State v. Anthony
Citation | 427 So.2d 1155 |
Decision Date | 23 February 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-K-1664,82-K-1664 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Michael ANTHONY. |
Court | Supreme Court of Louisiana |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Atty., for relator.
Michele Fournet, Asst. Public Defender, Indigent Public Defender Office, for respondent.
On September 21, 1981 defendant Michael Anthony was indicted by the grand jury for first degree murder, in violation of R.S. 14:30. 1 The defendant moved for a bill of particulars requesting the aggravating circumstances to be relied on in seeking the death penalty. C.Cr.P. 905.4. In response the state declared that it intended to show proof of a perpetration and attempted perpetration of an aggravated burglary, and proof that the defendant had a significant prior history of criminal activity. A motion to quash was filed by defendant, alleging that flight from the scene of an aggravated burglary is not in the perpetration of the burglary, and, therefore, is not an aggravating circumstance within the intent of the first degree murder statute. R.S. 14:30(1). On May 28, 1982 the trial court heard and granted the motion to quash. This court granted the state's application for writs.
At the argument on the motion to quash, the state and the defendant agreed to the following facts:
The state contends that since the murder was committed within the "res gestae" of the felony charged, it was committed "in the perpetration" of the felony. Because the aggravated burglaries and the homicide were parts of one continuous transaction and were closely connected in point of time and place, the state argues that the first degree murder statute should apply. For support, the state refers to Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 70-71, 78 N.E. 957, 959-960 (1906), which held that:
Aggravated burglary is defined as "the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, or of any structure, water craft, or movable where a person is present, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, if the offender, (1) Is armed with a dangerous weapon; or (2) After entering arms himself with a dangerous weapon; or (3) Commits a battery upon any person while in such a place, or in entering or leaving such a place." R.S. 14:60.
The definition of aggravated burglary in R.S. 14:60 can be distinguished from the circumstances which may occur "in the perpetration" of a particular aggravated burglary for purposes of R.S. 14:30. The definition is invariable. The particular act must meet the requisites of the statutory definition in order to be classified as an aggravated burglary. However, the things which occur in perpetrating the aggravated burglary vary with every case. These include the method of entry, the particular felony or theft to be committed, and the means of escape.
Many courts in deciding whether a killing which occurred after the commission of the felony was committed "in the perpetration of" the felony have held that the killing was within the ambit of the statute if it was within the "res gestae" of the underlying felony. See, e.g., Bissot v. State, 53 Ind. 408 (1876); State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 234 S.E.2d 563, cert. denied, Brown v. North Carolina, 434 U.S. 998, 98 S.Ct. 638, 54 L.Ed.2d 493 (1977); Conrad v. State, supra. The courts have generally spoken in terms of the "res gestae" of the crime when faced with the problem of determining when the underlying felony terminated for purposes of applying the felony murder doctrine. Payne v. State, 81 Nev. 503, 406 P.2d 922 (1965), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 927, 88 S.Ct. 1826, 20 L.Ed.2d 666 (1968). Res gestae, however, is merely a "label for the period within which a killing may be statutory felony murder." Cadmus, The Beginning and End of Attempts and Felonies Under the Statutory Felony Murder Doctrine, 51 Dick.L.Rev. 12, 18 (1946). The res gestae of the crime begins at the point where an indictable attempt is reached and ends where the chain of events between the attempted crime or completed felony is broken, with that question usually being a fact determination for the jury. Cadmus, supra.
In the instant case the indictable event occurred when the defendant broke into the residence the first time with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein. He left the residence with stolen goods and then committed three other offenses within a short period of time--a purse snatching, a second unauthorized entry, and a homicide. At trial for any of these offenses, evidence of the other offenses could be admissible as part of the res gestae.
The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana is primarily an evidentiary tool. Evidence that forms part of the res gestae, such as spontaneous utterances and declarations, is always admissible. State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369 (La.1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S.Ct. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981). Evidence of other crimes has also been held admissible as part of the res gestae. State v. Davis, 311 So.2d 860 (La.1975).
"Res gestae" language has not been used in conjunction with the first degree murder statute in Louisiana, even though it has been frequently used in this manner in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pickle v. State, 345 So.2d 623 (Miss.1977); Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 243 S.E.2d 477 (1978). Within the context of the felony murder rule, the term "res gestae" has been used to signify that the felony and the homicide form part of a continuous transaction (People v. Chavez, 37 Cal.2d 656, 234 P.2d 632 (1951)); that the homicide be incidental to the felony (Parson v. State, 222 A.2d 326 (Del.Sup.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 935, 87 S.Ct. 961, 17 L.Ed.2d 807 (1967)); and that there be no break in the chain of events between the felony and the homicide (Payne v. State, 81 Nev. 503, 406 P.2d 922 (1965), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 927, 88 S.Ct. 1826, 20 L.Ed.2d 666 (1968)). These definitions are similar to the description of res gestae set forth in R.S. 15:448. 2 When "res gestae" has been used...
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...offense is deemed to have been committed in any parish in this state in which any such act or element occurred.”); cf. State v. Anthony, 427 So.2d 1155, 1158 (La.1983)(“When ‘res gestae’ has been used to determine whether the homicide was committed in the perpetration of a certain felony, i......
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...offense is deemed to have been committed in any parish in this state in which any such act or element occurred."); cf. State v. Anthony, 427 So.2d 1155, 1158 (La. 1983)("When `res gestae' has been used to determine whether the homicide was committed in the perpetration of a certain felony, ......
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...denied, 94-3137 (La.5/5/95), 654 So.2d 337. Evidence that forms part of the res gestae of a crime is always admissible. State v. Anthony, 427 So.2d 1155 (La.1983). The "res gestae" doctrine encompasses not only spontaneous utterances and declarations made before and after commission of the ......