction by the circuit court of Taylor County, Judge Douglas T. Fox. The circuit court convicted defendant-appellant-petitioner Martin Annala on one count of first degree sexual assault in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(d), Stats. 1983-84. ¹ The issue raised on review is whether the district attorney abused his discretion in prosecuting Annala. We hold that the district attorney did not abuse his charging discretion and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

The facts are not in dispute. In January of 1984, Annala sexually molested an eight-year-old child while babysitting her. Annala was fifteen years old at the time. Shortly thereafter, the child informed her mother about the incident. The child's mother discussed the matter with Annala's parents and it was agreed that Annala should seek counseling and he did receive counseling. No criminal charges were pursued at that time.

In December of 1988, when Annala was twenty years old, the victim received counseling for a variety of emotional problems. She informed her counselor of the 1984 incident. As a routine procedure, the counselor reported the information to the district attorney. The district attorney had a member of the sheriff's department question Annala about the incident. At the interview, Annala was informed of his Miranda ² rights and he signed a form that he understood those rights. He admitted to the sexual contact with the victim. He also indicated that he knew what he did was wrong and that he had received the help he needed.

Originally, the district attorney decided not to prosecute Annala. The district attorney's decision not to prosecute was based on the age of the case, the defendant's age at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant's psychological counseling treatment, and the remote possibility of further inappropriate contact with the victim. However, following further discussions with the victim's family, their attorney, and a letter from the victim's therapist, the district attorney reluctantly instituted criminal charges against Annala. While the district attorney conceded that prosecuting Annala would be unfair to the defendant, he believed that prosecution would be in the best interests of the victim.

In State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), this court held that before an adult defendant could be tried for an offense committed before he was eighteen years of age where no juvenile proceedings were instituted, the State was required to show at a due process hearing that the prosecution was not delayed manipulatively so as to avoid the juvenile justice system. Becker, 74 Wis.2d at 678, 247 N.W.2d 495. Following a Becker hearing on August 2, 1989, the trial court found that Annala's prosecution was not intentionally delayed so as to avoid the juvenile justice system nor was it based on an improper motive.

Annala was subsequently tried and convicted of first degree sexual assault in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(d), Stats. 1983-84. Judge Fox sentenced Annala to three years probation and, as a condition of probation, thirty days in county jail. Annala appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district attorney abused his prosecutorial discretion in charging Annala. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 161 Wis.2d 935, 469 N.W.2d 249.

As an initial matter, we take this opportunity to express our agreement with the decision in State v. LeQue, 150 Wis.2d 256, 442 N.W.2d 494 (Ct.App.1989). Questions of jurisdiction may be considered at any time by the court, regardless of whether such questions were properly raised in the lower courts. Northern States P. Co. v. Hunter Bd. of Supv., 57 Wis.2d 118, 132-33, 203 N.W.2d 878 (1973). In LeQue, the court of appeals held that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear and determine charges brought against an adult defendant where the alleged offenses occurred when the defendant was a juvenile that could not be waived into adult court. LeQue, 150 Wis.2d at 265, 442 N.W.2d 494. The facts in LeQue are almost identical to those in the present case. LeQue was accused of sexually molesting an eight and one-half-years-old child. He was fifteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The incident was reported several years later and when LeQue was eighteen years old, he was charged with first-degree sexual assault.

Annala argues that LeQue was improperly decided because on its face sec. 48.18(1), Stats., ³ does not allow waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction unless the offender was at least sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. He contends that the only means for adult court to obtain jurisdiction over an individual that was a child at the time of the offense is if there has been a proper waiver by the juvenile court. The logical conclusion of his contention is that an adult court could never obtain jurisdiction over an individual that allegedly committed criminal conduct prior to reaching age sixteen because the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction under sec. 48.18(1). We disagree with the defendant's conclusion and his analysis of the statute.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law. State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis.2d 664, 669, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984). This court reviews questions of law de novo, giving no deference to the lower courts. Id.

We employ a number of well settled rules of statutory construction which must guide our analysis ... First and foremost is the rule that our purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 117 Wis.2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Our first resort in determining the legislative intent is to the language of the statute itself. Id. at 538, 345 N.W.2d 389. If the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, it is improper to employ extrinsic aids to determine the meaning intended. Standard Theatres v. Transportation Dept., 118 Wis.2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 110 Wis.2d 530, 534, 329 N.W.2d 178 (1983). Conversely, if the language of the statute is ambiguous or unclear, the court will examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Ball [, 117 Wis.2d] at 538, .

Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 122 Wis.2d 158, 166, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985).

We begin our analysis then by examining the language of the relevant statutes. Article VII, sec. 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and sec. 753.03, Stats., vests within the circuit court the power to hear and determine all civil and criminal actions and proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to some other court. Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, "The Children's Code," was enacted to specifically address the unique needs of children in areas such as custody, parental rights, adoption, foster homes, day care, and delinquency. Section 48.12(1), Stats., expressly provides that the juvenile court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction, except as provided in ... [s.] 48.18, over any child 12 years of age or older who is alleged to be delinquent as defined in s. 48.02(3m)."

The plain language of the statute unambiguously explains that the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court is of a limited nature and applies only to allegations against a child, not allegations against an adult. ⁴ "Child" is defined under sec. 48.02(2), Stats., to mean "a person who is less than 18 years of age." Furthermore, "delinquent" under sec. 48.02(3m), Stats., means "a child who is less than 18 years of age and 12 years of age or older who has violated any state or federal criminal law." The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is determined by the individual's age at the time charged, not the individual's age at the time of the alleged offense. State ex rel. Koopman v. Waukesha County Court, 38 Wis.2d 492, 497-500, 157 N.W.2d 623 (1968); State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 676, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976); State v. Avery, 80 Wis.2d 305, 310, 259 N.W.2d 63 (1977). Therefore, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over allegations against an adult defendant, regardless of the defendant's age when the alleged offense occurred.

Annala further contends that the present interpretation of sec. 48.12(1), Stats., creates an anomaly under sec. 48.12(2), Stats. Section 48.12(2) specifies that:

If a proceeding is commenced under this section before a child is 18 years of age, but the child becomes 18 before admitting facts of the petition at the plea hearing or if the child denies the facts, before an adjudication, the [juvenile] court retains jurisdiction over the case to dismiss the action with prejudice, to waive its jurisdiction under s. 48.18, or to enter into a consent decree.

See also In Interest of TDP, 109 Wis.2d 495, 326 N.W.2d 741 (1982). Annala maintains that the adult court could not acquire jurisdiction over an adult defendant that allegedly violated the law when he or she was less than sixteen years of age because the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over such delinquent children and the only alternatives available to the juvenile court once the child turns eighteen is to dismiss the action with prejudice or enter into a consent decree. The...